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In this work I am concerned with the following issue in metaphysics: how is
the part-whole structure of the material world related to the part-whole structure of
spacetime? Is it metaphysically necessary that those structures perfectly align, or is
it possible that they somehow mismatch? If they must perfectly align, what explains
that necessity? And if they may somehow mismatch, what sorts of disparities are
possible, and why?
I argue that themetaphysical possibility of certain sorts of deviations—which have
not been discussed or even entertained in the literature—follows from minimal and
otherwise plausible assumptions about modality and the nature of both part-whole
relations and relations of spatiotemporal location. ese are possibilities in which a
material thing, x, is part of a material object, y, but the region at which x is located
is not part of the region at which y is located, and in which the region at which x is
located is part of the region at which y is located, but x is not part of y. at these
possibilities follow from very weak assumptions makes it very hard to resist them—I
argue that radical measures are required to avoid them.
I also discuss a few consequences of accepting these possibilities for other debates
in metaphysics. I delve deeply into two such consequences. First, I suggest that these
possibilities aﬀord a new way of resisting an inﬂuential argument for the existence of
temporal parts: the so-called argument from vagueness. Second, I argue that these
possibilities allow us to have indeterminacy in matters of part and whole without in-
determinacy in matters about identity, existence, and cardinality. is provides a
new way of defending indeterminacy in matters of part and whole against inﬂuential
objections in the literature.
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CHAPTER 1
ALIGNMENTS ANDMISALIGNMENTS
1.1 e Issue, in a Nutshell
e material world has a part-whole structure. One may, of course, disagree about
what that structure looks like—there are diﬀerent views as to how exactly material
things are arranged into part-whole relations. For instance, one may think that any
material thingsmake up awhole, or that only someor evennone of themdo. Similarly,
one may think that there are material things with no parts, or material things with
parts all the way down. But regardless of one’s views on these speciﬁc issues, everyone
would agree that the material world has some part-whole structure or other. Part-
whole relations organize material things in some way or other.
Spacetime, too, has a part-whole structure. ere may also be disagreements
about the makeup of that structure. As with material things, there are diﬀerent views
as to how exactly spacetime regions are arranged into part-whole relations. One may
think that any regions make up a further region, or that only some or even none of
them do; one may think that there are regions with no subregions, or regions with
subregions all the way down; etc. But, as with the material world, no one would deny
that spacetime has some part-whole structure or other, regardless of anymore speciﬁc
views one might have about that structure. Part-whole relations organize spacetime
regions somehow or other.
Now, the material world is located in spacetime. One may again disagree about
the nature of that connection: there are diﬀerent views as to how exactly location
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relations tie material things to spacetime regions. For instance, one may think that
no spacetime region has more than one exact occupant, or that some of them do.
Similarly, one may think that no material object has more than one exact location, or
that some of them do. But, once again, even though one may disagree about these
speciﬁc issues, no one would deny that the material world is located in spacetime
somehow or other. Location relations tie material things to regions of spacetime in
one way or another.
ese basic facts about the material world and spacetime—that both the material
world and spacetime have a part-whole structure and that the material world is lo-
cated in spacetime—give rise to an interesting issue, which has been only partially and
indirectly addressed in the literature. e issue is this: given that the material world
is located in spacetime, how are their part-whole structures related to one another?
Is it metaphysically necessary that those structures perfectly align, or is it possible
that they somehow mismatch? If they must perfectly align, what explains that neces-
sity? And if it is possible that they somehow mismatch, what sorts of disparities are
possible, and what explains those possibilities?
is is the issue that I will be primarily concerned with in this work. My main
aim is to argue that the metaphysical possibility of certain sorts of deviations—which
have remained completely ignored in the literature, and which have a strong bearing
on various interesting debates in metaphysics—follows from minimal and otherwise
plausible assumptions aboutmetaphysicalmodality and the nature of both part-whole
relations and relations of spatiotemporal location.
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1.2 e Issue, in a Bit More Detail
To get a better grip on the issue and on what exactly I will argue here, it will be useful
to introduce a few notions and preliminary assumptions concerning three sorts of
ﬁrst-order relations: relations of part and whole, relations of spatiotemporal location,
and relations of relative spatiotemporal location.
1.2.1 Relations of Part andWhole
Relations of part and whole concern what is part of what, what overlaps what, what
composes what, etc. ey are also calledmereological relations, frommeros, theGreek
word for part. I will preliminarily systematize these relations by taking the parthood
relation of classical mereology as undeﬁned and deﬁning other part-whole relations
in terms of it in the usual way.1 at is, I will take parthood to be a topic-neutral, two-
place, reﬂexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric relation that does not hold relative to
times, places, worlds, sorts, or anything else, in terms of which we may deﬁne proper
parthood, overlap, and composition as follows:
(Proper Parthood)
x is a proper part of y =df x is part of y and y is not part of x.
(Overlap)
x overlaps y =df something is part of both x and y.
1For diﬀerent systematizations of these relations, including classical mereology and its extensions, see
Simons 1987. Even though interest in relations of part and whole has been present throughout the history
of philosophy, their systematic treatment did not arrive until Leśniewski 1916, Tarski 1929, and Goodman
and Leonard 1940.
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(Composition)
the xs compose y (y is a fusion of the xs) =df each of the xs is part of y, and
every part of y overlaps at least one of the xs.
A few examples will help clarify these relations. Let H be my head,Nmy nose, Bmy
body, RB the right half of my body, LB the le half of my body, TB the top half of my
body, and BB the bottom half of my body. Similarly, let SH be the head-shaped region
wheremy head is located, SN the nose-shaped regionwheremy nose is located, SB the
body-shaped region where my body is located, SRB the right half body-shaped region
where the right half of my body is located, SLB the le half body-shaped region where
the le half of my body is located, STB the top half body-shaped region where the
top half of my body is located, and SBB the bottom half body-shaped region where
the bottom half of my body is located. en parthood is meant to be a relation that
(prima facie) H bears to H, B, and TB, but not to N, RB, LB, or BB. Similarly, it is
meant to be a relation that (again, prima facie) SH bears to SH, SB, and STB, but not
to SN, SRB, SLB, or SBB. Proper parthood is meant to be a relation that H bears to B
and TB, but not to H,N, RB, LB, or BB. Similarly, it is meant to be a relation that SH
bears to SB and STB, but not to SH, SN, SRB, SLB, or SBB. Overlap is meant to be a
relation that H bears to H, N, B, RB, LB, TB, but not to BB. Similarly, it is meant to
be a relation that SH bears to SH, SN, SB, SRB, SLB, and STB, but not to SBB. Finally,
composition is meant to be a relation that B bears to B, that RB and LB bear to B, that
TB and BB bear to B, and that any three or more of RB, LB, TB, and BB bear to B,
but that RB and TB do not bear to B, thatH and BB do not bear to B, that not one or
more ofH, B, RB, LB, TB, and BB bear toN, etc. Similarly, it is meant to be a relation
that SB bears to SB, that SRB and SLB bear to SB, that STB and SBB bear to SB, and that
any three or more of SRB, SLB, STB, and SBB bear to SB, but that SRB and STB do not
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bear to SB, that SH and SBB do not bear to SB, that not one or more of SH, SB, SRB,
SLB, STB, and SBB bear to SN, etc.
Given these relations, we may deﬁne a few other mereological notions that will
be useful in what follows: what it is for something to be mereologically simple, what
it is for something to be mereologically complex, and what it is for something to be
mereologically gunky. ese are as follows:
(Mereological Simplicity)
x is mereologically simple =df x has no proper parts.
(Mereological Complexity)
x is mereologically complex =df x is not mereologically simple.
(Mereological Gunkiness)
x is mereologically gunky =df every part of x has proper parts.
A few examples to illustrate these notions. Prima facie, elementary physical parti-
cles would count as mereologically simple, since such things seem to have no proper
parts. Similarly, spacetime points would count as mereologically simple, since such
things seem to have no proper subregions. On the other hand, my body would count
as a mereologically complex material thing, since it has proper parts (e.g. my head).
Similarly, the body-shaped spacetime region where my body is would count as mere-
ologically complex, since it has proper subregions (e.g. the head-shaped region where
my head is). Ordinary examples of gunky things are hard to come by. But my nose,
for instance, would count as gunky if it had no mereologically simple things as parts.
Similarly, the nose-shaped region where my nose is would count as gunky if it had no
mereologically simple subregions as parts.
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I will assume, then, that part-whole relations understood as above organize both
material things and regions of spacetime somehow or other—both thematerial world
and spacetime get their part-whole structures, whatever they may look like, via such
part-whole relations. is is to assume that if either material things or spacetime
regions stand in some part-whole relation to one another, then such relation must be
deﬁnable in terms of the parthood relation I am taking as undeﬁned. An important
consequence of this assumption is that for a spacetime region to be a subregion of
another is just for the ﬁrst to be part of the second.
I should stress that these are all preliminary assumptions. Two points are worth
noting in this respect. First, choosing parthood understood as above as our theoreti-
cal primitive is purely for simpliﬁcatory purposes. Instead of parthood we could have
taken another part-whole relation as undeﬁned, and deﬁned other part-whole rela-
tions in terms of it (for instance, it is easy to show that parthood, proper parthood,
overlap, and composition are interdeﬁnable taking one of them as undeﬁned). Sim-
ilarly, we could have taken parthood (or whatever other mereological primitive) to
hold relative to something (e.g. times and worlds), or to have diﬀerent properties (e.g.
that parthood is not transitive). Everything I will say here is compatible with any of
that. Second, in §3.3 below I will explicitly discuss how what I will argue here would
be aﬀected if we thought that there was more than one sort of mereological relation,
e.g. if we thought that there was one sort of part-whole relations that held exclusively
among material things and another completely diﬀerent sort of part-whole relations
that held exclusively among regions of spacetime. So, even if you ﬁnd these notions
and assumptions about part-whole relations problematic or somehow inadequate, let
me hang on to them for the time being.
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1.2.2 Relations of Spatiotemporal Location
Relations of spatiotemporal location concern where things are in spacetime. I will
systematize these relations by taking as undeﬁned the relation Josh Parsons callsweak
location, and deﬁning other location relations in terms of it (Parsons 2007). Weak
location is an unrelativized two-place relation that some things bear to regions of
spacetime, which Parsons informally characterizes thus: “I should count as weakly
located in my oﬃce when I am sitting at my desk, when I am reaching an arm out
the window, or when I am reaching an arm in the window from the street outside” (p.
203). In terms of weak location and part-whole relations among spacetime regions,
we may deﬁne stronger location relations, such as entire location, pervasive location,
and exact location:
(Entire Location)
x is entirely located at S =df x is located at S, and x is located at some region S 0
only if S and S 0 have subregions in common.
(Pervasive Location)
x is pervasively located at S =df x is located at some region S 0 if S and S 0 have
subregions in common.
(Exact Location)
x is exactly located at S =df x is both entirely and pervasively located at S.
To illustrate these relations, consider the following examples (where all abbreviations
are as above). Weak location is meant to be a relation thatH bears to SH, SN, SB, SRB,
SLB, and STB, but not to SBB. Entire location is meant to be a relation that H bears to
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SH, SB, and STB, but not to SN, SRB, SLB, or SBB. Pervasive location is meant to be a
relation thatH bears to SH and SN, but not to SB, SRB, SLB, STB, or SBB. Finally, exact
location is meant to be a relation thatH bears to SH, but not to SN, SB, SRB, SLB, STB,
or SBB.
For simplicity’s sake, when I talk about location in an unqualiﬁed manner in what
follows, I will mean the location relation I have taken as undeﬁned, i.e.weak location.
I will also assume that exact location is a total function on material objects, i.e. that
every material object has exactly one exact location. is will allow us to talk about
the exact location of a material thing.
I will assume, then, that the material world is connected to spacetime through lo-
cation relations understood as above—material things are tied to spacetime regions,
somehow or other, via such relations. is is to assume that if some material ob-
ject bears some location relation to a region of spacetime, then such relation must be
deﬁnable in terms of the location relation I have taken as undeﬁned.2
As with part-whole relations, these are all preliminary assumptions. First, my
choice of weak location understood as above as a theoretical primitive is only for
simplicity’s sake. Everything I will say here is compatible with e.g. taking some other
location relation as undeﬁned, and deﬁning other location relations in terms of it
(weak, entire, pervasive, and exact location are interdeﬁnable taking any of them as
primitive). Similarly, everything I will say here is compatible with thinking that lo-
cation relations must be indexed to something (e.g. times and worlds), and that they
hold between things and regions of space instead of spacetime. Second, in §3.3 I will
2Of course, these location relations need not hold exclusively among material things and regions of
spacetime. If there are any such things as immanent universals, tropes, events, etc., then perhaps these
also bear location relations understood as above to spacetime. Here, however, I will only concentrate on
material things.
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explicitly discuss how what I will argue is aﬀected by thinking e.g. that exact loca-
tion is not a total function on material objects, or by thinking that there is more than
one sort of location relations tying material things to spacetime, which are not be in-
terdeﬁnable. Again, hold any reservations you might have about location relations
understood as above until later.
On the other hand, it is worth noting two issues regarding location relations that I
will be making no assumptions about: the nature of spacetime, and the nature of the
material world.
First, accepting the existence of relations of spatiotemporal location construed of
as above does not require substantivalism about spacetime. Substantivalism is a view
about the nature of spacetime, according to which spacetime regions are ontologically
independent of material things. But notice that relationalism about spacetime—the
view that spacetime regions ontologically depend on material things—is compatible
with some material things being located at some spacetime regions. In other words,
relationalists merely claim that spacetime regions exist in virtue of the existence of
material things, not that material things have no spatiotemporal location. Relation-
alism does have a bearing on the issue that I will be concerned with here, and I will
discuss that in §3.3. e point here is only that admitting the existence of location
relations understood as above does not require taking sides on the debate between
substantivalism vs. relationalism about spacetime.
Second, accepting the existence of spatiotemporal relations understood as above
does not require that there be an ontological duality between material things and
spacetime regions. Supersubstantivalism is a view about the nature of the material
world, according to which material things are identical to the regions of spacetime
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at which they are exactly located. So, supersubstantivalism rejects the existence of a
duality between material things and regions of spacetime. But then notice that su-
persubstantivalism is compatible with some material things being located at some
spacetime regions—for the supersubstantivalist, this is just to accept that some re-
gions are identical to themselves. In other words, supersubstantivalists merely claim
that material things are a certain kind of thing, not that they lack spatiotemporal lo-
cation. As with relationalism, supersubstantivalism does have a bearing on the issue
I will be concerned with here, which I will also discuss in §3.3. But merely accept-
ing the existence of location relations understood as above does not require assuming
that supersubstantivalism is false.
1.2.3 Relations of Relative Spatiotemporal Location
Relations of relative spatiotemporal location concern where a thing is located relative
to where another thing is located, or where some things are located relative to where
other things are located. I will systematize these relations via part-whole relations
among spacetime regions where the relata are exactly located:
(Contraction)
x is a contraction of y =df x’s exact location is a subregion of y’s exact location.
(Proper Contraction)
x is a proper contraction of y =df x is a contraction of y and y is not a contrac-
tion of x.
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(Expansion)
the xs expand into y (y is an expansion of the xs)=df the exact locations of the
xs compose the exact location of y.
So, to say that x is a contraction of y is to say that the region at which x is exactly
located is a subregion of the region at which y is exactly located. To say that x is
a proper contraction of y is to say that the region at which x is exactly located is a
proper subregion of the region at which y is exactly located. And to say that the xs
expand into y (or, what is the same, that y is an expansion of the xs) is to say that each
of the xs is exactly located at a subregion of the region at which y is exactly located,
and that every region at which y is (weakly) located has subregions in common with
the exact location of at least one of the xs.3
As with relations of part and whole and relations of spatiotemporal location, a
few examples will help clarify these relations (I again use the same abbreviations as
above). Contraction is meant to be a relation thatH bears toH, B, and TB, but not to
N, RB, LB, or BB. Proper contraction is meant to be a relation that H bears to B and
TB, but not to H, N, RB, LB, or BB. And expansion is meant to be a relation that B
bears to B, that RB and LB bear to B, that TB and BB bear to B, and that any three or
more of RB, LB, TB, and BB bear to B, but that RB and TB do not bear to B, that H
and BB do not bear to B, that not one or more of H, B, RB, LB, TB, and BB bear to
N, etc.
3Even though there has been plenty of indirect and implicit discussion of these notions in the literature,
this is the ﬁrst attempt at explicitly spelling them out and treating them in a systematic way. e contrac-
tion/expansion terminology comes from Sider (2007). However, Sider’s usage of ‘expansion’ diﬀers from
mine in two important respects. On the one hand, he thinks that expansion is a relation that single things
bear to single things, not that pluralities of things bear to single things. On the other, he takes a thing to
be an expansion of another iﬀ the latter is a contraction of the former. So even constrained to pluralities
of only one thing, my notion of an expansion is much stronger than his.
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It is important to emphasize that relations of relative spatiotemporal location are
relations that hold among some things solely on the basis of the mereological rela-
tions that happen to hold among those things’ exact locations, not in virtue of certain
mereological relations holding among those things. So if you were to specify what
relations of relative spatiotemporal location some things stand in to one another, it
would be necessary and suﬃcient to specify the mereological relations among their
exact locations. is will be important in what follows.
In sum, I have introduced three sorts of ﬁrst-order relations that shape the ma-
terial world and spacetime: relations of part and whole, which link material things
to material things, as well as spacetime regions to spacetime regions; relations of spa-
tiotemporal location, which linkmaterial things to spacetime regions; and relations of
relative spatiotemporal location, which link material things to material things, based
on how their exact locations are mereologically related. e picture below depicts
these three sorts of relations at work in a toy world with three material things, x1, x2,
and x3, and three spacetime regions, S1, S2, and S3:
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In this picture, mereological relations link x1, x2, and x3 to each other in some way
or another. Mereological relations also also link S1, S2, and S3 to each other in some
way or another. Location relations tie x1, x2, and x3 to S1, S2, and S3 in some way or
another. And relations of relative spatiotemporal location link x1, x2, and x3 to each
other, on the basis of the location relations that they happen to bear to S1, S2, and S3
and the mereological relations that S1, S2, and S3 happen to bear to one another.
1.2.4 Two Sorts of Misalignments
We are now in a position to better spell out the issue I will be concerned with here,
and what I will argue about it. Once again, the issue is whether it is metaphysically
possible that the part-whole structure of thematerial world and the part-whole struc-
ture of spacetime fail to perfectly align. If so, what kinds of disparities are possible,
and what explains their possibility? Otherwise, what explains the necessary perfect
correspondence between those structures?
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Here is one way in which those structures may fail to perfectly align: there may be
a mismatch between the part-whole structure of a material thing and the part-whole
structure of the region of spacetime at which that thing is exactly located. Mereologi-
cally simple material things that are exactly located at mereologically complex space-
time regions would be one case where this sort of misalignment occurs. For other
cases, consider mereologically complex material objects that are exactly located at
mereologically simple regions, gunky material objects that are exactly located at non-
gunky regions, and non-gunky material objects that are located at gunky regions. I
call disparities of the sort involved in these cases internal deviations, since they con-
cern the internal mereological structure of material things and their exact locations.
Put a bit more generally, internal deviations occur when biconditionals such as
the following are violated in one or the other direction where all of the following are
universally quantiﬁed over material things):
(1-1) x is mereologically simple iﬀ x’s exact location is mereologically simple.
(1-2) x is mereologically complex iﬀ x’s exact location is mereologically complex.
(1-3) x has exactly  parts iﬀ x’s exact location has exactly  subregions.4
(1-4) x is mereologically gunky iﬀ x’s exact location is mereologically gunky.
I call biconditionals of this sort internal alignment principles. Characterizing internal
deviations generally as disparities where internal alignment principles are violated in
one or the other direction makes it clear that they involve cases in which either the
4e attentive reader will notice that given the deﬁnitions of mereological simplicity and complexity,
(1-1) and (1-2) are logically equivalent, and that (1-1) and (1-2) are equivalent to an instance of (1-3), i.e.
the  = 1 instance (remember that parthood is reﬂexive). I have listed these principles separately for the
reader to get a better grasp of what is at issue in cases of internal deviations.
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part-whole structure of a material thing fails to be preserved onto its exact location,
or the part-whole structure of a material thing’s exact location fails to be preserved
onto that thing.
But there is another way in which themereological structure of thematerial world
and that of spacetimemay fail to perfectly align. Here themismatch is not between the
mereological structure of a material thing and that of its exact location, but between
the mereological relations on some material things and the mereological relations on
those things’ exact locations. Generally, these are disparities in which biconditionals
like the following are violated in one or the other direction:
(1-5) x is part of y iﬀ x’s exact location is a subregion of y’s exact location.
(1-6) x is proper part of y iﬀ x’s exact location is a proper subregion of y’s exact loca-
tion.
(1-7) x and y overlap iﬀ x’s exact location and y’s exact location overlap.
(1-8) the xs compose y iﬀ the exact location of the xs compose y’s exact location.
In cases violating these principles, either the mereological relations on some material
objects fail to be preserved onto those objects’ exact locations, or the mereological
relations on some material objects’ exact locations fail to be preserved onto those ob-
jects. I call disparities violating these principles external deviations, since they con-
cern external mereological relations amongmaterial objects and their exact locations,
regardless of what their internal mereological structures may be. Correspondingly, I
call biconditionals like the above external alignment principles.5
5ese principles were independently articulated by Gabriel Uzquiano (forthcoming), around the same
time that I articulated them in Saucedo (forthcoming). Uzquiano calls them principles of mereological
harmony. I prefer my label to his, given that there are two notions of mereological harmony (i.e. internal
and external), which, as we will see below, are logically independent of one another.
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What is the connection between these two varieties ofmereological mismatching?
If there are internal deviations, must there be external ones? And if there are external
deviations, must there be internal ones? e answer to both of these questions is no.
Here is why.
First, for a situation with internal but no external deviations, suppose that there
is exactly one material thing, and that such thing is a mereological simple that is ex-
actly located at a mereologically complex region. en the mereological structure of
some material thing and that of its exact location fail to perfectly align: the simple
has no proper parts, but its exact location has proper subregions. But all the mereo-
logical relations on any material things and their exact locations are nonetheless fully
preserved in both directions: no external alignment principle is violated. So internal
deviations do not require external ones.
Second, for a situation with external but no internal deviations, suppose that there
are exactly twomaterial objects, that each of those things is amereological simple, and
that they are co-located at a mereologically simple region. Here the part-whole struc-
ture of every material thing perfectly matches that of its exact location: no internal
alignment principle is violated. But various mereological relations on some material
objects’ exact locations fail to be preserved onto those objects. at is, the right-to-
le direction of various external alignment principles is violated: the exact locations
of the simples are subregions of one another, but neither simple is part of the other;
the exact locations of the simples have subregions in common, but the simples have
no parts in common; the exact locations of the simples compose the exact location of
either simple, but the simples compose neither simple. So external deviations do not
require internal ones.
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It follows that the distinction between our two varieties ofmereologicalmismatch-
ing is far from superﬁcial: they are logically independent from one another. is
shows that, at least in principle, one may accept the metaphysical possibility of in-
ternal deviations without accepting the metaphysical possibility of external ones, and
the other way around.6
is suggests that the general issue of whether it is metaphysically possible that
the part-whole structure of the material world and the part-whole structure of space-
time fail to perfectly align breaks down into two more speciﬁc issues. e ﬁrst one is
whether internal deviations aremetaphysically possible. If so, which forms of internal
deviations are possible, and what grounds their possibility? Otherwise, what explains
the necessary truth of internal alignment principles? e second issue is whether
external deviations are metaphysically possible. If so, which forms of external devia-
tions are possible, and what grounds their possibility? Otherwise, what explains the
necessary truth of external alignment principles?
e ﬁrst issue has received a fair share of attention in the recent literature. It has
not been raised explicitly, or in the full generality in which we may now appreciate
it, nor has it been distinguished from the second one. Nonetheless, metaphysicians
have widely discussed, for instance, whether it is metaphysically possible that mere-
ologically simple material objects be exactly located at regions with proper subre-
gions, i.e. whether violations to the le-to-right direction of (1-1) are possible (see
e.g. Markosian 1998, 2004; Parsons 2000; McDaniel 2007a, 2007b; Sider 2007). e
possibility of other forms of internal deviations has also been discussed in the litera-
ture, if to a lesser extent (e.g.McDaniel 2007a, 2006; Hudson 2007).
6Of course, this is compatible with there being connections between speciﬁc forms of external and in-
ternal deviations. Uzquiano (forthcoming), for instance, eﬀectively argues that certain forms of internal
deviations require certain forms of external ones.
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By contrast, the second issue has received practically no attention in the litera-
ture—whether external deviations aremetaphysically possible has not been addressed
or even entertained. My main aim in this work is to ﬁll this gap: I will be concerned
with whether certain cases of external deviations are metaphysically possible. e
cases I am interested in are ones in which both directions of both (1-5) and (1-8)
are violated, i.e. in which both parthood and composition fail to be preserved both
from some material things to their exact locations and from some material things’
exact locations to those things. I will argue that the metaphysical possibility of these
cases follows fromminimal and otherwise plausible assumptions about modality and
the nature of both part-whole relations and relations of spatiotemporal location. I
will suggest, moreover, that these cases are philosophically interesting not only be-
cause they require a pretty radical and thus far unforeseen misalignment between the
mereological structures of the material world and spacetime, but also because they
have a strong bearing on various debates in metaphysics. Let me brieﬂy characterize
these cases of external deviations in a way that will helpmake this more apparent, and
sketch the argument that I will give for their possibility.
1.3 Parts vs. Contractions, Fusions vs. Expansions
Remember that a material thing is a contraction of another iﬀ the region at which
the ﬁrst is exactly located is a subregion of the region at which the second is exactly
located. Notice, then, that (1-5) is equivalent to the following principle, according
to which in order for a material thing to be part of another it is both necessary and
suﬃcient that the ﬁrst be a contraction of the second:
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(Parts,Contractions)
x is part of y iﬀ x is a contraction of y.
Similarly, remember that some material things expand into a material object iﬀ that
object is exactly located at a region composed of the regions at which those things are
exactly located. So notice that (1-8) is equivalent to the following principle, according
to which in order for somematerial things to expand into another it is both necessary
and suﬃcient that they expand into it:
(Composition,Expansion)
the xs compose y iﬀ the xs expand into y.
And notice that (1-8) and Composition,Expansion are equivalent to the following
principle, according to which for a material thing to be a fusion of some material
objects it is necessary and suﬃcient that it be an expansion of those objects:
(Fusions,Expansions)
y is a fusion of the xs iﬀ y is an expansion of the xs.
is shows that there are two equivalent ways of characterizing external devia-
tions: as cases in which there is a mismatch between the part-whole relations among
some material things and the part-whole relations among those things’ exact loca-
tions, and as cases in which there is a mismatch between the part-whole relations
among some material things and the relations of relative spatiotemporal location
among those things. For instance, to say that parthood fails to be preserved either
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from some material things to their exact locations, or from some material things’ ex-
act locations to those material things, is just to say that there is a mismatch between
parthood and contraction, in one direction or the other. Similarly, to say that compo-
sition fails to be preserved either from some material things to their exact locations,
or from some material things’ exact locations to those material things, is just to say
that there is a mismatch between composition and expansion, in one direction or the
other. In general, then, to say that the mereological relations on somematerial things
and the mereological relations on those material things’ exact locations fail to per-
fectly align is just to say that the mereological relations on some material things and
the relative location relations on those material things fail to perfectly align.
e cases of external deviations I am interested in are precisely ones in which
there is a two-way mismatch between parthood and contraction, as well as a two-
way mismatch between composition and expansion. ese are cases in which
both Parts,Contractions and Fusions,Expansions are violated in both direc-
tions. Cases violating the le-to-right direction of Parts,Contractions—call it
Parts)Contractions—are ones in which a material thing has parts that are not con-
tractions of it, i.e. in which a material thing, x, is part of a material thing, y, but
x is exactly located at a region that is not a subregion of the region at which y
is exactly located. Cases violating the right-to-le of Parts,Contractions—call it
Contractions)Parts—are ones in which a material thing has contractions that are
not parts of it, i.e. in which a material thing, x, is exactly located at a subregion of
the region at which a material thing, y, is exactly located, but x is not part of y.
Similarly, cases violating the le-to-right direction of Fusions,Expansions—call it
Fusions)Expansions—are ones in which a material object is a fusion but not an ex-
pansion of some material things, i.e. in which some material things, the xs, compose
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a material object, y, but y is exactly located at a region that is not composed of the
regions at which the xs are exactly located. And cases violating the right-to-le di-
rection of Fusions,Expansions—call it Expansions)Fusions—are ones in which a
material object is an expansion but not a fusion of some material things, i.e. in which
a material object, y, is exactly located at a region composed of the regions at which
some material things, the xs, are exactly located, but y is not composed of the xs.
A couple of points about these cases are worth noting. First,
Fusions,Expansions is stronger than Parts,Contractions: Fusions)Expansions
entails Parts)Contractions and Expansions)Fusions entails Contractions)Parts.
For, on the one hand, if x is part of y, then, by the deﬁnition of fusions, y is a fusion
of x and y. By Fusions)Expansions, y is an expansion of x and y. But then, by
the deﬁnition of expansions, x is a contraction of y. On the other hand, if x is a
contraction of y, then, by the deﬁnition of expansions, y is an expansion of x and y.
By Expansions)Fusions, y is a fusion of x and y. So, by the deﬁnition of fusions, x is
part of y. is shows that the two relevant cases of external deviations are connected:
cases violating either direction of Parts,Contractions are also cases violating the
corresponding direction of Fusions,Expansions. Put another way: if parthood fails
to be preserved either from some material things to their exact locations, or from
some material things’ exact locations to those material things, then composition fails
to be preserved, too, in the corresponding direction. Or, what amounts to the same:
if there is a mismatch between parthood and contraction in either direction, then
there is also a mismatch between composition and expansion in the corresponding
direction.
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Second, it is important to distinguishContractions)Parts from the following par-
tition principle:
(Partition)
For every subregion of x’s exact location, there exists a part of x that is exactly
located at that region.
Clearly, Contractions)Parts does not entail Partition. More interestingly, the con-
verse does not hold either: Contractions)Parts follows from Partition only if co-
located material objects are ruled out. By the same token, Contractions)Parts is
logically independent from the so-called doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts (Van
Inwagen 1981):
(DAUP)
For any region, S, at which x is pervasively located, and any subregion S 0 of S at
which it is metaphysically possible that somematerial object be entirely located,
there exists a part of x that is entirely located at S.
at Contractions)Parts is independent from both Partition and DAUP is impor-
tant: it helps clarify what exactly Contractions)Parts claims, and distinguishes it
from other principles ﬂoating around in the literature. In particular, it makes it clear
that cases violating Contractions)Parts need not violate Partition or DAUP.
Cases of external deviations in which either direction of either
Parts,Contractions or Fusions,Expansions is violated are highly unintuitive:
the misalignments at stake in these cases are very radical, perhaps more so than
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those involved in cases violating internal alignment principles. is is most evident
in violations of Parts)Contractions and hence Fusions)Expansions, i.e. where a
material thing is part of another without being a contraction of it, and where some
material things compose a material object without expanding into it. ese are not
cases of scattered objects, at least not as they have been traditionally understood
in the literature (see e.g. Cartwright 1975). Scattered objects are material things
that are exactly located at discontinuous regions, i.e. regions that are composed of
a plurality of regions at least one of which has no boundaries in common with the
rest. To see how scattered objects diﬀer from the kind of material objects violating
Parts)Contractions and Fusions)Expansions, consider some arbitrary material
things, the xs. Assume that at least one of the xs is exactly located at a region that
has no boundaries in common with the exact location of any other of the xs. Let S
be the discontinuous region that the exact locations of the xs compose. Now let y
be a material thing that is composed of the xs and that is exactly located at S, and z
a material thing that is a fusion but not an expansion of the xs. It follows that y is a
scattered object: it is exactly located at a discontinuous region, i.e. S. Nonetheless, y
is an expansion of the xs: it is exactly located at the fusion of the regions at which the
xs are exactly located, i.e. S. By contrast, z is not an expansion of the xs: by deﬁnition,
it cannot be exactly located at S. Instead, it must be exactly located at a region that
has S as a proper subregion, or that is a proper subregion of S, or that overlaps S but
is neither a proper subregion of S nor has S as a proper subregion, or that does not
overlap S altogether. e exact location of z need not even be discontinuous.
One might think that cases violating Contractions)Parts, and hence
Expansions)Fusions, are far less exotic. For instance, consider the example of
two mereological simples co-located at a mereologically simple region that I gave in
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§1.2.4 above to illustrate that external deviations do not require internal ones. is
is a case where Contractions)Parts, and hence Expansions)Fusions, are violated:
both simples in this situation are both contractions and expansions of one another,
but neither of them is part of the other, or a fusion of the two. But one might think
that this is just an old-fashioned case of co-located material objects, where those
objects happen to be simples, and where their shared exact location happens to be a
simple region. One might then reasonably wonder whether there really is something
special about these cases of external deviations.
ere are, however, violations of Contractions)Parts and Expansions)Fusions
that make the oddity of the misalignments at hand more apparent. Consider the fol-
lowing principle, according to which in order for a material thing to be proper part
of another it is suﬃcient that the ﬁrst be a proper contraction of the second:
(Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts)
x is a proper contraction of y only if x is a proper part of y.
By the deﬁnition of proper contraction, this principle is equivalent to the right-
to-le direction of (1-6), and is weaker than Contractions)Parts and hence than
Expansions)Fusions. is means that violations of this claim are also violations of
Contractions)Parts, and hence of Expansions)Fusions.
Violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts require that a material thing
that is exactly located at a proper subregion of the region at which a material object
is exactly located not be a proper part of such an object (or a part of that object at all,
by Leibniz’s Law, since parthood is anti-symmetric). So cases violating this claim do
not involve co-location: by the deﬁnition of proper contractions, they do not involve
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two or more material things sharing their exact location. So they diﬀer from cases
like the one of the two co-located simples discussed above.
Violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts also diﬀer from other kinds of
cases discussed in the literature. Suppose, for instance, that someone swallows a rock.
is would not violate Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts. For while the rock is not
part of the body, it is not a contraction of the body either: the region at which the rock
is exactly located is not a subregion of the region at which the body is exactly located.
ere are, of course, regions at which the body is entirely located, which have the same
“outer” boundary as the body’s exact location, andwhich have the rock’s exact location
as a subregion. But the body is not exactly located at any such region. If you were
to draw the body’s exact location, then you could not just draw a continuous region
within a certain perimeter; youwould have to take into account cracks andholes of the
body, so to speak, and not count the relevant regions as subregions of the body’s exact
location. In doing so, you would not include the region at which the rock is exactly
located as a subregion of the region at which the body is exactly located. By contrast,
cases violating Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts require that a material thing that
is not part of another be exactly located at a proper subregion of the region at which
the other material thing is exactly located. Similarly, suppose that someone gets shot
and the bullet remains stuck inside the victim’s body. is would not violate Proper-
Contractions)Proper-Parts either. Like with the rock, the bullet is not a contraction
of the body: the bullet displaces, so to speak, the victim’s body, just as a nail displaces
the wall when we hammer it in. So the region at which the bullet is exactly located is
not a subregion of the region at which the body is exactly located. By contrast, there
is no displacement in violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts: a material
object is exactly located within another material object’s exact location.
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Put another way: in violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts, we have a
pair of material objects that are spatiotemporally related to one another in exactly
the same way as my arm and my body are related to one another, but that are not
mereologically related to one another by parthood in the way that my arm and my
body are. Neither the rock nor the bullet in the examples above are spatiotemporally
related to the body in the way that my arm is related to my body. Unlike an arm, they
are not exactly located at subregions of the body’s exact location.
Violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts diﬀer from yet other cases dis-
cussed in the literature. ey diﬀer, for instance, from situations in which there is
some stuﬀ within a material object’s exact location, or in which a material thing is
exactly located within a material object’s exact location but that thing and that ob-
ject are made out of diﬀerent matters, which interpenetrate one another. In cases
violating Proper-Contractions)Proper-Parts, there is nothing fancy like stuﬀ or in-
terpenetrating matters. All we have, plain and simple, is a material thing that is not
part of another, even though it is exactly located at a proper subregion of its exact
location.
It is these exotic cases of external deviations that I am interested in: I will be
concerned with whether these highly unintuitive violations of both directions of
both Parts,Contractions and Fusions,Expansions are metaphysically possible. As
I mentioned above, I will argue that their possibility follows from minimal and oth-
erwise plausible assumptions about modality, part-whole relations, and relations of
spatiotemporal location, and that their possibility has a strong bearing on various de-
bates in metaphysics. Let me ﬁnish this chapter by sketching the argument and the
rest of what I will do here.
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1.4 A Sketch of the Argument
I will argue that the metaphysical possibility of the cases of external deviations I am
interested in follows from twomain assumptions. eﬁrst one is an assumption about
modality: it is eﬀectively a recombination principle oﬀering suﬃcient conditions for
metaphysical possibility, according to which certain ways of distributing certain sorts
of relations are metaphysically possible. e second one is an assumption about the
nature ofmereological relations and relations of spatiotemporal location, according to
which they are among the sorts of relations that the aforementioned recombination
principle applies to, and according to which the ways of distributing them so that
there are external deviations of the sorts I am interested in are among the ways of
distributing them that the principle applies to.
is is in fact the main kind of argument that has been given in favor of the pos-
sibility of internal deviations. For instance, McDaniel (2007b) and Sider (2007) ar-
gue that the possibility of mereologically simple material things that are exactly lo-
cated atmereologically complex regionsmay be established on broadly combinatorial
grounds; andMcDaniel (2006) argues that the same holds for the possibility of mere-
ologically material objects with simple exact locations and the possibility of gunky
material objects with non-gunky exact locations. So what I will suggest here is that
this kind of argument cuts much deeper than that: it generalizes for the possibility
the radical cases of external deviations I am interested in.
However, the combinatorial argument that I will present diﬀers from those oﬀered
in the literature in a crucial respect. Appeals to modal recombination to establish
possibilities (or, what it the same, to undermine alleged necessities) are pervasive in
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the contemporary literature on metaphysics. Unfortunately, such appeals almost al-
ways rest on a poor understanding of modal recombination. On the one hand, issues
about modal recombination are run together with related but distinct issues concern-
ing modality, such as modal reduction, the metaphysics of possible worlds, etc. is
obscures what exactly is at stake in the relevant appeals to modal recombination. On
the other hand, recombination principles are rarely spelled out—most of the time
they are only casually stated, and that makes it hard to see exactly what follows from
them. Moreover, on the few occasions in which they are more carefully spelled out,
they almost always end up being too strong, so that they are clearly objectionable on
independent grounds, if not outright false. In showing how the possibility of the cases
I am interested in follows from broadly combinatorial considerations, I want to put an
end to this trend. I will disentangle issues concerning modal recombination proper
from related issues, and suggest a perfectly general and precise way in which recom-
bination principles may be spelled out. is will allow us to single out the principle
from which the possibility of the cases I am interested in follows. As we will see, such
principle is perfectly general but very weak. is is important because the weaker the
assumptions that the possibility of external deviations follows from, the stronger the
case for their possibility.
When I say that my main goal here is to show that the metaphysical possibil-
ity of external deviations follows from minimal and otherwise plausible assumptions
about modality, part-whole relations, and relations of spatiotemporal location, and
that those cases have a strong bearing on various metaphysical debates, I mean just
that. at is, I ammainly interested in identifying plausible andminimal assumptions
from which the possibility of the cases I am interested in follows, and in highlighting
some consequences of accepting their possibility, rather than in showing that those
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assumptions are in fact true, and that those cases are in fact possible. I am sympa-
thetic to those assumptions, and I will defend them at some length: I will argue that
rejecting them requires very radical metaphysical views, perhaps more extreme than
accepting the possibility of the cases I am interested in. But that is as far as I will go—I
will not further discuss whether one of those views is preferable to accepting the pos-
sibility of external deviations. Put another way: I ammore interested in showing that
the issue of whether external deviations are metaphysically possible leaves us with a
choice of unpalatable alternatives, and that one of those alternatives has interesting
applications to various metaphysical debates, than in showing that we should accept
one of those alternatives over the rest.
Let me conclude with a roadmap of what follows. In chapter 2, I will identify the
recombination principle that, together with the relevant assumptions about mereo-
logical relations and relations of spatiotemporal location, delivers the metaphysical
possibility of the cases of external deviations at issue. As I mentioned above, I will do
so by disentangling issues of modal recombination from other ones, and by suggest-
ing a general and precise way in which we may state recombination principles.
In chapter 3, I will do three things. First, I will show how exactly the possibility
of our cases follows from this principle and the relevant assumptions about mereol-
ogy and location. Second, I will defend that principle and those assumptions in the
limited sense described above: I will argue that rejecting them requires very radical
metaphysical views. ird, I will discuss some general consequences of accepting the
possibility of external deviations for a number of debates in metaphysics.
In chapters 4 and 5, I will delve more deeply into the consequences of accepting
the possibility of our cases for two debates in the literature. Chapter 4 is concerned
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with the debate over persistence over time. I will argue that the possibility of our cases
aﬀords a new and compelling objection to an inﬂuential argument for temporal parts,
the so-called argument from vagueness. Chapter 5 is concerned with the debate over
the possibility of mereological indeterminacy. I will argue that given the possibility
of our cases both parthood and composition among material objects may be inde-
terminate without identity, existence, or cardinality being indeterminate. If so, then
the possibility of our cases undermines the most inﬂuential arguments against the
possibility of said indeterminacy given in the literature.
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CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES OFMODAL RECOMBINATION
My goal in this chapter is to single out the recombination principle that will help
us get the metaphysical possibility of the cases of external deviations at issue. Let me
begin with some brief remarks about recombination principles in general, and how
they are related to a few issues concerning modality and Humeanism.
2.1 Recombination, Modality, and Humeanism
Recombination principles are a family of claims giving suﬃcient combinatorial con-
ditions for metaphysical possibility: they hold that for such-and-such ways of mix-
ing and matching such-and-such components of reality there exists a corresponding
metaphysical possibility. So they are claims of roughly the following form:
(2-1) For any such-and-such ways of rearranging any such-and-such entities, there
exists a metaphysically possible world where those entities are arranged that
way.
Diﬀerent principles diﬀer onwhat sorts of entities they are concerned with—actual or
possible particulars, properties and relations, states of aﬀairs, events, etc.—and what
sorts of rearrangements of the relevant sorts of entities are at issue. For instance,
consider the following claims:
(2-2) For any actual particular, x, and any actual property, F, there exists a metaphys-
ically possible world where x is not F.
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(2-3) For any possible particulars, x and y, and any actual two-place relation, R, there
exists a metaphysically possible world where x bears R to y.
(2-4) For any actual two-place relation, R, there exists ametaphysically possible world
where R is transitive.
(2-5) For any possible property, F, and any possible two-place relation, R, there exists
ametaphysically possible world where something is not F and bears R to exactly
 Fs.
ese are all examples of recombination principles. None of them is particularly plau-
sible: it is easy to think of relatively uncontroversial counterexamples to each of them.
But they all give suﬃcient conditions for metaphysical possibility along the lines of
(2-1): each claims that for such-and-such entities and such-and-such ways of mix-
ing and matching them, there exists a corresponding metaphysical possibility. (2-2)
is concerned with actual particulars, actual properties, and ways of recombining a
particular and a property so that the particular does not have the property. So this
principle would deliver a possibility in which, for instance, the apple I am eating is
not sweet. (2-3) is concerned with pairs of possible particulars and actual two-place
relations, and with ways of mixing andmatching a pair of particulars and a two-place
relation so that one particular bears the relation to the other. So this principle would
deliver a possibility in which, for instance, the son that Wittgenstein never actually
had but could have had is exactly ten feet away from the third arm that I do not ac-
tually have but could have had. (2-4) concerns actual two-place relations, and ways
of rearranging a two-place relation so that it is transitive. So it delivers, for instance,
a possibility in which being a father of is transitive, i.e. in which for any triple of par-
ticulars the ﬁrst is father of the second and the second is father of the third only if
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the ﬁrst is father of the third. (2-5) concerns possible properties and possible two-
place relations, and ways of rearranging a property and a two-place relation so that
something that lacks the property stands in the relation to any number of things that
have the property. So it delivers, for instance, a possibility in which a non-unicorn
is less than Planck length from as many unicorns as there are real numbers. (I am
assuming possibilist quantiﬁcation for the sake of these examples, so that the domain
of the actual is a proper class of the domain of the possible. But, as will become clear
below, principles such as (2-2)-(2-5) are perfectly neutral on issues about actualism
vs. possibilism.)
Recombination principles are sometimes thought of in connection with a com-
binatorial theory of possibility, such as Armstrong’s combinatorialism (Armstrong
1989, 1997). A combinatorial theory of possibility aims to be a reductive theory of
modality: it attempts to reduce all possibilities to ways of mixing and matching ele-
ments of other possibilities, in such way that eventually all possibilities trace back to
rearrangements of components of only the actual world. Recombination principles
are a key element of one such theory: that is how you get possibilities combinatori-
ally. And the success of the theory will depend on ﬁnding the right set of principles:
those that are collectively strong enough to deliver all the possibilities that there are,
but weak enough not to require impossibilities.
It is important to note, however, that recombination principles may hold even if
a combinatorial theory of possibility fails at modal reduction. e theory will fail at
reducing modality when there are possibilities for which there are not corresponding
rearrangements, i.e. possibilities that cannot be generated by just mixing and match-
ing elements from other possibilities in some way or other. But all that would mean
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is that the set of recombination principles of the theory is incomplete, not that it con-
tains false claims: a principle in the set will be false only if it generates impossibilities,
for recombination principles give only suﬃcient conditions for possibility. So while
the principles of the theory might fail to account for all possibilities, all possibilities
generated by its principlesmay be genuine, and so all such principlesmay be true. Put
another way: even if not all possibilities reduce to certain ways of mixing and match-
ing certain things, it may still be true that for certain such rearrangements there exists
a corresponding possibility. So recombination principles along the lines of (2-1) may
hold even if modality is not reducible to recombination, and so even if a theory like
Armstrong’s fails.1 Moreover, recombination principles may be motivated indepen-
dently of any issues concerning modal reduction: as we will see in chapter 3, there
are direct arguments for them that have nothing to do with their playing a role in a
reductive theory of modality.
Relatedly, recombination principles are completely neutral on what metaphysics
of modality one may favor. For instance, principles along the lines of (2-1) are per-
fectly compatible with both actualism and possibilism: regardless of whether you
think that there are non-actual entities, you may think that certain ways of recom-
bining certain elements of reality are possible. Actualists and possibilists simply dis-
agree, depending on the version of actualism at stake, either on what there is to be
recombined, or on the nature of what there is to be recombined. So-called proxy
actualists, who believe that although merely possible things do not exist there are
proxies for them (e.g. Plantinga 1974; Linsky and Zalta 1994, 1996; Williamson 1998,
1999; the label is due to Bennett 2006), disagree with possibilists about the nature of
some recombinables, such as Wittgenstein’s possible son. So-called strict actualists,
1For compelling reasons why recombination fails at reducing modality, see Sider 2005.
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who believe that there are neither merely possible things nor proxies for them (e.g.
Prior 1957, Adams 1981, Menzel 1990), disagree with possibilists as to whether such
things as Wittgenstein’s possible son are in any way among the recombinable. But
they may all nonetheless believe that for some ways of mixing and matching some
things there is a corresponding metaphysical possibility. Similarly, principles along
the lines of (2-1) are perfectly compatible with diﬀerent views on the nature of pos-
sible worlds. Regardless of what you think that possible worlds are—concrete things,
sets of propositions, ﬁctions, rearrangements, etc.—you may believe that for certain
ways of rearranging certain sorts of entities there exist metaphysically possible worlds
where those entities are arranged that way. us, recombination principles may hold
independently of all these issues in themetaphysics ofmodality—they are in principle
resilient to the success or failure of any particular view on these matters.
It follows that recombination principles are independent of issues concerning
modal reduction, as well as the metaphysics of modality. An important consequence
of this is that one may not in general reject recombination principles on the grounds
that they fail to do such-and-such work in reducing modality, or that they are some-
how in tension with some particular view in modal metaphysics. Such objections
would be misguided—they would fail to recognize recombination principles for what
they are, i.e. claims giving merely suﬃcient conditions for metaphysical possibility.
Recombination principles are also sometimes thought of in connection with
Humeanism, the doctrine that there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences.2 Onemay distinguish between diﬀerent versions of Humeanism, depend-
2Two views tracing back to Hume are called Humean these days: the view that there are no necessary
connections among distinct existences (see e.g. Lewis 1986, pp. 87-8), and the view that all the facts of
a world supervene on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities (see e.g. Lewis 1994). ese two
views are in principle independent from one another. One might think, for instance, that there are no
necessary connections among distinct existences, and still believe that, say, causation does not supervene
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ing on what sorts of entities are at stake, what notion of distinctness is at issue, and
what kind of connection it is denied that the relevant entities necessarily stand in.
Consider, for instance, the following two claims:
(2-6) For any actual particulars, x and y, that actually do not mereologically overlap,
and any possible properties F and G, it is not necessary that x be F only if y is
G.
(2-7) For any possible properties, F and G, that actually stand in no determinate-
determinable relation to one another, it is not necessary that there be exactly 
Fs only if there are exactly  0 Gs.
ese two claims diﬀer on what entities they are concerned with, what notion of dis-
tinctness is involved, and what necessary connection is at stake. (2-6) concerns pairs
of actual particulars, mereological distinctness, and a certain form of qualitative de-
pendence across modal space. And (2-7) is concerned with pairs of possible prop-
erties, determinable distinctness, and a certain form of instantiational dependence
across modal space. Nonetheless, (2-6 ) and (2-7) are both Humean: they both claim
that any entities of such-and-such sort that are distinct from one another in such-
and-such way are not necessarily tied to one another in such-and-such manner. at
is, they are both variations on the following Humean schema:
(2-8) For any such-and-such entities that are distinct from one another in such-and-
such way, it is not necessary that they be connected to one another in such-and-
such way.
on the spatiotemporal distribution of any local qualities. Similarly, one might think that causation, etc.
supervene on the spatiotemporal distribution of such-and-such local qualities, and still believe that there
are necessary connections among distinct entities. Recombination principles are directly connected to
Humeanism understood of in the former way; their ties to Humeanism understood in the latter way are
much less straightforward, and not relevant to my purposes here.
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From this it is easy to see how Humeanism is related to modal recombination:
eachHumean claim along the lines of (2-8) is equivalent to some recombination prin-
ciple along the lines of (2-1), for each such claim eﬀectively requires that for any such-
and-such ways of rearranging any such-and-such entities there exist a possible world
where those entities are arranged that way. ismeans that some recombination prin-
ciples are eﬀectively Humean, i.e. require that there be no necessary connections of
such-and-such sort among entities of such-and-such kindwhich are distinct fromone
another in such-and-such way. As we will see, the recombination principle that will
help deliver the possibility of external deviations is a Humean one: it eﬀectively de-
nies a certain form of necessary connection among a certain sort of actual ﬁrst-order
relations, which are distinct from one another in a certain way. It is important to note,
however, that not all recombination principles need be Humean. For instance, there
is nothingHumean about a claim like (2-4), since it concerns only single relations, and
hence cannot apply to entities that may be distinct from one another in some way or
other. is suggests that some recombination principles may hold independently of
any issues concerning Humeanism.
Another point concerning Humeanism is worth noting. Humeans are oen said
to be suspicious of “mysterious” necessary connections among things. Claims along
the lines of (2-8) entail that if there are necessary connections among some entities,
then such entities must fail to be distinct from one another in some relevant way.
So these claims do in fact suggest that if there were necessary connections among
relevantly distinct things, then such connections would be mysterious—they would
seem to come out of nowhere. However, it is important to distinguish between two
reasons why one may think that such connections are mysterious. First, one might
think that accepting necessary connections among relevantly distinct things is tan-
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tamount to accepting irreducible modal facts, i.e. that nothing grounds or explains
that it is necessary that so and so. From this perspective, such necessary connections
would come out of nowhere in the sense that they would not be grounded on the
non-modal. Second, one may think that it is independently plausible that there are
no necessary connections between relevantly distinct things, i.e. that it is prima facie
possible that such things not be related to one another in the relevant way. From this
perspective, such necessary connections would come out of nowhere in the sense that
there would be no good reason to believe in them.
Contrary to what is oen assumed in the literature (see deRosset 2009 for dis-
cussion), it would be odd for Humeans to think that necessary connections between
relevantly distinct entities are mysterious for the ﬁrst reason, i.e. because of worries
aboutmodal reduction. For as we have seen, in holding claims along the lines of (2-8)
Humeans not only deny certain necessities, but also eﬀectively postulate certain pos-
sibilities. And one may worry about the irreducibility of those possibilities to exactly
the same extent that one may worry about the irreducibility of those necessities. For
instance, consider the claim—contra (2-6)—that it is necessary that the apple I am
eating be sweet only if Socrates is a philosopher. It would be strange for the Humean
who holds (2-6) to be suspicious of this necessity qua modal fact, i.e. on the grounds
that nothing would explain why the apple and Socrates are related to one another that
way across modal space. For in holding (2-6) and in denying such necessity, she ef-
fectively holds that it is possible that the apple I am eating be sweet without Socrates’s
being a philosopher. And one may be suspicious of this possibility qua modal fact on
the same grounds as one may worry about the necessity qua modal fact, i.e. on the
grounds that nothing would explain whymy apple and Socrates are related to one an-
other this way across modal space. Put another way: the Humean and her opponent
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disagree simply disagree about how certain entities are related to one another across
modal space, i.e. about whether this or that modal fact holds. e question of what,
if anything, explains that such-and-such entities are or are not related to others in
such-and-such ways across modal space, i.e. of what explains that this or that modal
fact holds, is a completely diﬀerent issue, which should concern the Humean no less
than it should concern her opponent. So if the Humean is suspicious of this neces-
sary connection between the apple and Socrates, it must be simply because she has
independent reason to think that the apple and Socrates are not tied to one another
that way across modal space, e.g. she may hold a substantive view about the nature of
the apple on which its essence involves no facts extrinsic to it.
is suggests that Humeanism is independent of issues concerning modal reduc-
tion. is is important not only given that, as I mentioned above, it is oen assumed
otherwise, but also in light of two points I suggested above: that recombination prin-
ciples are independent of issues regarding modal reduction, and that the Humean
doctrine that there are no necessary connections among distinct existences is simply
the view that certain recombination principles are true.
Now, another reason why recombination principles have generated of lot of in-
terest in the recent literature is that they have sometimes been thought of as pur-
ported tools of modal discovery. As I have emphasized, recombination principles
(both Humean and non-Humean) oﬀer suﬃcient conditions for metaphysical pos-
sibility, and hence posit possibilities and rule out necessities. So, if true, they tell us
about what is possible and what is not necessary. In fact, Lewis goes as far as saying
that certain recombination principles (Humean ones, in the spirit of (2-6)) give us
“our best handle on the question of what possibilities there are” (2001, p. 611, em-
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phasis added). It is precisely in this respect, i.e. qua tools of modal discovery, that
recombination principles are relevant to the issue of whether the cases of external
deviations I am interested in are metaphysically possible. It would follow that they
are metaphysically possible if there were an independently plausible recombination
principle according to which we may mix and match some things in some relevant
way.
However, all the potential interest of recombination principles qua purported
tools of modal discovery has been shadowed by the fact that they have so far proven
elusive of systematic treatment. As Sider (2000) and Hudson (2007) have remarked,
the important task of systematizing them is far from trivial. On the one hand, it is hard
to precisely formulate many principles without making them either too strong or too
weak to be philosophically interesting, i.e. without identifying them with claims that
entail either that uncontroversially impossible situations are possible, or that only un-
controversially possible situations are possible. And without a precise formulation, it
is diﬃcult to make anything out of them, for it is unclear exactly what follows from
them. On the other hand, it is hard to draw principled distinctions among diﬀerent
recombination principles, so that it is not arbitrary that some such principles hold but
not others. at is, it is hard to independently motivate why such-and-such entities
may be recombined in certain ways but not others, or why certain entities but not oth-
ers may be recombined in such-and-such ways. Without independent motivation, it
would be ad-hoc to think that some given recombination principle is true, but that a
slightly stronger yet clearly implausible one is not.
For instance, Lewis cashes a Humean recombination principle particularly im-
portant for many of his philosophical views as the claim that “anything can coexist
40
with anything else [and] anything can fail to exist with anything else,” as well as the
claim that “patching together parts of diﬀerent possible worlds yields another possi-
ble world” (Lewis 1986, pp. 87-8). ese formulations are suggestive, but they make
it very hard to see what exactly these principles entail. Moreover, they make it very
hard to see whether theymake the same claim, as Lewis assumes; prima facie, the ﬁrst
principle seems to concern recombination of particulars, while the second seems to
concern recombination of states of aﬀairs. And as the literature on these issues makes
clear, it is actually very hard to formulate these principles without collapsing them
into either clearly false or clearly trivial claims. (2-6), for instance, is precise and non-
trivial, but is arguably false, as well as far from general enough for Lewis’s purposes.
Given these diﬃculties for systematizing recombination principles, it is reason-
able to be suspicious of appeals to them qua tools of modal discovery. I believe, how-
ever, that these diﬃculties can be addressed. In what follows I will suggest a general
strategy to precisely formulate recombination principles, which will allow us to see
exactly what each of them entails and how they are related to one another. And I will
suggest principled distinctions that may be drawn among diﬀerent principles, which
will allow us to see that it is not ad hoc to think that some principles are true but that
closely related ones are not. I will show in detail how this may be done to single out
the principle that we are interested in here, i.e. the one that will help us get the pos-
sibility of the cases of external deviations at issue. But the general strategy I suggest
allows us to systematize other sorts of recombination principles.
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2.2 Possibly True Second-Order Sentences
What we are aer is a recombination principle according to which we may mix and
match things so that there are external deviations of the sort we are interested in. Re-
member that recombination principles diﬀer on the kinds of entities and on the ways
of rearranging those entities they recombine. e principle we are looking for con-
cerns actual, ﬁrst-order properties and relations and certain ways of rearranging them:
it claims that for certain ways of mixing andmatching certain actual ﬁrst-order prop-
erties or relations there exists a corresponding metaphysical possibility. Principles of
this sort are sometimes expressed along the following lines (I leave the restriction to
actual ﬁrst-order properties and relations implicit from here on):
(2-9) Any such-and-such pattern of instantiation of any such-and-such ﬁrst-order
properties or relations is metaphysically possible.
What exactly is a pattern of instantiation of some ﬁrst-order properties or relations?
at is, what exactly is a way of rearranging or of mixing and matching some ﬁrst
order properties or relations? Roughly, a pattern of instantiation of a single ﬁrst-order
property or relation is a way in which such property or relation may be distributed
over some particulars. For instance, being red may be instantiated so that there are
exactly three red things, or so that there are at least seven red things, or so that there
are at most two red things, or so that everything is red, or so that there is at least one
red thing and at least two things that are not red, or so that every red thing bears some
relation to another red thing, etc. Similarly, a pattern of instantiation of a plurality of
ﬁrst-order properties or relations is just a way in which those properties or relations
may be distributed over some particulars. For instance, being red and being exactly
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two feet away from may be instantiated so that there is at least one red thing and
everything is exactly two feet away from everything else, or so that every red thing
is exactly two feet away from something that is not red, or so that every red thing
that bears some relation to an object that is not red is exactly two feet away from that
object, etc. So principles along the lines of (2-9) just claim that for certain ways of
instantiating certain ﬁrst-order properties and relations, it is metaphysically possible
that those properties and relations be instantiated in those ways.
Notice that we may express that a ﬁrst-order property or relation is instantiated
so that so-and-so with a sentence of an artiﬁcial second-order language that has a
predicate for that ﬁrst-order property or relation, where such sentence claims (exten-
sionally) that so-and-so. For instance, we may express that being red is instantiated
so that every red thing bears a two-place relation to another red thing with a sen-
tence such as ‘8x(Rx ! 9y9X(x 6= y & Ry & Xxy))’, where ‘R’ expresses (denotes,
stands for, etc.) being red. Similarly, we may express that a plurality of ﬁrst-order
properties or relations are instantiated so that so-and-so with a sentence of an ar-
tiﬁcial second-order language that has predicates for those ﬁrst-order properties or
relations, where such sentence claims that so-and-so. For instance, we may express
that being red and being exactly two feet away from are instantiated so that every red
thing is exactly two feet away from something that is not red with a sentence such as
‘8x(Rx ! 9y(:Ry & Axy))’, where ‘R’ and ‘A’ express being red and being exactly
two feet away from, respectively.
Given this natural correspondence betweenpatterns of instantiation of some given
properties or relations and sentences of suﬃciently expressive languages that have
predicates for those properties or relations, we may trade talk about such patterns
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for talk about such sentences. is suggests that we may formulate recombination
principles for ﬁrst-order properties and relations along the following lines, instead of
along the lines of (2-9): for any such-and-such sentences of a second-order language
with occurrences of such-and-such predicates, there exists a metaphysically possible
world where that sentence is true.
Here is a more concrete picture of how this might go. Suppose that L is a second-
order language with standard logical vocabulary (ﬁrst- and second-order variables,
quantiﬁers, the identity symbol, and the truth-functional connectives) and a stock
of ﬁrst-order predicates (L has no individual constants or second-order predicates).
Let’s assume that everyn-place ﬁrst-order predicate of L expresses exactly onen-place
ﬁrst-order property or relation, and that everyn-place ﬁrst-order property or relation
is expressed by exactly one n-place ﬁrst-order predicate of L.3 en we may state
recombination principles for ﬁrst-order properties and relations along the following
lines:
(2-10) For any such-and-such predicatesi11 , . . . ,
in
n ofL and any such-and-suchwell-
formed formula (Xi11 , . . . ,X
in
n ) of L, there is a metaphysically possible world
where (i11 , . . . ,
in
n ) is true,
where superscripts indicate adicity, each X
ij
j is a second-order variable,
(X
i1
1 , . . . ,X
in
n ) has at least one free occurrence of each X
ij
j but no free occur-
rences of ﬁrst-order variables, and (i11 , . . . ,
in
n ) is the sentence of L we get by
replacing every free occurrence of each X
ij
j in (X
i1
1 , . . . ,X
in
n ) with exactly one
occurrence of 
ij
j . (2-10) just says that for every sentence of L that has occurrences
3I do not count the identity symbol as one of the predicates of L; so when I talk about the predicates
of L in what follows, I mean the non-logical predicates of L. is is just a terminological point, not a deep
claim about identity.
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of predicates expressing such-and-such ﬁrst-order properties or relations of any
adicity whatever and that claims that those properties or relations are instantiated
in such-and-such way, there is a possible world where that sentence is true. In
quantifying over such-and-such predicates L, principles along the lines of (2-10) will
concern such-and-such ﬁrst-order properties or relations. And in quantifying over
such-and-such well-formed formulas of L, they will concern such-and-such patterns
of instantiation of ﬁrst-order properties or relations.
Formulating recombination principles along the lines of (2-10) instead of along
the lines of (2-9) has several advantages. It makes their logical form perfectly trans-
parent. It also makes talk of the somewhat slippery notion of a rearrangement (or
a way of mixing and matching, or a pattern of instantiation, or distribution of) ﬁrst-
order properties or relations perfectly rigorous, for it converts it into talk of sentences
of a language with well-deﬁned properties. Moreover, it will make it very easy to spec-
ify the character and complexity of a given pattern of instantiation of some properties
or relations, for this will be revealed in the logical form of the relevant sentences of the
language. It will alsomake it very easy to distinguish between diﬀerent recombination
principles and understand the relations between them, for diﬀerent principles will set
diﬀerent restrictions on which sentences of L have a possible world at which they are
true. Finally, it has another sort of advantage: it makes recombination principles for
ﬁrst-order properties or relations nominalist-friendly. For even if you think that there
are no ﬁrst-order properties or relations, and hence no rearrangements of these, you
may think that any such-and-such sentences with occurrences of any such-and-such
predicates are possibly true.
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It is worth noting a couple of points about L, however. First, one might think
that there are more actual ﬁrst-order properties and relations than a language like
L may have predicates for, and so there could not be a language with the properties
we have attributed to L. For instance, one might think that for every real number, r,
something that is exactly r feet long actually exists. But one might be convinced that
a language like L could not have as many predicates as there are real numbers, given
familiar objections to languages with more than denumerably many expressions. I
am not convinced that those objections are serious. But even if they are, we may just
assume that there is a one-one correspondence between the predicates of L and the
ﬁrst-order properties and relations we normally care about—being a dog, being red,
being an electron, being exactly q feet long for any rational number q, being part of,
etc. For our purposes, it will not matter if L lacks a predicate for, say, having mass of
exactly
p
2 nanograms.
Second, one might think that for our purposes we do not need a second-order
language, but only a ﬁrst-order one. Aer all, L has no second-order predicates; why
would we need quantiﬁcation over ﬁrst-order properties and relations? e reason
is that certain patterns of instantiation of ﬁrst-order properties and relations are not
expressible with only ﬁrst-order resources. For a simple case, consider an example we
already looked at above: that being red is instantiated so that every red thing bears
a two-place relation to another red thing cannot be expressed without second-order
quantiﬁcation. For other cases, notice that second-order quantiﬁcation is required in
order to express, say, that a relation is well-founded, or that some ﬁrst-order property
is instantiated so that there are uncountably many things with that property. So in
order not to constrain from the get-go what sorts of possibilities recombination prin-
ciples along the lines of (2-10) may in principle deliver, a second-order language is
preferable.
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Given this general strategy for formulating recombination principles for ﬁrst-
order properties and relations, let us now single out the principle that will help deliver
the possibility of the cases at external deviations at issue.
2.3 Recombination Unbound
Diﬀerent recombination principles along the lines of (2-10) set diﬀerent restrictions
onwhat kinds of ﬁrst-order properties and relationsmay be recombined, and onwhat
ways those ﬁrst-order properties and relations may be recombined. Clearly, the more
liberal a principle is, the stronger it is; that is, the more ﬁrst-order properties and
relations a principle is about, and the more ways of instantiating them it concerns,
the more possibilities it delivers. e cases of external deviations at issue require only
a very weak principle, which concerns only some ﬁrst-order relations and only some
ways of instantiating them; i.e. it applies to only a very speciﬁc class of sentences of L.
It will be useful to introduce this principle by placing restrictions on stronger ones.
Let’s begin with a completely unbound principle:
(2-11) For any predicates i11 , . . . ,
in
n of L and any well-formed formula
(X
i1
1 , . . . ,X
in
n ) of L, there is a metaphysically possible world where
(
i1
1 , . . . ,
in
n ) is true.
is is a very strong principle: it claims that every sentence of L is true at some possible
world, i.e. that any ﬁrst-order properties or relations whatsoever may be recombined
in any way whatsoever. And it is clear that (2-11) is in fact too strong. It entails, for
instance, that it is possible that something not be self-identical, that something be
47
both red and not red, that something be both round and red without being red, that
something be roundwithout being either round or red, that something be redwithout
having a property, that something be made out of water without being made out of
H2O, that something have both mass of exactly two grams and mass of exactly three
grams, that something be both square and round, that something be square without
being polygonal, that something that is exactly one foot long be longer than something
that is exactly two feet long, etc. For there are sentences of L with occurrences of
predicates expressing the relevant properties and relations that require that they be
instantiated in the relevant ways.
ese consequences of (2-11)make it clear that recombination of ﬁrst-order prop-
erties and relations must be constrained somehow: a principle like (2-11) is just ab-
surd. At the same time, what we need are principled restrictions on recombination,
i.e. non-ad hoc ways of distinguishing between those ﬁrst-order properties and rela-
tions that may be recombined and those that may not, as well as between those ways
in which recombinable ﬁrst-order properties and relations may be recombined and
those in which they may not. In other words, we need to single out weakenings of
(2-11) that apply to all entities satisfying a certain well-motivated condition, and to
all ways of recombining those entities that satisfy an also well-motivated condition.
Otherwise it would be unacceptably arbitrary to say that these but not those ﬁrst-order
properties or relations may be recombined, or that they may be recombined in this
but not that way. Let’s see how this may be done.
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2.4 Logic and Determinable-Distinctness
Aﬁrst well-motivated restriction has to dowith logic: an obvious problemwith (2-11)
is that it entails logical falsehoods. So one may constrain recombination as follows:
any ﬁrst-order properties and relations may be recombined in any logically consistent
way. is would be to weaken (2-11) so that only sentences of L that have a model be
true at somepossibleworld, where amodel is a familiar set-theoretic structure. Notice
that this constraint does not require the somewhat controversial view that equates
logical truth withmodel-theoretic validity. All it requires is the uncontroversial claim
that model-theoretic invalidity is suﬃcient for logical falsehood.
is restriction suﬃces to avoid many of the unwanted consequences mentioned
above, e.g. that it is possible that something not be self-identical, that something be
both red and not red, that something be both red and round without being red, that
something be round without being either round or red, that something be red with-
out having a property, that something be made out of water without being made out
of H2O, etc. For in these cases it is logically inconsistent that the relevant ﬁrst-order
properties and relations be instantiated in the relevant ways—the corresponding sen-
tences of L do not have a model. is includes cases of a posteriori identities between
properties, such as beingmade out of water and beingmade out of H2O: a sentence of
L requiring that these properties not be identical does not have amodel, because these
properties are identical and we have stipulated that L has no more than one predicate
for any given property or relation.
However, this restriction alone does not suﬃce to rule out other unwelcome con-
sequences of (2-11), e.g. that it is possible that something have both mass of exactly
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one gram and mass of exactly two grams, that something be both square and round,
that something be square without being polygonal, that a thing that is exactly one foot
long be longer than a thing that is exactly two feet long, etc. For in these cases it is
logically consistent that the relevant ﬁrst-order properties and relations be instanti-
ated in the relevant ways—there are models of the corresponding sentences of L. So
further restrictions on recombination are needed—logic alone is not enough.
A salient feature of the remaining undesirable consequences of (2-11) is that
they involve ﬁrst-order properties and relations that stand in some determinate-
determinable relation to one another. For instance, having mass of exactly one gram
and having mass of exactly two grams are determinates of having mass, just as being
square and being round are determinates of being shaped. Similarly for being exactly
one foot long and being exactly two feet long. On the other hand, being square is
a determinate of being polygonal, just as being polygonal is a determinate of being
shaped, etc. is suggests that we may avoid the remaining problem cases by placing
a restriction on recombination concerning determinates and determinables. Such a
restriction would not be ad hoc, since that ﬁrst-order properties and relations nec-
essarily stand in relations of determinate and determinable to one another may be
independently motivated. So, let’s say that a pair of ﬁrst-order properties or relations
are determinably-distinct just in case they stand in no determinate-determinable re-
lation to one another. at is, for any ﬁrst-order properties or relations, F and G:
(Determinable-Distinctness)
F and G are determinably distinct =df F is not a determinate of G, G is not a
determinate of F, and there is no H that both F and G are determinates of.4
4Of course, this is to be construed so that being a property and being a relation do not count as deter-
minables. For then trivially no two properties and no two relations would be determinably distinct.
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en we may restrict recombination as follows: any pairwise determinably-distinct
ﬁrst-order properties or relations may be recombined in any logically consistent way.
is would be to weaken (2-11) as follows:
(2-12) For any predicates i11 , . . . ,
in
n of L that express pairwise determinately-
distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations, and any predicate-free formula
(X
i1
1 , . . . ,X
in
n ) of L, if (
i1
1 , . . . ,
in
n ) has a model, then there is a metaphysi-
cally possible world where (i11 , . . . ,
in
n ) is true.
e requirement that (Xi11 , . . . ,X
in
n ) be predicate-free is important: without it,
(X
i1
1 , . . . ,X
in
n )may have occurrences of predicates other than 
i1
1 , . . . ,
in
n for non-
determinably distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations, making the intended restric-
tion useless.
(2-12) seems to be themost liberal recombination principle for ﬁrst-order proper-
ties and relations that is not downright implausible. It is powerful enough to generate
many possibilities, but it is weak enough not to entail any of the unwanted possibilities
above.
2.5 Fundamentality
e logic and determinable-distinctness constraints on recombination suﬃce to
avoid the most obvious undesirable consequences of (2-11). But they are not enough
to deal with another class of alleged necessities: those concerning ﬁrst-order prop-
erties and relations that are more fundamental than others. Fundamentality is about
relative position in a priority ordering over the components of reality, such that facts
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about less fundamental entities are grounded on or explained by facts about more
fundamental ones. Some philosophers think that some ﬁrst-order properties and
relations are more fundamental than others, whereby facts about less fundamen-
tal ones are grounded on facts about more fundamental ones. For instance, some
philosophers think that neural properties are more fundamental than mental prop-
erties, and that facts about the latter are grounded on facts about the former. Sim-
ilarly, some philosophers think that properties and relations of subatomic particles
aremore fundamental than properties and relations of atoms andmolecules, whereby
facts about the former are explained by facts about the latter. Some of those philoso-
phers also think that facts about fundamentality and grounding are metaphysically
necessary, and so that less fundamental properties and relations could not be instan-
tiated without more fundamental ones being instantiated as well. But since less and
more fundamental ﬁrst-order properties and relations need not stand in determinate-
determinable relations to one another, and since it is logically consistent that less
fundamental properties and relations be instantiated without the more fundamental
ones being instantiated, such philosophers would think that further constraints on
recombination are needed.
Although all these claims are highly controversial, nothing is lost by restricting
recombination so that it remains compatiblewith all the relevant necessities. ismay
be achieved by constraining it to those ﬁrst-order properties and relations at the very
bottomof the priority ordering, i.e. to those properties and relations facts aboutwhich
are not grounded on facts about other properties and relations. Let’s call such ﬁrst-
order properties and relations the fundamental ones.5 Adding this constraint to the
5ere are diﬀerent ways of accounting for fundamentality in the literature (see e.g. Fine 1994, 2001;
Sider 2009, MS; Schaﬀer 2009, MSa; RosenMS), but they all postulate a fundamental level. And, of course,
the present constraint on recombination is neutral on how exactly fundamentality is to be ultimately cashed
out.
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previous two, we may restrict recombination as follows: any fundamental, pairwise
determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations may be recombined in any
logically consistent way. is would be to restrict (2-12) as follows:
(2-13) For any predicates i11 , . . . ,
in
n of L that express fundamental, pairwise deter-
minately -distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations, and any predicate-free for-
mula (Xi11 , . . . ,X
in
n ) of L, if (
i1
1 , . . . ,
in
n ) has a model, then there is a meta-
physically possible world where (i11 , . . . ,
in
n ) is true.
Notice that, without further assumptions, the determinable-distinctness restriction
is not redundant given the fundamentality one. One may think, for instance, that
having mass and having mass of exactly one gram are both fundamental.
(2-13) is surely more plausible than (2-11) and (2-12). It is also strong enough for
our purposes: it entails that cases of external deviations are possible together with the
assumptions that material thinghood, regionhood, our primitive parthood relation,
and our primitive relation of spatiotemporal location are both fundamental and pair-
wise determinably-distinct. For it is logically consistent that parthood, spatiotempo-
ral location, material thinghood, and regionhood be instantiated in the relevant ways.
at is, there are models of sentences of L with the predicates for parthood, location,
material thinghood, and regionhood according to which these are instantiated so that
there are external deviations.
However, (2-13) and those assumptions also entail other possibilities. For in-
stance, they entail that it is possible that parthood fail to be reﬂexive, as well as that it
may fail to be transitive, since it is logically consistent that parthood be instantiated in
the relevant ways—there are models of corresponding sentences of L. Similarly, they
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entail that gunky material objects are possible, as well as that any view on when some
material things compose a material object is contingent, since it is logically consistent
that parthood andmaterial thinghood be instantiated in the relevant ways—there are
models of corresponding sentences of L. By the same token, they entail that gunky
regions are possible, as well as that any view on when some regions compose a region
is contingent, since it is logically consistent that parthood and regionhood be instan-
tiated in the relevant ways—there are models of corresponding sentences of L. (2-13)
and those assumptions also entail that co-located material objects are possible, since
it is logically consistent that parthood, location, material thinghood, and regionhood
be instantiated in the relevant ways—there are models of corresponding sentences of
L. ey also entail that it is possible that there be any countable number of material
objects, as well as that there be uncountably many of them, since it is logically consis-
tent that material thinghood be instantiated in the relevant ways—there are models
of corresponding sentences of L.
It is highly controversial whether any of the situations above ismetaphysically pos-
sible. In fact, there is plenty of independent motivation to reject that some of them
are possible, such as situations in which parthood fails to be transitive. So in order to
make a strong case for the possibility of external deviations, it would be desirable to
have either a weaker recombination principle or weaker assumptions, which entailed
the possibility of external deviations without entailing any of the other possibilities.
Moreover, not only would it be desirable to weaken either (2-13) or the assumptions
above to that eﬀect, but also that they must be weakened somehow. For in addition
to the controversial possibilities above, they require some outright implausible pos-
sibilities. For instance, they entail that it is possible that a material object be located
nowhere, since it is logically consistent that parthood, location, material thinghood,
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and regionhood be instantiated in the relevant way, since there are models of corre-
sponding sentences of L.
So that we get the possibility of external deviations without any of the other pos-
sibilities above, I believe a two-prong strategy is required: (2-13) has to be weakened,
but in addition our assumptions about parthood, location, material thinghood and
regionhood have to be weakened in some ways and strengthened in others. For now
let us see how (2-13) ought to be further restricted. In chapter 3, I will show how our
assumptions about parthood, location, material thinghood, and regionhood have to
be modiﬁed.
2.6 Varieties of Second-Order Anti-Essentialism
It is hard to see exactly how further principled restrictions on (2-13) may
be placed—doing so would seem to require hand-picking certain fundamental
determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order properties and relations over others, or certain pat-
terns of instantiation of ﬁrst-order properties and relations over others. And that
seems intolerably arbitrarily. But I believe that there actually are non-ad hoc ways of
weakening (2-13). e key is to think about second-order properties and relations.
Notice that onemay think of a ﬁrst-order property or relation being instantiated so
that so-and-so as that ﬁrst-order property or relation having such-and-such second-
order property. For instance, if a ﬁrst-order two-place relation is instantiated so that
no two things mutually stand in that relation to one another, we may think of such
ﬁrst-order relation as having a certain second-order property (we even have a name
for that second-order property: anti-symmetry). Similarly, one may think of some
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ﬁrst-order properties or relations being instantiated so that so-and-so as those ﬁrst-
order properties or relations standing in such-and-such second-order relation to one
another. For instance, if a ﬁrst-order property and a ﬁrst-order two-place relation
are instantiated so that a thing has that property and stands in that relation to some
object only if that object also has that property, then one may think of that ﬁrst-order
property and that ﬁrst-order relation as standing in a certain second-order relation
to one another (per Frege 1879, we also have a name for that second-order relation:
hereditariness of a property on a relation). Accordingly, one may think of a certain
sentence of L with occurrences of a single predicate as claiming that the ﬁrst-order
property or relation expressed by such predicate has a certain second-order property.
And one may think of a certain sentence of L with occurrences of more than one
predicate as claiming that the plurality of ﬁrst-order properties or relations expressed
by those predicates stand in a certain second-order relation to one another.
Now, just as onemay think that someﬁrst-order properties and relations are essen-
tial to the particulars that have and stand in them, one may think that some second-
order properties and relations are essential to the ﬁrst-order properties and relations
that have and stand in them. at is, just one may be an essentialist about partic-
ulars, one may be an essentialist about ﬁrst-order properties and relations. Call the
view that some ﬁrst-order properties and relations are essential to the particulars that
have and stand in them ﬁrst-order essentialism. Similarly, call the view that some
second-order properties and relations are essential to the ﬁrst-order properties and
relations that have and stand in them second-order essentialism. Like ﬁrst-order es-
sentialism, second-order essentialism comes in diﬀerent strengths: one might think
that all second-order properties and relations are essential to their ﬁrst-order bearers
and relata, or that only some of them are.
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From this it is clear that recombination principles like (2-11)-(2-13) are in ef-
fect anti-essentialist claims about ﬁrst-order properties and relations: they require
that certain second-order properties and relations not be essential to their ﬁrst-order
bearers and relata. In fact, the stronger the recombination principle, the stronger
the form of second-order anti-essentialism it requires, and the weaker the form of
second-order essentialism the principle is compatible with. And the weaker the re-
combination principle, the weaker the form of second-order anti-essentialism it re-
quires, and the stronger the form of second-order essentialism it is compatible with.
(2-13) is then a very strong second-order anti-essentialist principle: it requires that
prettymuch no second-order property or relation be essential to its ﬁrst-order bearers
and relata. (2-13) is compatible with only a very weak form of second-order essen-
tialism, according to which only trivial second-order properties and relations—those
corresponding to sentences of L that are model-theoretic validities—may be essential
to their ﬁrst-bearers and relata.6
ere are two main reasons why (2-13) is such a strong second-order anti-
essentialist principle. First, (2-13) does not distinguish between second-order prop-
erties and second-order relations. For any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-
order properties or relations, (2-13) requires that they have no essential second-order
properties to exactly the same degree that it requires them to stand in no essential
second-order relations to one another. But it is important to distinguish between two
forms of second-order anti-essentialism here. On the one hand, one might think that
6Of course, here I am considering only extensional second-order properties and relations, i.e. those
second-order properties and relations that may be expressed by sentences of a second-order language
without second-order predicates. (2-13) is neutral on intensional second-order properties and relations,
i.e. those that may only be expressed using second-order predicates. For all (2-13) says, every intensional
second-order property and relation may be essential to its ﬁrst-order bearers and relata. For instance, (2-
13) is compatible with the claim that having unit negative charge has the second-order properties of being
fundamental and of being my favorite property essentially.
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ﬁrst-order properties and relations stand in no non-trivial essential second-order re-
lations to one another, but remain neutral as to whether they have any non-trivial
essential second-order properties. On the other hand, one might think that ﬁrst-
order properties and relations have no non-trivial essential second-order properties,
but remain neutral as to whether they stand in any non-trivial essential second-order
relations to one another. e distinction between these two forms of second-order
anti-essentialism is parallel to a distinction between two forms of ﬁrst-order anti-
essentialism. On the one hand, onemight think that no non-trivial ﬁrst-order relation
among particulars is essential to them, but remain neutral as to whether particulars
have non-trivial essential ﬁrst-order properties. On the other hand, one might think
that no particular has non-trivial essential ﬁrst-order properties, but remain neutral
as to whether particulars stand in any non-trivial ﬁrst-order relations essentially.
e distinction between these two more moderate forms of second-order anti-
essentialism suggests a principled distinction between two versions of (2-13): one that
is anti-essentialist about second-order relations but remains neutral about second-
order properties, and one that is anti-essentialist about second-order properties but
remains neutral about second-order relations. e former claims that any funda-
mental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations may be instantiated
together in any way that is compatible with those ways in which each such property
or relation must be instantiated on its own, whatever those ways may be. e latter
claims that any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order properties or relations
may be instantiated on their own in any way that is compatible with those ways in
which they must be instantiated together, whatever those ways may be.
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e second reason why (2-13) is a very strong second-order anti-essentialist prin-
ciple is that, just as it does not distinguish between properties and relations in the
second-order case, it does not distinguish between them in the ﬁrst-order case either.
But onemay insist that distinguishing among the latter is as important as distinguish-
ing among the former, in so far as diﬀerent anti-essentialist views are concerned. So,
on the one hand, one might think that no ﬁrst-order properties have or stand in any
non-trivial second-order properties or relations essentially, but remain neutral as to
whether ﬁrst-order relations do. On the other hand, one might think that no ﬁrst-
order relations have or stand in any non-trivial second-order properties or relations
essentially, but remain neutral as to whether ﬁrst-order properties do. e distinc-
tion between these two views has no analogue for particulars: there is no feature of
particulars corresponding to adicity. Still, one may motivate the distinction between
these two views by thinking about particulars. For instance, one might think that no
ﬁrst-order relations among elementary particles are essential to them, but that it is es-
sential to an elementary particle that it have a cluster of various ﬁrst-order properties
(mass, charge, spin, etc.). iswould be to think that certain non-trivial second-order
relations are essential to certain ﬁrst-order properties (nothing can be an elementary
particle without having mass, charge, spin, etc.), but that no non-trivial second-order
relations are essential to ﬁrst-order relations.
edistinction between these two further forms of second-order anti-essentialism
suggests a principled distinction between two further versions of (2-13): one that con-
cerns ﬁrst-order properties but remains neutral about ﬁrst-order relations, and one
that concerns ﬁrst-order relations but remains neutral about ﬁrst-order properties.
According to the former, any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order proper-
ties may be instantiated (together or alone) in any way that is compatible with those
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ways in which fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations must be in-
stantiated (together or alone), whatever those ways may be. According to the latter,
any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations may be instantiated (to-
gether or alone) in any way that is compatible with those ways in which fundamental
determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order properties must be instantiated (together or alone),
whatever those ways may be.
From the above it is clear that onemay distinguish between further essentialist and
anti-essentialist views about ﬁrst-order properties and relations, which would allow
one to distinguish between further principled weakenings of recombination princi-
ples like (2-11)-(2-13). In particular, one may devise a view that is anti-essentialist
about only second-order relations among only fundamental determinably-distinct
ﬁrst-order relations, which remains neutral about everything else. is is a view ac-
cording to which no non-trivial second-order relation is essential to any fundamen-
tal determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations, but which remains silent as to whether
any other non-trivial second-order properties and relations are essential to their ﬁrst-
order bearers and relata. e recombination principle corresponding to this view
claims that any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations may be in-
stantiated together in any way that is compatible with (i) those ways in which each
such relation must be instantiated on its own, (ii) those ways in which each such rela-
tionmust be instantiated togetherwith any ﬁrst-order properties or non-fundamental
relations, and (iii) those ways in which any ﬁrst-order properties or non-fundamental
relations must be instantiated either together or on their own, whatever all such ways
may be. is is the principle we are looking for, which will deliver the possibility
of the cases of external deviations at issue without any of the other controversial or
implausible consequences of (2-13).
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Let’s then formulate our principle. First, it cannot be stated by simply restrict-
ing (2-13) to those predicates of L expressing fundamental, pairwise determinably-
distinct ﬁrst-order relations, and to those predicate-free formulas of L that have free
occurrences of two or more second-order variables. For, on the one hand, such prin-
ciple would not be neutral as to whether fundamental ﬁrst-order relations have any
essential second-order properties, and so would still deliver some of the controversial
consequences of (2-13). For instance, together with the assumption that parthood
and location are fundamental and determinably-distinct, such principle would still
entail that it is possible that parthood fail to be both reﬂexive and transitive, that gunk
is possible, etc., since there are corresponding sentences of L with only the predicates
for parthood and location. On the other hand, such principle would deliver possibil-
ities in which only parthood and location are instantiated together, not possibilities
in which parthood, location, material thinghood, and regionhood are all instantiated
together, as cases of external deviations require. So our principle calls for a more
subtle formulation.
Here is the idea behind the proper formulation of our principle. Take any neces-
sary truths that concern at most one fundamental ﬁrst-order relation, whatever such
necessary truths may be. Now take any plurality of ﬁrst-order properties or relations
which involves at least two fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations.
en: for any way in which such properties or relations may be instantiating together
that is compatible with such necessary truths, there is a metaphysically possible world
where those properties or relations are instantiated that way. Here is how we may
cash this out in terms of sentences of L. Let T be the set of all sentences of L with
occurrences of at most one predicate expressing a fundamental ﬁrst-order relation.
A member of T may thus claim that any ﬁrst-order properties or relations (whether
61
fundamental or not, whether pairwise determinably-distinct or not) are instantiated
any way (either together or on their own), so long as it concerns no more than one
fundamental ﬁrst-order relation. Now let T be the set of all members of T that are
necessarily true, whatever such sentences may be. en we may state our principle as
the following recombination-to-possibility claim:
(R)P)
For any predicates i11 , . . . ,
in
n of L expressing fundamental, pairwise
determinately-distinct ﬁrst-order relations, and any formula (Xi11 , . . . ,X
in
n ) of
L, if f(i11 , . . . ,
in
n )g[ T has a model, then there is a metaphysically possible
world where (i11 , . . . ,
in
n ) is true,
where n, ij > 2, to make it explicit that R)P concerns only ﬁrst-order relations and
only ways in which two or more of themmay be instantiated together. R)P just says
that any sentence of L with predicates for two or more fundamental determinably-
distinct ﬁrst-order relations is true at some possible world, provided that such sen-
tence is compatible with all necessarily true sentences of Lwith at most one predicate
expressing a fundamental relation, whatever such sentences may be. Such a sentence
may claim that any ﬁrst-order properties or relations (whether fundamental or not,
whether pairwise determinably-distinct or not) are instantiated any way (either to-
gether or on their on), provided it concerns at least two fundamental determinably
distinct ﬁrst-order relations.
To get a better grip on R)P, think of T as representing the set of whatever
second-order properties each fundamental ﬁrst-order relation may have essentially,
whatever second-order properties each ﬁrst-order property (whether fundamental
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or not) may have essentially, whatever second-order relations may hold essentially
among any ﬁrst-order properties (whether fundamental and determinably-distinct
or not), whatever second-order relations may hold among any ﬁrst-order properties
(whether fundamental or not) and any ﬁrst-order relations (whether fundamental
and determinably-distinct or not), and whatever second-order relations may hold
among any non-fundamental and non-determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations.
R)P claims that any second-order relation among any fundamental determinably-
distinct ﬁrst-order relations that is consistent with all that is not essential to them.
To further get clear on what R)P says, it would be helpful to give two further
equivalent formulations of it. Let’s say that a sentence of L is a candidate sentence
just in case it has occurrences of two or more predicates expressing fundamental
determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations. And let’s say that a sentence of L is a con-
straining sentence just in case it has occurrences of no more than one predicate ex-
pressing a fundamental relation. en we may reformulate R)P as the claim that
every candidate sentence that is compatible with any constraining sentences that are
necessarily true—whatever such sentences may be—is true at some metaphysically
possible world. We may also reformulate it as the claim that if every constraining
sentence entailed by some candidate sentence is true at some metaphysically possible
world, then so is that candidate sentence.
It is important to realize just how much weaker than (2-13) R)P is: without as-
sumptions about the contents of T, R)P has only trivial consequences. Suppose, for
instance, that R1 and R2 are two fundamental, determinately-distinct, two-place ﬁrst-
order relations. (2-13) automatically delivers a world in which, for instance, some-
thing bears R1 but not R2 to itself. at is, (2-13) on its own entails that a sentence
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of L according to which something bears R1 but not R2 to itself is true at some possi-
ble world. By contrast, R)P alone delivers only trivial possibilities in which R1 and
R2 are instantiated together—R)P on its own does not entail that it is possible that
something bear R1 but not R2 to itself. For R1may be essentially irreﬂexive, or R2may
be essentially reﬂexive. at is, there maymembers of T requiring that nothing bear
R1 to itself, or that everything bear R2 to itself, which would be incompatible with any
sentence of L according to which something bears R1 but not R2 to itself. So R)P en-
tails that it is possible that something bear R1 but not R2 to itself only given further
assumptions about the essential second-order properties of R1 and R2, i.e. that R1 is
not essentially irreﬂexive and that R2 is not essentially reﬂexive. In other words, R)P
delivers a world where a sentence of L according to which something bears R1 but not
R2 to itself is true only together with further assumptions about the contents of T,
i.e. that it has no members requiring that nothing bear R1 to itself, or that everything
bearR2 to itself. Sincemaking these assumptions about the contents of T amounts to
assuming that it is possible that something bear R1 to itself, and that it is possible that
something not bear R2 to itself, this shows that R)P delivers interesting possibilities
only given other possibilities: if it is possible that something bear R1 to itself, and it is
possible that something not bear R2 to itself, then R)P entails that it is possible that
something bear R1 but not R2 to itself. But, on its own, R)P is completely innocuous:
since it is silent as to what is in T, it alone entails only logical truths.7
Another example: let R1 and R2 be as above, and let F1 and F2 be two ﬁrst-order
properties. Even if we assume that it is possible that something bear R1 to itself, and
that it is possible that something not bearR2 to itself, R)P alone does not entail that it
7Of course, many actually true sentences of L are not logical truths, and any such sentence must be
compatible with whatever the contents of T may be. So R)P does entail some non-trivial possibilities,
i.e. those that are actual. So let me qualify my claim: other than actual contingencies, R)P alone entails
only logical truths; i.e. on its own, it delivers only trivial non-actual possibilities.
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is possible that there be an F1 that is not an F2, which bears R1 to itself without bearing
R2 to itself. For T may have a member according to which there is at least one F2, or
according to which every F1 is an F2, or according to which every F1 does not bear R1
to itself, or according to which every F1 that is not an F2 bears R2 to itself, etc. So R)P
entails that it is possible that there be an F1 that is not an F2 and that bears R1 but not
R2 to itself only given other possibilities, which rule out that T have members like
the above: if it is possible that there be an F1 that is not an F2 and that bears R1 to itself,
and it is possible that there be an F1 that is not an F2 and that does not bear R2 to itself,
then R)P entails that it is possible that there be an F1 that is not an F2 and that bears
R1 but not R2 to itself. By contrast, (2-13) does not need any further assumptions to
deliver such possibility: it on its own entails that there is a world where there is an F1
that is not an F2 and that bears R1 but not R2 to itself.
Now, notice that R)P is a Humean principle for determinably-distinct funda-
mental ﬁrst-order relations, since it eﬀectively requires that there be no necessary
connections of a certain sort between them. But from the above it is clear that R)P
encodes only a very weak form of Humeanism: it denies only a very speciﬁc form
of necessary connection among such relations. To illustrate the point, suppose again
that R1 and R2 are two determinably-distinct fundamental ﬁrst-order relations. R)P
allows for there to be necessary connections between R1 and R2. For instance, it al-
lows for them to be necessarily connected so that R1 is transitive iﬀ R2 is reﬂexive. For
as we have seen, R)P is neutral as to what essential second-order properties R1 and
R2 may have. And their having essential second-order properties requires that there
be certain necessary connections between them. In this example, if R1 is necessarily
transitive and R2 is necessarily reﬂexive, then it must be necessary that R1 be transi-
tive iﬀ R2 is reﬂexive. Similarly, R)P allows for R1 and R2 to be necessarily connected
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so that R1 is instantiated iﬀ so is R2. For as we have also seen, R)P is neutral as to
what necessary second-order relations R1 and R2 may bear to ﬁrst-order properties
and non-fundamental ﬁrst-order relations. And R1 and R2 bearing certain second-
order to ﬁrst-order properties or non-fundamental ﬁrst-order relations may require
that there be certain necessary connections between them. In this example, if it is nec-
essary that something bear R1 to something only if it is F, and it is necessary that every
F bears R2 to something, then it must be necessary that something bear R1 to some-
thing only if something bears R2 to something. So although R)P is a Humean prin-
ciple for fundamental ﬁrst-order relations that are determinably-distinct, the form of
Humeanism at issue is very limited—it rules out only a very particular sort of neces-
sary connection among the relations at stake. Moreover, from our discussion about
second-order essentialism, it is not unprincipled to be a Humean about only certain
sorts of necessary connections between them.
R)P is then the recombination principle that will help deliver possibility of the
cases of external deviations I am interested in. As should be clear from the above,
we will need to make certain assumptions to get that result. I will introduce such
assumptions in chapter 3, and show how exactly the possibility of the cases at stake
from them and R)P. And I will also discuss what I take to be strong arguments for
both R)P and assumptions. What is important to keep in mind for the moment
is what I have been trying to stress: that R)P is a very precise, very weak, and yet
perfectly general recombination principle—it applies to all entities satisfying a certain
well-motivated condition and to all ways of recombining those entities that satisfy an
also well-motivated condition.
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2.7 Extending the Framework
estrategy bywhich I singled out R)P is perfectly general—it allows for the system-
atization of recombination principles generally, not only for those concerning ﬁrst-
order properties and relations. I want to ﬁnish this chapter with some brief remarks
about this.
e key idea I suggested for systematizing recombination principles concerning
actual ﬁrst-order properties and relations was to cash them out as claims according
to which certain sentences of a suﬃciently expressive language with predicates for
certain of those properties and relations are possibly true. We may generalize this
idea to systematize recombination principles concerning other sorts of entities. For
instance, if you want to recombine not only actual but also merely possible ﬁrst-order
properties and relations, you need only extend L so that it includes predicates for
such things. In that case, a principle, say, as strong as (2-12) would deliver not only a
metaphysical possibility in which there are two apples that stand exactly two feet from
one another, but also one in which there is an uncountable number of dragons and
an uncountable number of unicorns such that every dragon stands less than Planck
length from some unicorn.
Similarly, if you want to recombine not only properties and relations, but also
particulars (whether only actual or alsomerely possible), you need just add individual
constants to your language. In that case, a principle as strong as (2-12) would entail,
for instance, not only that it is possible that something be nine feet tall, but also that it
is possible that Socrates be nine feet tall. It would also entail not only that it is possible
that some human being exist and the Earth have satellites, but also that it is possible
that Socrates exist but the Moon does not.
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Once you have individual constants and ﬁrst-order predicates, you may also eas-
ily systematize recombination principles concerning states of aﬀairs, entities made
out of particulars instantiating properties. Suppose, for instance, that you want to
recombine atomic states of aﬀairs that are merely possible but that are made out of
only actual particulars instantiating only actual ﬁrst-order properties, e.g. the state of
aﬀairs of Socrates instantiating the property of being nine feet tall, the state of aﬀairs
of Wittgenstein instantiating the property of being four feet tall, etc. To get the rele-
vant recombination principle, all you need is a language with individual constants for
actual particulars and predicates for actual ﬁrst-order properties. en youmay state
the principle thus: for any atomic sentences of the language, if each of them is true
at some possible world but not at the actual one, and their conjunction has a model,
then there is a possible world at which such conjunction is true.
And so on for recombination principles dealing with diﬀerent sorts of entities and
diﬀerent ways of recombining them. All you need is a suﬃciently expressive language
with expressions for the relevant entities. en youmay just formulate recombination
principles for those entities as claims according to which such-and-such sentences
of that language are true at some metaphysically possible world. is would give a
precise rendition of many diﬀerent sorts of principles, whether Humean or not, and
would allow us to clearly see how exactly they are related to one another, i.e. whether
one is weaker, stronger, equivalent, or independent of another. Of course, drawing
distinctions between diﬀerent such principles would have to be done on a case-by-
case basis, as we did with recombination principles for actual ﬁrst-order properties
and relations. But the basic machinery to systematize such restrictions is perfectly
general.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTERNAL DEVIATIONS
My goal in this chapter is to show how exactly the metaphysical possibility of the
cases of external deviations at issue follows from R)P (the recombination principle
singled out in chapter 2) and minimal assumptions about the nature of mereological
relations and relations of spatiotemporal location. I will also defend R)P and those
assumptions in the qualiﬁed way that I described at the outset, and highlight a few
general consequences of accepting the possibility of our cases of external deviations
for various metaphysical debates.
3.1 RecombiningMereological and Location Relations
Remember from chapter 2 that the metaphysical possibility of our cases of external
deviations follows from (2-13) and the assumptions that our primitive parthood re-
lation, our primitive location relation, material thinghood, and regionhood are all
fundamental and pairwise determinably distinct. Given that we have traded (3-13)
for R)P, wemay give up these assumptions for the following two, since R)P recom-
bines only ﬁrst-order relations, not ﬁrst-order properties:
(Fundamentality) Parthood and location are fundamental.
(Distinctness) Parthood and location are determinably-distinct.
at we need only assume fundamentality and determinable-distinctness for part-
hood and location is a signiﬁcant advantage of R)P over (3-13), for it is highly con-
troversial whether material thinghood and regionhood are fundamental. But from
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our discussion about just how weak R)P is, it is clear that we also we need to take
certain possibilities for granted. As we will see below, the following ones suﬃce for
our purposes:
(P1) It is possible that there be two material things and two regions, such that one
of those material things is exactly located at one of those regions, and the other
material thing is exactly located at the other region.
(P2) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, one of which is part of the
other, and a pair of regions, one of which is not a subregion of the other.
(P3) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, one of which is not proper
part of the other, and a pair of regions, one of which is a subregion of the other.
Assuming P1-P3 is the same asmaking certain assumptions about the contents of T.
Let ‘M’ be the predicate ofL formaterial thinghood, ‘R’ the one for regionhood, ‘6’ the
one for our primitive parthood relation, ‘<’ the one for the proper parthood relation
deﬁned in terms of our primitive parthood relation, ‘@’ the one for our primitive
location relation, and ‘@’ the one for the exact location relation that we deﬁned from
our primitive one. Now remember that from the deﬁnition of proper parthood and
exact location, px < yq abbreviates px 6 y & : y 6 xq and that px@Sq abbreviates
p8S 0(x@S 0  9y (Ry & y 6 S & y 6 S 0))q. en it is clear that assuming P1-P3 is
just to assume that each of the following sentences of L is true at somemetaphysically
possible world, i.e. that no sentence of L that is incompatible with any of them is a
member of T:
(3-1) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 & Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1 6= x2 & y1 6= y2 & x1@y1 &
x2@y2)
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(3-2) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1 6 x2 & :y1 6 y2)
(3-3) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & y1 6 y2 & :x1 < x2)
Let us now see how the metaphysical possibility of the cases of external deviations at
stake follows from R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and P1-P3.
First, R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and P2 entail that it is metaphys-
ically possible that a material thing be part of a material object without being a
contraction of that object, i.e. that violations of Parts)Contractions, and hence of
Fusions)Expansions, are metaphysically possible. For consider a sentence, , of L
according to which a material thing that is part of a material object is exactly located
at a region that is not a subregion of that object’s exact location.  could then be any
sentence of L equivalent to the following one:
(3-4) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 & Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1@y1 & x2@y2 & x1 6 x2 &
:y1 6 y2)
Now notice that, by P1, no sentence of L concerning location, material thinghood, or
regionhood that is inconsistent with  is a member of T. By P2, no sentence of L
concerning parthood, material thinghood, or regionhood that is inconsistent with 
is amember of T. So, by Fundamentality andDistinctness, the antecedent of R)P is
satisﬁed for . So R)P requires that there be a metaphysically possible world where
 is true.
Another way to see this: given Fundamentality and Distinctness, R)P is eﬀec-
tively a principle according to which if (3-1) is true at some metaphysically possible
world, and so is (3-2), then so is (3-4). And P1 and P2 eﬀectively tell us that there is a
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metaphysically possible world at which (3-1) and (3-2) are true. So, from R)P, Fun-
damentality, Distinctness, P1, and P2 it follows that there is a metaphysically possible
world at which (3-4) is true.
Second, R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and P3 entail that it ismetaphysi-
cally possible that amaterial thing be a proper contraction of amaterial object without
being a proper part of that object, i.e. that violations of Proper-Contractions)Proper-
Parts, and hence of Contractions)Parts and Expansions)Fusions, are metaphysi-
cally possible. For consider a sentence, , of L according to which a material thing
that is not a proper part of a material object is exactly located at a region that is a
proper subregion of that object’s exact location.  could then be any sentence of L
equivalent to the following one:
(3-5) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 & Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1@y1 & x2@y2 & y1 < y2 &
:x1 < x2)
By P1, no sentence of L concerning location, material thinghood, or regionhood that
is inconsistent with  is a member of T. By P3, no sentence of L concerning part-
hood, material thinghood, or regionhood that is inconsistent with  is a member of
T. So, by Fundamentality and Distinctness, the antecedent of R)P is satisﬁed for
. So R)P requires that it be true at some possible world.
From the alternative viewpoint: given Fundamentality and Distinctness, R)P is
eﬀectively a principle according to which if (3-1) is true at some metaphysically pos-
sible world, and so is (3-3), then so is (3-5). And P1 and P3 eﬀectively tell us that
there is a metaphysically possible world at which (3-1) and (3-3) are true. So, from
R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and P2 it follows that there is a metaphysi-
cally possible world at which (3-5) is true.
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us, the metaphysical possibility of all the relevant violations of both directions
of both Parts,Contractions and Fusions,Expansions follows from R)P, Funda-
mentality, Distinctness, and P1-P3. It is worth noting that by strengthening P2 and
P3 just a tiny bit we may get cases of external deviations that are much more drastic
than the ones we just got. For instance, consider:
(P2*) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, one of which is part of the
other, and a pair of regions, which do not overlap.
(P2**) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, one of which is part of the
other, and a pair of regions, one of which is a proper subregion of the other.
(P3*) It is possible that there be a pair of material things that do not overlap, and a
pair of regions, one of which is a proper subregion of the other.
at is, suppose that the following sentences of L are true at some metaphysically
possible world, i.e. that no sentence of L that is incompatible with any of them is a
member of T:
(3-2*) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1&Mx2&Ry1&Ry2& x1 6 x2&:9y3(Ry3&y3 6 y1&
y3 6 y2))
(3-2**) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1 6 x2 & y1 < y2)
(3-3*) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 & Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & y1 < y2 & :9x3(Mx3 & x3 6
x1 & x3 6 x2))
By the same reasoning above, R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and P2* entail
that it is possible that a material thing be part of another, but that their exact locations
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be completely disjoint. at is, they entail that some sentence of L equivalent to the
following one is true at some possible world:
(3-4*) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1@y1 & x2@y2 & x1 6 x2 &
:9y3(Ry3 & y3 6 y1 & y3 6 y2))
By the same token, if we replace P2* with P2**, they entail that it is possible that a
material thing be part of one of its proper contractions, i.e. that a material thing be
part of a material object, where that object’s exact location is a proper subregion of
that thing’s exact location. at is, they entail that some sentence of L equivalent to
the following one is true at some possible world:
(3-4**) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1@y1 & x2@y2 & x1 6 x2 &
y2 < y1)
ese are twomore speciﬁc and pretty extreme violations of Parts)Contractions, and
hence of Fusions)Expansions. Similarly, R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1 and
P3* entail that it is possible that a material thing that fails to altogether overlap some
material object be a proper contraction of that object. at is, they entail that some
sentence of L equivalent to the following one is true at some possible world:
(3-5*) 9x19x29y19y2(Mx1 &Mx2 & Ry1 & Ry2 & x1@y1 & x2@y2 & y2 < y1 &
:9x3(Ry3 & x3 6 x1 & x3 6 x2))
is is amore speciﬁc and pretty extreme violation of Contractions)Parts, and hence
of Expansions)Fusions.
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R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and the diﬀerent versions of P2 andP3 are
thus strong enough to give us very radical cases of external deviations. e question
now is, of course, whether these claims are in fact true. Below I will defend these
claims. First, I will show that they have none of the questionable consequences that
(3-13) and the other assumptions have, and that they are in fact collectively veryweak.
en Iwill go throughR)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, andP1-P3 one by one, and
argue that rejecting each of them requires very extreme views, perhaps more so than
accepting the possibility of our cases of external deviations.
3.2 No Unexpected Costs
Let us then see why R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and the diﬀerent versions
of P2 and P3 are weak enough to deliver none of the other controversial and implau-
sible consequences of (3-13) et al. is should be clear from the fact that (i) without
further assumptions, R)P, Fundamentality, and Distinctness entail only trivial pos-
sibilities; that (ii) P1 makes very few demands about location, material thinghood,
and regionhood, whether taken together or on their own; and that (iii) the diﬀerent
versions of P2 and P3 make very few demands about parthood, material thinghood,
and regionhood, whether taken together or on their own. For instance, P1 and the
diﬀerent versions of P2 or P3 are compatible and with parthood being necessarily re-
ﬂexive, as well as with it being necessarily transitive; i.e. they do not require that T
have no members according to which parthood is reﬂexive, or according to which it
is transitive. So they are compatible with the antecedent of R)P being unsatisﬁed
for every sentence of L according to which parthood is not reﬂexive, or according to
which it is not transitive. Similarly, P1 and the diﬀerent versions of P2 and P3 are
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compatible with parthood being necessarily governed by classical extensional mere-
ology in both the case of material objects and the case of regions, with gunkymaterial
objects and gunky regions being impossible, with co-located material objects being
impossible, with it being impossible that there be certain cardinalities of material ob-
jects or regions, with it being impossible that a material object be located nowhere,
etc. It is clear that Tmay contain sentences of L for all the corresponding necessities.
Notice that from this it follows that all the above cases of external deviations are
themselves neutral on all the controversial consequences of (3-13) et al. So all such
cases are compatible with very strong necessities involving location, material thing-
hood, and regionhood, as well as with very strong necessities involving parthood,
material thinghood, and regionhood. It will be useful to go through a couple of cases
where this may not be obvious. First, Expansions)Fusions may be violated even if
composition among material objects is both necessarily unrestricted and necessarily
unique, and even if it is necessary that there be no co-located material objects. For
suppose that a material object, y, is an expansion but not a fusion of some material
things, the xs. en, although the xs do not compose y, the xs may still compose
a material thing, z; all that’s required is that z 6= y. Moreover, nothing forbids z
from being the only fusion of the xs. So composition may be both unrestricted and
unique in this situation. And since nothing requires that z share its exact location
withy, there need not be co-locatedmaterial objects in this situation. Second, Proper-
Contractions)Proper-Partsmay be violated even if it is necessary that everymaterial
object have proper parts, and even if it is necessary that there be no co-located mate-
rial objects. For suppose that a material thing, x, is a proper contraction of a material
thing, y, but that x is not proper part of y. at is compatible with y having proper
parts, and even with y being gunky; all that is required is that x not be one of y’s parts.
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So everything may have proper parts in this situation. And since none of y’s proper
parts need be a contraction of y, x need not share its exact location with any of y’s
parts. So there need not be co-located material objects in this situation.
An important point emerges from the above: although R)P, Fundamentality,
Distinctness, P1, and the diﬀerent versions of P2 and P3 entail that the mereological
structures of the material world and spacetime may radically misalign, they remain
to a great extent neutral as to what those structures look like, and as to how exactly
location ties the material world to spacetime. Moreover, they even remain neutral
as to whether those structures may internally misalign: R)P, Fundamentality, and
Distinctness deliver the possibility of internal deviations only if P1-P3 are replaced
with more substantive assumptions about the mereological structures of the mate-
rial world and spacetime, e.g. that simple and gunky material things and regions are
possible.
It is worth noting that all the above cases of external deviations are also compatible
with very strong claims of a diﬀerent sort. Consider, for instance, universalism about
expansions (i.e. the claim that any material things have an expansion), uniqueness
about expansions (i.e. the claim that no material things have more than one expan-
sion), and the claim that every material object has proper contractions. R)P, Fun-
damentality, Distinctness, and appropriate replacements of P1-P3 require that none
of such claims be necessary, since they are claims according to which parthood and
location are instantiated together in some way. But it is interesting that there may be
worlds with external deviations where such claims hold, for it stresses just how little
external deviations require. For instance, Fusions)Expansions may be violated at
worlds where expansions are both unrestricted and unique. For suppose that some
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xs compose but do not expand into some y. en the xs may still expand into some
z 6= y, where z is the only expansion of the xs. So expansions may be both unre-
stricted and unique in this situation. (Moreover, there need not be co-located mate-
rial objects in this situation: by deﬁnition, y’s exact location is not z’s exact location.)
Similarly, Parts)Contractions may be violated at worlds where every material thing
has a proper contraction. For if some x is a part but not a contraction of some y, y
may still have proper contractions, as long as x is not one of them. So everything may
have proper parts in this situation. (Moreover, there need not be co-located material
objects: by deﬁnition, x’s exact location is not the location of any of y’s contractions.)
Here is another way in which R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1, and the
diﬀerent versions of P2 and P3 are very weak. ese claims are neutral as to which
ﬁrst-order properties and relations particulars have or stand in essentially, i.e. on is-
sues about ﬁrst-order essentialism. For instance, they do not entail that it is possible
that my hand be one of my parts but not one of my contractions, or that it is possible
that my head be one of my contractions but not one of my parts. Nor do they entail
that I could have a part that is not one of my contractions, or a contraction that is not
part of me. Moreover, they are compatible with such strong views as mereological es-
sentialism (the view that a thing’s parts are essential to it) and locational essentialism
(the view that a thing’s locations are essential to it). All this is clear from the fact that
no sentence of L has individual constants: R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, P1,
and the diﬀerent versions of P2 and P3 deliver only de dicto possibilities.
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3.3 A Reductio?
So far I have argued that the possibility of violations of both directions of both
Parts,Contractions and Fusions,Expansions follows from R)P, Fundamentality,
Distinctness, and P1-P3. But all this means is that these claims together are inconsis-
tent. So one may take this result as a reductio on at least one of R)P, Fundamental-
ity, Distinctness, and P1-P3, rather than as an argument for the possibility of external
deviations. As I mentioned at the outset, I will remain neutral on this issue. I will
only argue that rejecting R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, or P1-P3 leaves us with
a choice of equally unappealing alternatives. A thorough assessment of the relative
merits and drawbacks of all the options on the table will have to wait for some other
time.
Let’s begin with P1-P3. P1 is a very weak claim: all it claims is that it is possible
that there be two material things and two regions at which those things are exactly
located. at is, all it claims is that there is a metaphysically possible world at which
(3-1) is true. So rejecting this claim seems pretty extreme: one would have to hold
that it is impossible that there be at least two regions, or that it is impossible that there
be at least two material objects, or that it is impossible that a material object be ex-
actly located at some region, etc. As implausible as each of these options may sound,
however, there are views in the literature supporting them. Consider, for instance,
existence nihilism, the view that there are no concrete objects (cf. Hawthorne and
Cortens 1995). One may reject P1 by arguing that existence nihilism is necessarily
true, for such view entails that it is impossible that there be any material objects or
regions. Or consider existence monism, the view that there is exactly one concrete
object (cf. Horgan and Potrč 2000). One may reject P1 by arguing that existence
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monism is necessarily true, for such view entails that it is impossible that there be
at least two material objects, or at least two regions. But thinking that either exis-
tence nihilism or existence monism is necessarily true is arguably at least as radical
as thinking that external deviations are possible.
It is worth noting that other seemingly less drastic views are not on their own suﬃ-
cient to reject P1. For instance, P1 is compatible with the bundle theory of particulars
being necessarily true. For the bundle theory does not claim that there are no regions
or material objects—it only claims that each of those things is identical to some clus-
ter of compresent properties. In other words, the bundle theory is a view about the
nature of particulars, not about their existence, and P1 is completely neutral as to
what the nature of particulars may be. Similarly, the view that substantivalism about
spacetime is necessarily false does not suﬃce to reject P1. For, as I argued at the outset,
substantivalists and relationalists disagree about the nature of spacetime, not about its
existence, and P1 is neutral as to what the nature of spacetimemay be. In other words,
P1 is perfectly compatible with any views you might have as to whether the existence
and features of regions is reducible to the existence and features of material objects
and relations among them. By the same token, thinking that supersubstantivalism is
necessarily true is not suﬃcient to reject P1. Remember that supersubstantivalism is
the view that every material thing is identical to its exact location. So it does not deny
the existence of material objects—it is a view about the nature of such things, not
about their existence. And P1 is neutral as to what the nature of material things may
be. (Supersubstantivalism does provide a way of resisting the possibility of external
deviations, which I address below. My point here is only that the necessary truth of
supersubstantivalism does not require that P1 be false.)
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Another way to put the point: the necessary truth of the bundle theory, relation-
alism, or supersubstantivalism does not guarantee the existence of members of T
that are incompatible with a sentence of L according to which two material objects
are exactly located at two regions. e existence of such members of T follows only
from more radical nihilist claims about the existence of material things and regions.
It seems, then, that any reasonable way to reject P1 along these lines requires that a
view along the lines of existence nihilism or existence monism be necessarily true.
I want to ﬁnish my discussion of P1 by noting why a less extreme way in which P1
may be rejected is ultimately ineﬀective. One may think that although it is necessary
that everymaterial object be located somewhere, it is not necessary that everymaterial
object be exactly located at some region. at is, onemay reject an assumption Imade
at the outset: that exact location is necessarily a total function on material things.
is in fact seems to be actually the case: quantummechanics suggests that the exact
location of some fundamental particles is indeterminate.
However, this on its own is not suﬃcient to reject P1, for P1 only claims that it is
possible that some material thing be exactly located somewhere. What is required in
order to reject P1 along these lines is that it be altogether impossible that a material
object have an exact location. is would seem to be a pretty extreme view, perhaps
more so than any of the ones considered so far. But even if such view is true, we
may still get misalignments of the intended sort by focusing on entire location, or
even weak location instead of on exact location. Consider, for instance, a weakening
of P1 along the following lines: it is possible that there be two material things and
two regions, such that one material thing is entirely/weakly located one region but
not at the other, and the other material thing is entirely/weakly located at the other
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region but not at the ﬁrst. Together with R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and
P2, this claim entails that it is possible that a thing be part of another, but that it be
entirely/weakly located at a region that the other is not. So in order to reject this
weakening of P1 along the intended lines, a yet more exotic view is required: that it
is impossible that a material object be entirely/weakly located somewhere!
us, rejecting P1 leaves us with a choice of alternatives that are at least as radical
as the possibility external deviations. Let me now move on to P2 and P3.
P2 and P3 are also very weak: all they claim is that (3-2) and (3-3) are true at some
possible world. Like with P1, these claimsmay be rejected by arguing that a view such
as that existence nihilism or existencemonism is necessarily true. But there is another
option in this case. Notice that P2 entails that it is possible that a material object have
proper parts. Similarly, P3 entails that it is possible that a region have proper subre-
gions. One may then reject P2 and P3 by arguing that mereological nihilism about
both material objects and regions is necessarily true, i.e. that only simple material ob-
jects and regions are possible. But this view is also a very extreme one: it claims that
both composite material objects and composite regions are impossible. So it seems
that rejecting P2 and P3 also leaves us with a choice of no less radical alternatives than
the possibility of external deviations.
Let me now take a look at R)P, Fundamentality, and Distinctness. I will go
through them in turn.
As discussed in chapter 2, recombination principles are oen dismissed on two
sorts of grounds: that they are imprecise and it is unclear what exactly they entail, or
that they clearly entail too much. But R)P cannot be dismissed on either of these
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grounds. Unlike principles along the lines of (3-9), it is perfectly precise: its logical
form is transparent, and it is absolutely clear what exactly follows from it. And unlike
principles such as (3-11)-(3-13), it does not entail too much. In fact, remember that
R)P is very weak: it alone delivers only trivial possibilities.
Given how weak R)P is, it is a very hard claim to reject. It may be rejected only
if there is a plurality of fundamental, pairwise determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order rela-
tions other than parthood and location, such that there are independently plausible
possibilities concerning only one of those relations (i.e. possibilities playing the role
of P1-P3) on the basis of which R)P delivers an independently implausible possi-
bility concerning two or more of those relations (i.e. a possibility playing the role of
the possibility of external deviations). For only by there being one such plurality of
relations would one have independent motivation to reject R)P.
It is hard to think of one such an independently motivated case against R)P.
Moreover, one may give a direct argument for R)P, which rules out the existence
of such counterexamples. Here is the gist: arguably the contents of T allow that
R)P be true of at least some fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations
and at least some non-trivial non-actual ways of instantiating them together. at
is, arguably the contents of T allow that for at least some such relations and at least
some suchways of instantiating them together it bemetaphysically possible that those
relations be instantiated together in those ways. But then it would be unacceptably
arbitrary if R)P did not hold for all such relations and all such ways of instantiat-
ing them together (provided they remain compatible with T). For there is nothing
special about only some of those relations, or about only some of those ways of instan-
tiating them together—they are all metaphysically on par. So, on pain of arbitrariness,
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R)P must hold across the board: for any fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-
order relations and any non-trivial non-actual ways of instantiating them together
that are compatible with T, it is metaphysically possible that those relations be in-
stantiated together in those ways. Call this argument for R)P the argument from
metaphysical parity.
In order to resist the argument frommetaphysical parity one must either buy into
arbitrariness or deny that R)P is true of at least some fundamental determinably-
distinct ﬁrst-order relations and at least some non-trivial non-actual ways of instan-
tiating them together. e former option is unacceptable—nature does not play fa-
vorites. But the latter one is not much more appealing. For if R)P is not true of at
least some such relations and some such ways of instantiating them together, then
every way in which any two or more such relations are actually instantiated together
must be necessary. at is, every actually true sentence of L with occurrences of two
or more predicates expressing such relations and with occurrences of no other predi-
cates must be necessarily true. And this has undesirable consequences—it entails that
many arguably contingent features of the actual world are necessary. For instance, it
entails that there could not be fewer concrete objects than those that actually stand in
various fundamental determinably-distinct ﬁrst-order relations to one another. For
the class of actually true sentences of Lwith occurrences of two ormore predicates ex-
pressing such relations and with occurrences of no other predicates entails that there
actually are at least  concrete things, for some cardinal number . But if such sen-
tences are necessarily true, then it is impossible that there be fewer than  concrete
things. is is problematic not only because that there are at least  concrete things
seems to be contingent, but also because such necessity calls for an explanation. And
it is hard to even imagine what could explain such necessity. Brutemodality threatens.
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So not only is it hard to think of independently plausible counterexamples to R)P,
but rejecting it leaves us with unpalatable options: either metaphysical arbitrariness
or that seemingly contingent features of the actual world are not only necessary, but
also brutally necessary.
Let me now turn to Fundamentality. Remember that to say that parthood and lo-
cation are fundamental is to say that facts about each are not grounded on facts about
some other ﬁrst-order properties or relations. So in order to reject that parthood is
fundamental it is not suﬃcient to argue that parthood may be deﬁned in terms of
other mereological relations, such as proper parthood, overlap, etc. For that at best
shows that parthood is not theoretically or conceptually primitive, not that it is not
metaphysically primitive. Moreover, what is at stake is whether facts about mereo-
logical relations are grounded on facts about some non-mereological properties or
relations. is is completely independent of which mereological relation one takes to
be conceptually prior, as well as of whether Fundamentality is formulated in terms of
parthood or in terms of other mereological relations. Similarly, in order to reject that
location is fundamental it is not enough to note that locationmay be deﬁned in terms
of other location relations. Again, what is at stake is whether facts about location re-
lations are grounded on facts about some non-locational properties or relations. And
this again is completely independent of which location relation one takes to be con-
ceptually primitive, as well as of which such relation Fundamentality is formulated in
terms of.
In order to reject Fundamentality it is not suﬃcient to think that facts about the lo-
cation of composite material objects are grounded on facts about the location of their
parts either (cf. Brzozowski 2008,Williams 2008). is is a picture onwhich there is a
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fundamental location relation that holds between simple material things and regions,
and a non-fundamental location relation that holds between composite material ob-
jects and regions. But then there is still a fundamental location relation on this view,
and this is all Fundamentality requires. Moreover, violations of Contractions)Parts
need only involve location of simple material things: that x is a contraction but not a
part of y is compatible with both x and y being simple. But the more serious problem
with this attempt at undermining Fundamentality is that the view in question is per-
fectly compatible with violations of either direction of either Parts,Contractions or
Fusions,Expansions. For instance, pace Brzozowski and Williams, that x is a part
but not a contraction ofy is perfectly compatible with the claim thaty is locatedwhere
it is in virtue of x and the rest of y’s proper parts being located where they are.
Now, it is hard to see which facts about non-mereological properties or relations
could ground facts about mereological relations. It is also hard to see which facts
about some non-locational properties and relations could ground facts about loca-
tional relations. But not only is it diﬃcult to see how could Fundamentality be re-
jected—there is also a general worry about rejecting it. e worry is that doing so
would eﬀectively undermine every combinatorial argument for the possibility of any
sort of misalignment between the mereological structure of the material world and
that of spacetime. As I mentioned at the outset, combinatorial arguments are the
main kind of argument that have been oﬀered for the possibility of cases of internal
deviations, such as the possibility of mereological simples with amereologically com-
plex exact location. Such arguments require Fundamentality as a premise, for as we
have seen there are independent reasons not to want to recombine non-fundamental
ﬁrst-order relations. So if one thinks that it is possible that there be internal devia-
tions but not external ones, then a new kind of argument is needed for the possibility
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of internal deviations, which does not have Fundamentality as a premise and does not
generalize for the possibility of external deviations. Moreover, a new kind of expla-
nation for why internal deviations are possible is called for: we can no longer say that
they are possible because such-and-such components of reality may be recombined
in such-and-such way. Brute modality threatens once again.
Of course, if it is necessary that the mereological structures of the material world
and spacetime perfectly align, then it will not be a problem that rejecting Funda-
mentality undermines every combinatorial argument for the possibility of any sort of
misalignment between those structures, as well as every combinatorial explanation of
any such possibility. But brutemodality threatens here as well: an explanation of such
necessity is called for. And it seems that the only view capable of fully explaining why
such perfect alignment is necessary is the view that supersubstantivalism is necessar-
ily true. If supersubstantivalism is necessarily true, then it is trivial that both internal
and external deviations are impossible. If every material thing is its exact location,
then, trivially, its mereological structure and that of its exact location perfectly align.
And if material things are their exact locations, then mereological relations on them
and on their exact locations are trivially preserved in both directions. e necessary
truth of supersubstantivalism would thus fully and easily explain the necessity at is-
sue. (Schaﬀer MSb defends supersubstantivalism precisely on these grounds.) But
the view that supersubstantivalism is necessarily true is arguably at least as radical as
the view that external deviations are possible.
So not only is it hard to see what non-mereological and non-locational facts could
ground mereological and locational facts: rejecting Fundamentality also leaves us
with either brute modality or the view that supersubstantivalism is necessarily true.
And both options are at least as unpalatable as the possibility of external deviations.
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Let’s now go onto Distinctness. is would seem to be an uncontroversial claim:
it seems that neither parthood nor location is a determinate of the other, and that they
are not determinates of some common determinable (other than a trivial one: rela-
tionhood). However, Distinctness may be rejected under supersubstantivalism. For
if every material object is identical to its exact location, then for a material thing to be
located at some region is for it to overlap that region. So, according to supersubstan-
tivalists, location relations betweenmaterial objects and regions are just mereological
relations between regions. It follows that location relations andmereological relations
are not determinably-distinct: since location relations aremereological relations, any
determinable that mereological relations fall under is a determinable that location
relations also fall under. is actually explains why for the supersubstantivalist it is
trivial that both internal and external deviations are impossible. Remember that we
have stipulated that L has only one predicate for any given ﬁrst-order property or re-
lation. So a supersubstantivalist construal of L will not include diﬀerent predicates
for location relations and mereological relations: sentences of L concerning location
will be sentences with only mereological vocabulary. But then every sentence of L ac-
cording to which parthood and location are instantiated so that there are internal or
external disparities will be a logical falsehood. For instance, a sentence of L according
to which a material thing is a part but not a contraction of another is a sentence of L
saying that a thing that is part of another without being part of it.
I have already said that I believe that supersubstantivalism is as radical as that
external deviations are possible. And it is hard to think of any other grounds onwhich
one may reject Distinctness. So it seems that rejecting it leaves us again with a choice
of equally unappealing alternatives.
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To conclude this section, I would like to discuss a ﬁnal way inwhich onemay block
the argument for the possibility of external deviations, which targets a couple of back-
ground assumptions, rather than R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and P1-P3. Re-
member that at the outset we assumed that there was only one sort of part-whole re-
lations, so that if any things stand in some part-whole relation to one another, then
such relation must be deﬁnable in terms of the parthood relation we chose as primi-
tive. Similarly, we assumed that there was only one sort of relations of spatiotemporal
location, so that if any things stand in some location to some regions, then such re-
lation must be deﬁnable in terms of the location relation we chose as primitive. Call
the views that reject these assumptions mereological pluralism and location plural-
ism, respectively. According to the former, there is more than one primitive sort of
mereological relations, which are not interdeﬁnable; according to the latter, there is
more than one sort of location relations, which are not interdeﬁnable. Each of these
views aﬀords a way to resist the argument for the possibility of external deviations.
For instance, mereological pluralism allows for there to be a sort of part-whole rela-
tions that hold exclusively among material things, and another sort that hold exclu-
sively among spacetime regions. But then such relations will fail to be determinably-
distinct—they are both part-whole relations of some sort or other—and hence they
will not be amenable to recombination. Similarly, location pluralism would allow,
for instance, for a view on which every material object bears a diﬀerent sort of loca-
tion relation to spacetime regions. But if so, location relations will not be able to be
recombined with mereological relations so that there are external deviations.
Regardless of what one may think about the viability of pluralist proposals along
these lines, blocking the argument for external deviations this way will face the same
general worries that rejecting Fundamentality faces. Adopting any such proposal
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would undermine any combinatorial argument for and explanation of the possibility
of any sort of misalignment between the part-whole structure of the material world
and the part-whole structure of spacetime. And if so, on pain of brute modality, one
would once again have to resort to thinking that supersubstantivalism is necessarily
true.
Rejecting, then, one of R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and P1-P3 leaves us
with a choice of alternatives that are just as unpalatable as the possibility of external
deviations: that existence nihilism is necessarily true, that existencemonism is neces-
sarily true, that mereological nihilism about both material objects and regions is nec-
essarily true, that supersubstantivalism is necessarily true, that there is metaphysical
arbitrariness, and that some possibilities and necessities are brute. Another way to put
the point: anyone who thinks that neither existence nihilism nor existence monism
is necessarily true, that supersubstantivalism is not necessarily true, that there is no
metaphysical arbitrariness, and that there are no brute modal facts must believe that
external deviations are metaphysically possible. So this result should be of great in-
terest, for very few philosophers are existence nihilists, existence monists, supersub-
stantivalists, or friends of either arbitrariness or brute modality.
As I mentioned above, I will not further discuss whether any of the alternatives
is to be preferred over the possibility of external deviations. Instead, I now want to
highlight a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various other important
debates in metaphysics, for that their possibility may be weighed against other sorts
of considerations perhaps illuminates whether we should accept or reject them. In
the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the relevance of their possibility for a few
debates very generally. In the remaining two chapters I will delve deeply into two
more speciﬁc consequences.
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3.4 SoWhat ifey Are Possible?
Remember that external deviations are those in which mereological relations fail to
be preserved either from some material things to their exact locations, or from some
material things’ exact locations to those material things. One way to conceive of ex-
ternal deviations is as misalignments between the mereological structure of the ma-
terial world and the mereological structure of spacetime. But one may also conceive
of them as failures of correspondence between two structures of the material world:
its mereological structure, which is ﬁxed by the part-whole relations that material
things bear to one another, and its spatiotemporal structure, which is ﬁxed by the
relations of relative spatiotemporal location that material things bear to one another.
For remember that cases violating either direction of either Parts,Contractions or
Fusions,Expansions are just cases in which mereological relations and relations of
relative spatiotemporal location among material objects come apart in one or the
other direction. Conceiving of external deviations in this second way will allow us
to more directly see how their possibility has a strong bearing on various important
debates in metaphysics.
Although cases of external deviations require that the mereological and spa-
tiotemporal structures of the material world misalign, they are compatible with
those structures being equally complex. For remember from §3.2 above that
Expansions)Fusions may be violated even if composition among material objects
is unrestricted: a material thing, y, may be an expansion but not a fusion of some
material objects, the xs, even if any material things—including the xs, as well as the
xs and y—have a fusion. Similarly, Fusions)Expansions may be violated even if
expansion among material objects is unrestricted: y may be a fusion but not an ex-
91
pansion of the xs even if any things—including the xs, as well as the xs and y—have
an expansion. From this it is easy to see that either direction of Fusions,Expansions
may be violated even if both composition and expansion are unrestricted, for nothing
in these situations would prevent any material things from having both a fusion and
an expansion. So it is clear that wemay have external deviations, and hencemisalign-
ments between the mereological and spatiotemporal structures of the material world,
even if those structures are equally complex.
However, some of the most interesting consequences of the possibility of external
deviations involve cases where the mereological and spatiotemporal structures of the
material world diﬀer in complexity. To see this, let’s ﬁrst see how there may be such
diﬀerences. Notice that just as Expansions)Fusionsmay be violated even if composi-
tion amongmaterial objects is unrestricted, it may be violated even ifmereological ni-
hilism about material objects is true: a material thing, y, may be an expansion but not
a fusion of some material things, the xs, even if no two or more material objects—the
xs included—have a fusion. But from this it follows that a world may have spatiotem-
porally complex material objects without having mereologically complex ones, i.e.
that a world may have material objects with proper contractions but no material ob-
jects with proper parts. So the material world may be spatiotemporally complex but
mereologically simple. Similarly, just as Fusions)Expansions may be violated even if
expansion is unrestricted, it may be violated even if nihilism about expansions is true:
amaterial thing, y, may be a fusion but not an expansion of somematerial objects, the
xs, even if no two or more material objects—the xs included—have an expansion. It
follows that a world may have mereologically complex material objects without hav-
ing spatiotemporally complex ones, i.e. that a world may have material things with
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parts but no material things with proper contractions. e material world may thus
bemereologically complex but spatiotemporally simple.1
Of course, the complexity of the mereological and spatiotemporal structures of
the material world may come apart in other ways. For there are three general views
about composition amongmaterial objects: that it is unrestricted (anymaterial things
compose something), that it is restricted (only some material things compose some-
thing), and that it is null (no two or more material things compose something). And
there are three analogous views about expansion among material objects: that it is
unrestricted (any material things expand into something), that it is restricted (only
somematerial things expand into something), and that it is null (no two or more ma-
terial things expand into something). From the above it is easy to see that each of
these views on composition is compatible with each of these views about expansion.
So the mereological and spatiotemporal complexity of the material world may diﬀer
in any of these ways.
Let’s then go into some consequences of the possibility of external deviations in
which the mereological and spatiotemporal structures of the material world diﬀer
in complexity. Consider a world where Expansions)Fusions is violated but where
mereological nihilism about material objects holds. Such a world would be popu-
lated bymaterial objects of an interesting sort, which I call crowded extended simples.
Crowded extended simples are mereologically simple but spatiotemporally complex
material objects, i.e. they have proper contractions but no proper parts. Crowded
extended simples may then be arbitrarily large, since they may have arbitrarily large
1Remember that R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and P1-P3 are neutral on what the mereologi-
cal structure of both the material world and spacetime look like. So they are also neutral on whether it
is metaphysically possible that the mereological and spatiotemporal structures of the material world dif-
fer in complexity. To explore the relevance of external deviations for other debates in metaphysics, I am
bracketing these issues.
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contractions. ey may also have arbitrary spatiotemporal complexity, since they
may have an arbitrarily large number of contractions. Provided that the mereological
structure of their exact location allows for it, each of their contractionsmay even have
proper contractions, i.e. they may be spatiotemporally gunky. Moreover, their exact
location may be a scattered region. But they would still be mereologically simple:
they would have no proper parts.
e possibility of crowded extended simples has not been entertained in the lit-
erature before. In fact, it has been widely assumed that a simple may have no proper
contractions. Sider (2007), for instance, claims that nomaterial thing could be exactly
located at a proper subregion of an extended simple’s exact location, hence implicitly
assuming that crowded extended simples are impossible. Certain views on simples
allow for material stuﬀ to be exactly located at proper subregions of an extended sim-
ple’s exact location (e.g.Markosian 1998, 2004). But crowded extended simples have
material things, not material stuﬀ, within their exact locations.
Not only has the possibility of this new breed of simples not been entertained in
the literature before—it is also of great interest for a number of metaphysical debates.
For instance, it makes it clear thatmereological nihilists need not be committed to be-
lieving that only tiny, structureless material objects exist, as it is commonly thought.
In fact, it shows that mereological nihilists may believe in a multitude of arbitrar-
ily large material objects with an arbitrarily complex structure. is suggests that a
mereologically nihilist ontology allows for the existence of material objects that could
in principle be identiﬁed with the medium-sized dry goods of common sense—there
need not only be tiny particles arranged such-and-such-wise.2
2Of course, it is not obvious how such an ontology may avoid the metaphysical problems that motivate
mereological nihilism in the ﬁrst place (e.g. puzzles about coincidence and change about common sense
material things). In a work in progress, I show how this may be done.
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Crowded extended simples also have a strong bearing on debates about howmate-
rial things extend and change across space and time. First, crowded extended simples
extend across space and time without having spatial or temporal parts. Let’s say that
a material thing extends over space iﬀ it spreads over more than one spatial region,
and persists over time if it spreads over more than one time. Let’s also say that per-
tending objects are those that extend over space without having spatial parts, and that
perduring objects are those that persist over time by having temporal parts. Cf. Par-
sons (MS). en it is clear that crowded extended simples they do not extend over
space by pertending, and they do not persist over time by perduring, for they have no
proper parts. Nonetheless, crowded extended simples allow for as much plenitude
as friends of arbitrary spatial and temporal parts believe in: for any ﬁlled spatial or
temporal region at a world populated by crowded extended simples, there may be a
material object exactly located at that region (compare with Hawthorne 2006). More-
over, there may be exactly one material object at any such region, and so there may
be plenitude in a non-pertending and non-perduring world even without coincident
material objects.
Second, crowded extended simples may qualitatively vary across both space and
time: they may change from being F to being G across either space or time by hav-
ing a spatial or temporal contraction that is F, and another that is G. Notice that
this is perfectly compatible with F and G being properties that material things have
simpliciter. Crowded extended simples thus show that material things with neither
spatial nor temporal parts may vary across space and time without having properties
relative to spatial or temporal regions (as well as without having anything so fancy
as distributional properties; cf. Parsons 2004). So they aﬀord a new treatment of the
so-called problems of temporary and spatial intrinsics (cf. Lewis 1986 and McDaniel
2003, respectively).
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Letme now discuss a few consequences of another way in which the complexity of
themereological and spatiotemporal structures of thematerial worldmay come apart.
Consider a world where Fusions)Expansions is violated but where nihilism about
expansions holds. Such a world would be inhabited by material objects of another
interesting sort, which I call compact fusions. Compact fusions have proper parts but
no proper contractions: they are spatiotemporally simple but mereologically com-
plex material things. Compact fusions may thus be arbitrarily small. Provided that
the mereological structure of spacetime allows for it, their exact location may even
be a simple region, e.g. a point. Nonetheless, they have proper parts. In fact, their
proper parts may be arbitrarily large—they may even be proper contractions of one
of their proper parts. Moreover, compact fusions may have arbitrarily many proper
parts—they may even be gunky, i.e. have parts all the way down (or, rather, all the
way up, or all the way around).
As bizarre as such tinymonsters may be, the possibility of compact fusions is con-
nected to various debates in metaphysics.3 For instance, it goes against various suf-
ﬁcient conditions for mereological simplicity that have been given in the literature.
According toMarkosian (1998), a material thing is mereologically simple if it is max-
imally continuous, and McDaniel (2007a) suggests that a material thing is mereolog-
ically simple if it, and only it, is exactly located at some point.4 But from the above it
3at a material thing has proper parts that are not contractions of it may not be as outlandish a claim
as one may think. Two kinds of cases to consider: ﬁrst, Sider reminds us that “We give metaphorical
expression to deep love by saying: ‘this person is a part of me’. Deep loss: ‘A part of me has been cut
out”’ (Sider, 2007, §2). A view on mereological relations on which claims along these lines (even if not
the speciﬁc ones Sider mentions) are literally true would have room for compact fusions. And it seems
that one such view should not be dismissed without argument—perhaps it gets at what is deep, intimate,
and special about parthood. Second, consider quantum nonlocality. Perhaps action at a distance involves
mereologically related but spatially disjoint material objects.
4A maximally continuous object is a material thing that is exactly located at a region every subregion
of which is occupied by some object or other, and cannot be divided into two regions such that the closure
of one shares no subregion with the other.
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is clear that a compact fusion may be maximally continuous and exactly located—all
alone—at a point. e possibility of compact fusions also goes against the claim that
a material thing must be located where it is parts are located, which Parsons (2007)
considers an analytic truth, and Sider (2007) a constitutive claim of the nature of part-
hood. For clearly a compact fusion must fail to be located at some region where one
of its parts is located. And the possibility of compact fusions also shows that mereo-
logical universalists need not be committed to believing in arbitrarily large, scattered
objects, as is commonly thought. For instance, it shows that from the existence of a
fusion of my nose and the Eiﬀel tower it does not follow that there is an object that is
located at both Paris and New York.
Perhaps crowded extended simples and compact fusions reveal something more
general about metaphysical debates concerning the structure of the material world,
however. When one wonders whether there are material simples, perhaps what is
really at issue is whether there are material things with no proper contractions, not
whether there are material things with no proper parts. Similarly, when one won-
ders whether a material thing may be complex all the way down, perhaps what is at
issue is whether it may have proper contractions all the way down, not whether it
may have parts all the way down. And when one wonders whether a material thing
must be complex in order for it to extend and qualitatively vary across space and time,
perhaps what is really at issue is whether it must have spatial and temporal contrac-
tions, not spatial and temporal parts. Or when one wonders whether some material
things make up a further one, perhaps what is at issue is whether they have an ex-
pansion, not whether they have a fusion. So perhaps metaphysicians have focused on
the wrong kinds of issues when they have addressed issues about the simplicity and
complexity of the material world—maybe what is really at stake is the spatiotemporal
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structure of the world, not its mereological structure. If so, then we should ask and
address questions that have not been explicitly asked or addressed before, instead of
the questions we have been focusing on so far. For instance, we should ask what are
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for some material things to expand into an-
other, not what are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for somematerial things to
compose another (compare with Van Inwagen 1990). Similarly, we should ask what
are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a material thing to have no proper con-
tractions, not what are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a material thing to
have no proper parts (compare with Markosian 1998).
One may be tempted to think that these questions about contractions and ex-
pansions may be addressed in just the same ways that the questions about parts and
fusions have been addressed in the literature, i.e. that debates over contractions and
expansions would simply follow the debates over parts and fusions. But it is easy
to dispel this thought. For instance, parthood and contraction have very diﬀerent
formal properties: it is a logical truth that if subregionhood is reﬂexive and transi-
tive, then contraction is both reﬂexive and transitive. But the same is not true about
parthood. Whether parthood is anti-symmetric is controversial, but not as contro-
versial as whether contraction is anti-symmetric (provided subregionhood is anti-
symmetric, anti-symmetry for contraction is just the claim that no twomaterial things
share their exact location). On the other hand, we have seen that R)P, Fundamental-
ity, Distinctness, and P1-P3 entail that any view on when a material thing has proper
contractions is contingently true, and similarly with any view on when somematerial
objects have an expansion. But, as we have also seen, R)P, Fundamentality, Distinct-
ness, and P1-P3 entail nothing about mereological simplicity or complexity. So it is
not trivial that one may deal with questions about contractions and expansions just
as questions about parthood and composition have been dealt with.
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Let me close this chapter with another debate for which the possibility of external
deviations is relevant: the debate over coincident material objects. Consider the old
puzzle of a statue and the lump of clay it is made of. ere is a view on which the
lump and the statue are both composed of some plurality of physical particles, but
on which either certain things that are part of the lump are not part of the statue
(e.g. some scattered claybits), or certain things that are part of the statue are not part
of the lump (e.g. the statue’s head, arms, etc.) (cf. Doepke 1982, Baker 2000, Lowe
2003). Wasserman (2002) suggests that this sort of view is incoherent, i.e. that it is
incoherent that the statue and the lump share all of their microphysical parts without
sharing all of their macrophysical ones. e possibility of external deviationsmakes it
clear otherwise, however, providedwe think—as friends of distinct coincident objects
do—that uniqueness of composition, expansion, and exact location are not among the
necessary truths that hold of parthood and location. For theremay be three pluralities
of material things, the xs, the ys, and the zs, such that for two material objects, a and
b, (i) a and b are both fusions and expansions of the xs; (ii) a is a fusion and an
expansion of the ys, and an expansion but not a fusion of the zs; and (iii) b is a fusion
and an expansion of the zs, and an expansion but not a fusion of the ys. Applied
to the statue and the lump: one may think that (i) the statue and the lump are both
fusions and expansions of some microphysical particles; (ii) the statue is a fusion as
well as an expansion of its head, arms, etc., and an expansion but not a fusion of some
claybits; and (iii) the lump is a fusion as well as an expansion of those claybits, and
an expansion but not a fusion of the statue’s head, arms, etc. And not only does the
possibility of external deviations show that this view is coherent—it also show how
the statue and the lump may diﬀer in their categorical features: they diﬀer in their
parts. So external deviations also aﬀord new treatment of the grounding problem for
coincident objects.
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CHAPTER 4
PERSISTENCE, DIACHRONIC COMPOSITION, AND DIACHRONIC
CONTRACTION
Perdurantism is the view that things persist over time by having diﬀerent temporal
parts at diﬀerent times at which they exist. One of themost interesting and inﬂuential
arguments for this view is the so-called argument from vagueness, the clearest and
most compelling formulation of which we owe to Sider (1997, 2001). e general
structure of the argument is straightforward. It has twomain steps. e ﬁrst step aims
at establishing unrestricted diachronic composition—the view that for any things and
any times at which they exist, there exists an object that those things compose across
those times—from considerations about indeterminacy. e second step purports to
show that perdurantism follows from unrestricted diachronic composition.
Filling in the details gets a bit more complicated. For the ﬁrst step, the idea is to
apply Lewis’s argument for unrestricted composition simpliciter—the view that any
thingswhatsoever compose something—to the cross-temporal case. Here is the gist of
Lewis’s argument: any plausible restriction on composition requires that composition
be indeterminate. Composition cannot be indeterminate; so, there is no restriction
on composition (Lewis 1986, pp. 212-213). e thought is to apply this to the cross-
temporal case as follows: any plausible restriction ondiachronic composition requires
that it be indeterminate. Diachronic composition cannot be indeterminate; so, there
is no restriction on diachronic composition. For the second step, the idea is that
unrestricted diachronic composition entails that a thing exists at some time only if it
has a temporal part at that time. And this consequence is supposed to be tantamount
to accepting perdurantism.
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Objections to the ﬁrst step of the argument have focused on the plausibility of
restrictions on composition that do not require that (diachronic) composition be in-
determinate, as well as on the question of whether (diachronic) composition may
be indeterminate (see next chapter). Objections to the second step have focused on
the jump from unrestricted diachronic composition to perdurantism (Koslicki 2003,
Miller 2005, Lowe 2005; see Varzi 2007 for discussion). Here I would like to press on a
diﬀerent sort of worry. e worry is that the argument does not distinguish between
mereological relations and relations of relative spatiotemporal location. As a result,
the argument requires not the view that diachronic composition is unrestricted, but a
much stronger view, which eﬀectively claims not only that composition across time is
unrestricted, but also that contraction across time is unrestricted. However, in light of
the distinction between fusions and expansions and between parts and contractions,
this is something that foes of perdurantism may have independent motivation to re-
ject. My aim in this chapter is to articulate this worry: I will argue that the distinction
between matters of mereology and matters of relative spatiotemporal location aﬀords
a new way of resisting the argument from vagueness for perdurantism.
I will spell this out in two stages. First, I will present the argument from vagueness
for perdurantism in a bit more detail. Second, I will explain how the argument runs
together matters of mereology andmatters of relative spatiotemporal location, as well
as how distinguishing between them undermines the argument.
4.1 e Argument from Vagueness for Temporal Parts
e aim of the argument from vagueness is to establish perdurantism. Roughly, per-
durantism is the view that things exist at diﬀerent times by having diﬀerent temporal
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parts at each of those times, where a temporal part of an object at some time is a “slice”
of such an object at that time.
e notion of existence at a time at play here is none other than the familiar notion
of location at a region of spacetime we have been working with so far: to say that a
thing, x, exists at a time, t, is just to say that x is located at t. If t is an instant, then
to say that x is located at t is to say that x is located at some region of spacetime that
has t as its temporal coordinate. And if t is a non-instantaneous interval (whether
continuous or scattered), then to say that x is located at t is to say that x is located at
a spacetime region that has subregions in common with some spacetime region that
has some instant within t as its temporal coordinate. For simplicity’s sake, in what
follows I will stick to talk about things bearing location relations to times instead of
regions of spacetime. But this talk is technically to be understood as things bearing
location relations to regions of spacetime in the way I just speciﬁed.
Now, how to characterize perdurantism and temporal parts in a precise way is a
matter of some controversy (see Parsons 2007 for discussion). For simplicity’s sake,
here I will not go into those issues, and will concentrate on a formulation of perdu-
rantism and a deﬁnition of temporal parts that are very close to Sider’s own. e
characterizations I will use are as follows:
(Perdurantism)
For anymaterial object, x, and any time, y, x is pervasively located at some time,
t, only if x has a temporal part at t;
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(Temporal Parts)
For any pair of material things, x and y, and any time, t, x is a temporal part of
y at t =df x is part of y at t, x exactly located at t, and x overlaps at t every part
of y at t;
A couple of points are worth noting. First, like Sider’s own characterizations, the ones
above take mereological relations to be temporally relativized. is departs from my
understanding of parthood so far as an unrelativized relation, but it will not make a
diﬀerence inmy argument.1 Second, Perdurantism is to be understood as quantifying
over any time whatsoever, no matter how long or how scattered. Similarly, the notion
of a temporal part is deﬁned for any such time.2 is allows us to have a uniﬁed
formulation of perdurantism and temporal parts for instants and intervals, unlike for
Sider, who treats instants and intervals separately (2001, pp. 59-60).
To illustrate what perdurantism claims, consider my nose, which existed from
Monday through Wednesday this week (it existed before that and has existed aer
that, but let’s concentrate only on that interval). By the deﬁnition of pervasive loca-
tion (see chapter 1), my nose is pervasively located at all of the following times: Mon-
day, Tuesday, Wednesday, the interval from Monday to Tuesday, the interval from
Tuesday to Wendesday, the interval from Monday to Wednesday, and the scattered
interval made out of only Monday and Wednesday. Perdurantism requires that for
each such time, my nose have a temporal part then, i.e. that there be a thing that is
part of my nose at that time, that overlaps at that time every part of my nose then,
1Taking parthood at a time as undeﬁned, we may deﬁne other temporally relativized mereological re-
lations as follows: x is proper part of y at t=df x is part of y at t, and y is not part of x at t; x overlaps y at
t=df something is part of both x and y at t; some xs compose y at t=df each of those xs is part of y at t,
and every part of y at t overlaps at t at least one of those xs.
2If t is an interval, then x is part of y at t iﬀ x is part of y at every time in t. Similarly, x overlaps y at t
iﬀ x overlaps y at every time in t.
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and that is exactly located then. And so on for any other time at which my nose is
pervasively located.
With these characterizations of perdurantism and temporal parts in mind, let’s
move on to the argument from vagueness. e argument aims to establish Perdu-
rantism on the grounds that diachronic composition is unrestricted. What exactly
is diachronic composition, though? Given temporally relativized parthood, the no-
tion of synchronic composition, i.e. of some things composing another at a time, is
clear. But characterizing composition across time is less straightforward. One idea is
as follows. Suppose that t1 and t2 are two times, and that the xs and the ys are two
pluralities of things such that each of the xs is pervasively located at t1, and each of the
ys is pervasively located at t2. en an object composed of those things across those
times is a thing that is composed of the xs at t1, and of the ys at t2. Sider builds on this
idea, and generalizes it with the notions of an assignment and of a D-fusion (short for
diachronic fusion) (2001, p. 133). An assignment, f, is a function from times to classes
of objects such that every member of f(t) is pervasively located at t. An object is a
D-fusion of an assignment f iﬀ for every t in f’s domain, such an object is composed
at t of the members of f(t). Sider also introduces a stronger notion, which is key for
the argument from vagueness, i.e. the notion of a minimal D-fusion. A minimal D-
fusion of an assignment f is a D-fusion of f that is exactly located at interval made up
from the times in f’s domain.
Now, call the view that every assignment has a minimal D-fusion universalism
about minimal D-fusions, or (U) for short:
(U) Every assignment has a minimal D-fusion.
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(U) is the central claim of the argument from vagueness. According to the ﬁrst half
of the argument, (U) follows from considerations about indeterminacy. According to
the second half of the argument, (U) entails Perdurantism. Let’s take a look at each
half in turn.
Let’s use an example to get the gist of how (U) is supposed to follow from consid-
erations about indeterminacy. Suppose that we have a top and a base, from which we
put together a table at some time t1; and suppose that we destroy the table at some
later time t2. en there is an object that the top and base compose from t1 to t2,
which exists exactly at that interval. Now, it seems that very minor changes in that
situation would not prevent this from happening. at is, it seems that in a slightly
diﬀerent situation there would still be an object that is composed of the top and base
throughout the interval, and that exists exactly then. For instance, it seems that if
the top and base were a nanometer further apart from one another, they would still
compose a thing throughout those times that exists exactly then. But then the same
applies to this situation: it seems that if the top and base were yet another nanometer
apart from one another, they would still compose something throughout those times
that exists exactly then. And so on: by applying the same reasoning to any result-
ing alternative situation, we would get that in any situation whatsoever the top and
base compose an object throughout the relevant interval that exists exactly then. is
includes any situation in which the top and base are a gigameter apart from one an-
other throughout some interval, as well as any situation in which they go back and
forth from being a nanometer apart to being a gigameter apart throughout some in-
terval. Otherwise, it would be arbitrary if a small change made a big diﬀerence at
one point, so that the top and base compose something in one situation but not in a
minimally diﬀerent one. Or worse: at some point it would be indeterminate whether
there is something composed of the top and base.
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Sider generalizes this kind of reasoning as follows (2001, p. 134):
(4-1) If not every assignment has a minimal D-fusion, then there must be a pair of
cases which are connected by a continuous series, and in one of them, minimal
D-fusion occurs, but in the other, minimal D-fusion does not occur.
(4-2) In no continuous series is there a sharp cutoﬀ.
(4-3) In any case, either minimal D-fusion determinately occurs, or minimal D-
fusion determinately does not occur.
A case is just a situation like those in the example of the top and base above, i.e. a
possible situation involving some times t1, t2, . . . and some xs, some ys, . . . such that
each of the xs is pervasively located at t1, each of the ys is pervasively located at t2,
etc., and those objects have certain properties and stand in certain relations at each
of t1, t2, . . . , as well as across them. A continuous series is a ﬁnite sequence of cases,
such that each case in the sequence is only slightly diﬀerent from the immediately
adjacent ones in any respect that might be relevant as to whether the things involved
have a minimal D-fusion. A sharp cutoﬀ is a pair of immediately adjacent cases in a
continuous series, such that in one of them the things in question determinately have
aminimal D-fusion, but in the other the things in question determinately do not have
a minimal D-fusion.
Now, here is how (U) is meant to follow from (4-1)-(4-3). Assume otherwise.
en by (4-1), there must be a case where minimal D-fusion occurs and one in which
it does not, such that a continuous series connects them both. By (4-3), in each case
in the series either minimal D-fusion determinately occurs, or it determinately does
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not. But since minimal D-fusion does not occur at one end of the series, there must
be a sharp cutoﬀ somewhere in the continuous series, contrary to what (4-2) requires.
Let us now see how (U) is meant to entail Perdurantism. e basic idea is that
minimal D-fusions are temporal parts of persisting objects. If a thing, x, is pervasively
located at a time, t, then (U) requires that the assignment that assigns fxg to t have a
minimal D-fusion. at is, (U) requires that there be a thing, y, that is exactly located
at t, and that is composed of x at t. By the deﬁnition of temporal parts, to show that y
is a temporal part of x at t it suﬃces to show that y is part of x at t and that y overlaps
at t every part of x at t. e latter follows straightforwardly from the deﬁnition of
composition at a time and transitivity of temporally relativized parthood. e former
follows from the deﬁnition of composition at a time and the following mereological
principle (Sider 2001, p. 58):
(PO) For any x and y, if both x and y are located at t, and x is not part of y at t, then
x has some part at t that does not overlap y at t.
So the claim is that Perdurantism follows from (U) given the relevant deﬁnitions and
a certain principle governing temporally relativized parthood, since x and t were ar-
bitrary.
is is, then, the argument from vagueness for Perdurantism. It contends that the
existence of temporal parts follows from the claim that composition is unrestricted
across times, which in turn follows from considerations about indeterminacy. Let us
now see how the distinction between matters of mereology and matters of location
undermines the argument.
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4.2 Diachronic Composition vs. Diachronic Contraction
e objection I want to advance here grants that (U) follows from (4-1)-(4-3), as well
as that Perdurantism follows from (U). However, it points out that (U) runs together
matters of mereology and matters of relative spatiotemporal location, which foes of
perdurantism may have independent motivation to distinguish between. To see this,
let’s ﬁrst get an a bit more transparent account of D-fusions, minimal D-fusions, and
(U).
Remember that a thing, x, is a D-fusion of an assignment f is just to say that x
composed of themembers of f(t1) at t1, of themembers of f(t2) at t2, of themembers
of f(t3) at t3, etc. And remember that an assignment, f, is just a function from times
to classes of objects such that each of the members of f(t) is pervasively located at t.
So consider any times, t1, t2, t3 . . . , and any pluralities of things, the xs, the ys, the zs,
…, such that each of the xs is pervasively located at t1, each of the ys is pervasively
located at t2, each of the zs is pervasively located at t3, etc. en to say that thing, x,
is a D-fusion of the assignment that maps t1 to the xs, t2 to the ys, t3 to the zs, etc. is
just to say that x is composed of the xs at t1, of the ys at t2, of the zs at t3, etc. And
to say that thing, x, is a minimal D-fusion of that assignment is just to say that x is
composed of the xs at t1, of the ys at t2, of the zs at t3, etc. but that x is exactly located
at the interval composed of t1, t2, t3 . . . .
is more explicit understanding of D-fusions and minimal D-fusions allows us
to formulate (U) more transparently as follows:
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(U*) For any times, t1, t2, t3 . . . , and any pluralities of things, the xs, theys, the zs,…,
such that each of the xs is pervasively located at t1, each of the ys is pervasively
located at t2, each of the zs is pervasively located at t3, etc. there exists a thing,
x, that is composed of the xs at t1, of the ys at t2, of the zs at t3, etc. but that is
exactly located at the interval composed of t1, t2, t3 . . .
It also allows us make the crucial consequence of (U*) explicit, from which Perdu-
rantism follows given the deﬁnition of temporal parts and (PO):
(4-4) For any object, x, and any time, t, at which x is pervasively located, there exists
a thing, y, that is composed of x at t, and that is exactly located at t.
And it also allows us tomake explicit another consequence of (U*) that will be central
to what I want to say here:
(Arbitrary Diachronic Contraction)
For any object, x, and any time, t, at which x is pervasively located, there exists
a thing, y, that is exactly located at t.
Now, let’s focus on (U*) and Arbitrary Diachronic Contraction. Notice that there
is something odd about the fact that the former requires the latter. (U*) was sup-
posed to be a principle concerning diachronic composition, i.e. a principle according
to which if we have some things at some times we get a thing that is made out of
those things across those times. However, Arbitrary Diachronic Contraction is not
concerned with joining things together. Quite the opposite: it concerned with cut-
ting things up cross-temporally. So how come (U*), a principle that is meant to join
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things arbitrarily across time, requires that things be sliced through arbitrarily across
time? In other words, what does diachronic contraction have anything to do with
diachronic composition? And of course: why should we accept a principle that runs
these two things together? ere would seem to be plenty of motivation to accept
that we may arbitrarily join things across time without accepting that we arbitrarily
cut them up cross-temporally, and the other way around.
eoddity of (U*) springs from the notion of aminimalD-fusion. is is a strange
notion: it not only concerns the existence of cross-temporal composites, but also im-
poses very strong constraints on where in time may such composites be located. at
is, unlike the notion of a D-fusion, the notion of a minimal D-fusion is not a purely
mereological notion: it mixes inmereology and location. To illustrate, consider some
things that are pervasively located at some period of time; e.g. my nose and the Eif-
fel tower, which existed from Monday through Tuesday this week. Like the notion
of a D-fusion, the notion of a minimal D-fusion concerns the existence of a thing
that is composed of my nose and the Eiﬀel tower on Monday, the existence of a thing
that is composed of my nose and the Eiﬀel tower on Tuesday, and the existence of a
thing that is composed of my nose and the Eiﬀel Tower on bothMonday and Tuesday.
But unlike the notion of a D-fusion, the notion of a minimal D-fusion concerns the
existence of a thing that is exactly located on Monday, the existence of a thing that
is exactly located on Tuesday, and the existence of a thing that is exactly located on
Monday throughTuesday. So unlike the notion of aD-fusion, the notion of aminimal
D-fusion concerns not only cross-temporal composites, but also the exact location of
those composites in time. It is because of this conﬂation of mereology and location
that (U*) not only poses the existence of arbitrary fusions of things across time, but
also the existence of arbitrary contractions of things across time.
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To make the oddity of (U*) yet more apparent, consider what an analogous prin-
ciple would say in the case of spatiotemporal location generally, instead of only tem-
poral location. Such a principle would entail a claim analogous to (4-4), according
to which for any thing, x, and any region of spacetime, S, that x pervades, there is
a thing, y, that is composed of x and that is exactly located at S. And from this it
would follow not only that e.g. my nose has arbitrary proper contractions, but also,
by the deﬁnition of composition, that my nose is part of each of its proper contrac-
tions. So such principle would mix matters of mereology and matters of location
to the point of entailing some of the most radical violations of Parts)Contractions
and of Fusions)Expansions that we saw in chapter 3. (U*) has exactly parallel con-
sequences, only limited to the case of temporal location instead of spatiotemporal
location generally.
It is clear, then, that (U*) runs together issues about mereology and issues about
location. So it would be useful to distinguish it from a principle concerning mere-
ology alone, which posits the existence of cross-temporal composites without setting
restrictions on where in time such composites are located:
(Unrestricted Diachronic Composition)
For any times, t1, t2, t3 . . . , and any pluralities of things, the xs, theys, the zs,…,
such that each of the xs is pervasively located at t1, each of the ys is pervasively
located at t2, each of the zs is pervasively located at t3, etc. there exists a thing,
x, that is composed of the xs at t1, of the ys at t2, of the zs at t3, etc.
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is is what one may regard as unrestricted diachronic composition properly under-
stood, devoid of issues concerning location. And notice that it is none other than the
claim that every assignment has a D-fusion, i.e. universalism about D-fusions.
Now, as I mentioned above and as should be clear from our discussion in chapter
3, onemay have perfectly goodmotivation to reject that things have arbitrary contrac-
tions across time; one may even do so while accepting that diachronic composition
is unrestricted. at is, one may have perfectly good motivation to reject Arbitrary
Diachronic Contractions and hence (U*), and one may even do so and accept Unre-
stricted Diachronic Composition. is is particularly salient given that the following
is a coherent and well-motivated view on persistence: at least some persisting things
are not only mereologically but also spatiotemporally simple, i.e. have an exact lo-
cation with non-zero temporal extension but have neither proper parts nor proper
contractions. is view would be analogous to the view that there are at least some
extended simples that do not have proper contractions. And it would clearly dodge
the argument from vagueness, without having to reject that either that (U) follows
from (4-1)-(4-3) or that Perdurantism follows from (U), as well as without having
to reject (PO), Unrestricted Diachronic Composition, Sider’s deﬁnition of temporal
parts, his formulation of perdurantism, etc.3
Notice, however, that if we rejected (U*) on the above grounds, but accepted that
it follows from (4-1)-(4-3), we would still have to reject one of (4-1)-(4-3). Which,
3Moreover, given the possibility of compact fusions from chapter 3, the following is a coherent enduran-
tist picture that is fully compatible with Unrestricted Diachronic Composition: all persisting objects, i.e.
all things that pervade at least two times, have neither proper parts nor proper contractions. But there are
unrestricted fusions of any such things which happen to be non-persisting objects, i.e. things that pervade
only one time. So on this view nothingwould have proper contractions, but any things would have a fusion.
While this would be an odd version of endurantism, it is a coherent view, and illustrates another way in
which Unrestricted Diachronic Contraction may be rejected even if one accepts Unrestricted Diachronic
Composition.
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though? Given the view on persistence I sketched above, on which at least some per-
sisting things are both mereologically and spatiotemporally simple, (4-2) would be
the one to go. For suppose that x is both mereologically and spatiotemporally simple,
i.e. that is has neither proper parts nor proper contractions. Suppose, too, that x is
exactly located at the temporal interval composed of times t1, . . . , tn. en the assign-
ment that assigns fxg to each ti would have a minimal D-fusion, i.e. x itself. But none
of the minimally diﬀerent assignments that assign fxg to all but one ti would have a
minimal D-fusion, for that would require that x have proper contractions. In other
words, (U*) would be true of x and some temporal interval, but false of x and a slightly
diﬀerent temporal interval: while for t1, . . . , tn there would be something composed
of x at each ti (namely, x itself), for t1, . . . , tn-1 there would be nothing composed of
x at each ti, for that would require that x not be spatiotemporally simple.
Now, Sider defends (4-2) on the following grounds (2001, p. 124):
there would seem to be something ‘metaphysically arbitrary’ about a
sharp cutoﬀ in a continuous series of cases […]Why is there a cutoﬀ here,
rather than there? Granted, everyone must admit some metaphysically
‘brute’ facts […] Nevertheless, this brute fact seems particularly hard to
stomach.
However, from the example above it is clear that this charge of arbitrariness would
not apply the view I suggested: someone who held that some persisting things have
neither proper parts nor proper contractions could not be accused of acceptingmeta-
physical arbitrariness; she would simply disagree with the perdurantist as to how
things persist. e perdurantist would thus have said nothing to pressure her to
change her mind.
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us, the argument from vagueness for temporal parts requires a much stronger
view than the view that diachronic composition is unrestricted to go through. But
such view eﬀectively runs together matters of mereology and matters of location,
which opponents of perdurantism may simply reject. Distinguishing, then, between
such matters aﬀords a new way of resisting the argument.
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CHAPTER 5
MEREOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY AT LOGICALLY DETERMINATE
WORLDS
Prima facie, there is indeterminacy in the part-whole structure of the material
world—it is indeterminate whether some material things bear certain part-whole re-
lations to others. Consider, for instance, mount Kilimanjaro. Some rocks are deter-
minately part of Kilimanjaro. Rocks near the top are determinately part of it, and so
are rocks near the middle. And some rocks are determinately not part of Kiliman-
jaro. Rocks in the Ithaca gorges are determinately not part of it, and neither are rocks
in Io, the largest Galilean moon of Jupiter. It seems, however, that not all rocks fall
neatly into one of those two classes, i.e. the class of rocks that are determinately part
of Kilimanjaro and the class of rocks that are determinately not part of it. at is, for
some rocks, it seems to be indeterminate whether they are part of Kilimanjaro. For
instance, some rocks near the base appear to be neither determinately nor determi-
nately not part of it; if you wanted to take home a part of Kilimanjaro as a souvenir
of your trip to Tanzania, you would be safer picking one near the middle or the top
rather than one near the base. It seems, thus, that parthood may be indeterminate, at
least as far as material objects are concerned: prima facie, there are pairs of material
things such that it is indeterminate whether one is part of the other.
It seems that composition, too, may be indeterminate. Suppose, for instance, that
exactly one rock in the universe is in the unfortunate position of being neither de-
terminately nor determinately not part of Kilimanjaro; call it R. Now consider all the
rocks that are determinately part of Kilimanjaro; call them the rocks. en it seems
that it is indeterminate whether the rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro. For the rocks
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and R compose Kilimanjaro only if R is part of it, but it is indeterminate whether R
is part of Kilimanjaro. For another kind of example, suppose that we are putting to-
gether a table. When the top and the base are far apart from one another, it seems that
they determinately compose nothing. Oncewe attach the top to the base, it seems that
they determinately compose something. But at some point as we are bringing the top
and the base together, it seems to be indeterminate whether the top and base com-
pose something: they neither determinately nor determinately not compose some-
thing. us, it looks like composition may also be indeterminate, at least as far as
material things are concerned—prima facie, there are material things such that it is
indeterminate whether they compose something.
It seems, then, that there is indeterminacy in the part-whole relations among ma-
terial things, i.e. in themereological structure of thematerial world. Somemetaphysi-
cians have recently argued, however, that there could not be such indeterminacy. e
thought is that if there were, then there would also be indeterminacy in matters of
identity, existence, and cardinality. But, the argument goes, there could not be inde-
terminacy in such matters. So, there could not be indeterminacy in matters of part
and whole either. In other words, the idea is that indeterminacy in the mereological
features of the material world requires indeterminacy in its logical features—those
having to do with the identity, existence, and cardinality—but that there could not be
indeterminacy in its logical features.
More speciﬁcally, foes of mereological indeterminacy have argued for the follow-
ing claims (I leave the restriction to material things implicit):
(5-1) If parthood is indeterminate, then identity must also be indeterminate.
(5-2) If composition is indeterminate, then identity must also be indeterminate.
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(5-3) If composition is indeterminate, then existence must also be indeterminate.
(5-4) If composition is indeterminate, then it must also be indeterminate how many
things there are.
(5-5) Identity, existence, and cardinality could not be indeterminate.
e ﬁrst four claims hold that certain forms of indeterminacy in the mereological
structure of the material world require certain forms of indeterminacy in its mere-
ological structure, i.e. that there is necessary connection between certain forms of
mereological indeterminacy and certain forms of logical indeterminacy. (5-1) claims
that indeterminate parthood requires indeterminate identity, while (5-2)-(5-4) claim
that indeterminate composition requires indeterminate identity, indeterminate exis-
tence, and indeterminate cardinality. But (5-5) claims that there could not be such
forms of indeterminacy in the logical structure of the material world, i.e. that there
could not be indeterminate identity, indeterminate existence, or indeterminate car-
dinality. So from (5-1)-(5-5) it follows that there could not be such forms of inde-
terminacy in the part-whole structure of the material world either, i.e. that parthood
and composition could not be indeterminate.
Here is the gist of the argument for both (5-1) and (5-2) (Weatherson 2003,
Williams and Barnes forthcoming). Let R and the rocks be as in the example above.
Now suppose that Kilimanjaro- is a thing that the rocks determinately compose, and
that Kilimanjaro+ is a thing that the rocks and R determinately compose. en it
seems that if it is indeterminate whether R is part of Kilimanjaro, then it must also
be indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro = Kilimanjaro-, as well as whether Kiliman-
jaro = Kilimanjaro+. But if so, then indeterminate parthood requires indeterminate
identity: if it is indeterminate whether a material thing is part of another, then it must
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be indeterminate whether a material thing is identical to another. Similarly, it seems
that if it is indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro is composed of the rocks and R, then it
must also be indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro = Kilimanjaro-, as well as whether
Kilimanjaro = Kilimanjaro+. But if so, then indeterminate composition requires in-
determinate identity: if it is indeterminate whether some material things compose
another, then it must be indeterminate whether some material thing is identical to
another.
Here is the idea behind the argument for (5-3) and (5-4) (e.g. Sider 2001, 2003;
Smith 2005). Consider the example of the table above. Now consider the base and
the top as we bring them closer together. It seems that if it is indeterminate whether
they compose something, then it must also be indeterminate whether some material
thing exists. Aer all, when the base and the top are far apart from one another, it is
determinate that there are no material objects in addition to the ones “already” there.
And when the base and the top are attached, it is determinate that there is a material
object in addition to the ones that were there already. But then if at some point when
we are bringing the base and the top together it is indeterminate whether they com-
pose something, then it is indeterminate whether there is a material thing in addition
to the ones already there. But if so, if it is indeterminate whether somematerial things
compose something, then it must indeterminate whether something exists. Similarly,
it seems that if it is indeterminate whether the top and base compose something, then
it must also be indeterminate how many material things there are, at least in worlds
with only ﬁnitely many material things. For suppose that there are exactly nmaterial
things when the top and base are far apart from each other, for some ﬁnite n. en
there are at least n+1 material things when the top and base are brought together. So
it seems that if it is indeterminate whether the base and top compose something, then
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it must be indeterminate whether there are exactly n or exactlymmaterial things, for
somem > n+ 1. But if so, if it is indeterminate whether some material things com-
pose something, then it must be indeterminate how many material things there are.
(e restriction toworlds with only ﬁnitelymanymaterial things here does not signif-
icantly aﬀect the argument against mereological indeterminacy based on (5-1)-(5-5).
For as Sider points out, if theremay be indeterminacy in themereological structure of
the material world, then surely that may happen at worlds with ﬁnitely manymaterial
things (cf. Sider 2001). It would be rather odd indeed to think that it could happen
only at worlds with at least denumerably many material things.)
Now, here is the gist of the argument for (5-5) (Lewis 1986; Sider 2001, 2003).
e key claim is that all indeterminacy is semantic indeterminacy. If, for instance,
it is indeterminate whether someone is bald, then it is because the predicate ‘is bald’
has diﬀerent properties as precisiﬁcations or candidatemeanings, not because it is on-
tologically indeterminate whether the person instantiates the property that ‘is bald’
determinately expresses, or because we are ignorant of the conditions under which
someone instantiates that property. So the idea is that if existence, identity, or cardi-
nality are indeterminate, then some relevant expression must have multiple precisi-
ﬁcations. But since claims about the identity, existence, and cardinality of material
things may be expressed with only logical vocabulary and the predicate for material
thinghood, that would require that either some piece of logical terminology or the
predicate for material thinghood have multiple precisiﬁcations. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the predicate for material thinghood does not have multiple
precisiﬁcations, it follows that some piece of logical vocabulary must have multiple
precisiﬁcations. But, the argument goes, no piece of logical vocabulary has multiple
precisiﬁcations.
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Friends of indeterminate parthood and indeterminate composition have at-
tempted to fend oﬀ this line of attack by trying to undermine the argument for (5-
5). ey have attempted to resist the argument by rejecting either that all indetermi-
nacy is semantic (perhaps, for instance, there is ontological indeterminacy), or that
no piece of logical terminology has multiple precisiﬁcations (perhaps, for instance,
existential quantiﬁers have several candidate meanings).
is has been not only one strategy that friends of mereological indeterminacy
have pursued, but also their only strategy. So far very little pressure has been put
on (5-1)-(5-4) and the arguments for them. at is, until now no one has attempted
to undermine the alleged necessary connection between indeterminacy in the part-
whole structure of the material world and indeterminacy in its logical structure. My
goal in this chapter is to do just that. I will argue that the possibility of external devi-
ations allows for both parthood and composition to be indeterminate without iden-
tity, existence, and cardinality being indeterminate. e basic idea is that there may
be worlds where relations of relative spatiotemporal location among material things
are determinate, and where those relations ﬁx the logical structure of the material
world. But since mereological relations and relations of relative spatiotemporal loca-
tion amongmaterial things may come apart per the possibility of external deviations,
there may be indeterminacy in mereological relations without indeterminacy in re-
lations of relative spatiotemporal location, and hence without indeterminacy in the
logical structure of the material world. I will suggest, moreover, that this strategy is
completely neutral as to what forms of indeterminacy theremay be. So it undermines
the above line of argument against mereological indeterminacy even if all indetermi-
nacy is semantic indeterminacy and logical vocabulary has no precisiﬁcations, and so
even if we grant the argument for (5-5).
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Here is the plan. I will begin with a few preliminary remarks about determinacy
and indeterminacy. is will allow us to get clear on what exactly it means to say that
parthood, composition, identity, existence, and cardinality are indeterminate, which
will in turn allow us to get clear on what exactly (5-1)-(5-4) are claiming and what
are the arguments for them. With that setup, I will then show how the possibility
of external deviations delivers counterexamples to those claims and undermines the
arguments in their favor.
5.1 Determinacy and Indeterminacy
In the examples above we talked about determinacy and indeterminacy, i.e. about it
being neither determinate that so-and-so nor determinate that not so-and-so, about
it being indeterminate whether so-and-so, etc. is kind of talk about determinacy
and indeterminacy makes use of a pair of propositional operators, it is determinate
that and it is indeterminate whether. So it is important to make a few clariﬁcations
about these determinate-that and indeterminate-whether operators, about how they
are connected to one another, and about how they are related to other determinacy
and indeterminacy operators.
e determinate-that operator intuitively applies to all and only those proposi-
tions that hold determinately. e logical behavior of this operator is arguably exactly
parallel to the logical behavior of the necessity operator in the S5 system of modal
logic, but here I will only assume that it is governed by the K system. Using ‘M’ for the
determinate-that operator, this means that the determinate-that operator obeys the
following schemata:
121
(RN)  j= M.
(K) M( !  )! (M !M ).
e indeterminate-whether operator intuitively applies to all and only those
propositions that neither hold determinately nor fail to hold determinately. So
the determinate-that and indeterminate-whether operators are linked to each other
through the following principle: it is indeterminate whether so-and-so just in case
it is neither determinate that so-and-so nor determinate that not so-and-so, which
is the same as saying that it is not indeterminate whether so-and-so just in case it is
either determinate that so-and-so or determinate that not so-and-so. Using ‘r’ for
the indeterminate-whether operator, this principle is as follows:
(5-6) r $ ( :M & :M:).
is suggests that the indeterminate-whether operator behaves just as the contin-
gency operator behaves in modal logic, which applies to all and only those propo-
sitions such that neither it nor its negation are necessarily true. is means that prin-
ciples such as the following hold of the indeterminate-whether operator:
(5-7) M $  & :r
(5-8) r $ r:
(5-9) r(_ ) $ (r _ r )
From this it follows that the behavior of the indeterminate-whether operator is not
parallel to the behavior of the possibility operator in familiar systems of modal logic;
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in particular, the determinate-that and indeterminate-whether operators are not du-
als of each other. And for good reason: there are various principles you would want
the possibility operator to be governed by that you would not want to hold of the
indeterminacy-whether operator, and there are various principles you would want
the indeterminacy-whether operator to abide by that you would not want to be true
of the possibility operator. For instance, while in general it is arguably necessary that
so-and-so iﬀ it is not possible that not so-and-so, youwould not want to say in general
that it is determinate that so-and-so iﬀ it is not indeterminate whether not so-and-so.
Surely it is not determinate that Socrates is both tall and not tall, but it is not inde-
terminate whether Socrates is not both tall and not tall. Similarly, while in general
you would want to say that it is indeterminate whether so-and-so iﬀ it is indetermi-
nate whether not so-and-so, surely it is not the case in general that it is possible that
so-and-so iﬀ it is possible that not so-and-so. For instance, it is possible that all tall
things be tall, but surely it is not possible that not all tall things be tall.
Now, sometimes claims about indeterminacy are made with that- instead of
whether- clauses, i.e. via locutions of the form “it is indeterminate that so-and-
so”. Similarly, claims about determinacy are sometimes made with whether- instead
of that- clauses, i.e. via locutions of the form “it is determinate whether so-and-
so”. What is the connection between claims about indeterminacy-that and claims
about indeterminacy-whether? And what is the connection between claims about
determinacy-whether and claims about determinacy-that?
Claims concerning indeterminacy-that are arguably just claims about
indeterminacy-whether; it is hard to think of grounds to distinguish between
the content of the claim that it is indeterminate that so-and-so and the content of the
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claim that it is indeterminate whether so-and-so. For instance, someone might intro-
duce an operator that is the dual of the determinate-that operator (i.e. which holds
of all and only those propositions the negation of which fails to hold determinately)
and insist that claims about indeterminacy-that are better captured via this operator
than via our indeterminate-whether operator. But that would be wrong. For the
dual of the determinate-that operator would behave just as the possibility operator
behaves in various systems of modal logic. And for reasons discussed above, no
operator that behaves like the possibility operator could capture the content of claims
about indeterminacy, whether they are expressed with that- or whether- clauses. You
would not want to say that Socrates is tall only if it is indeterminate that Socrates is
tall, just as you would not want to say that Socrates is tall only if it is indeterminate
whether Socrates is tall.
On the other hand, there is a clear distinction between claims concern-
ing determinacy-whether and claims concerning determinacy-that: the latter are
stronger than the former. If it is determinate that Socrates is tall, then surely it is deter-
minate whether Socrates is tall. But the converse does not hold: that it is determinate
whether Socrates is tall does not imply that it is determinate that Socrates is tall. For
it may be determinate whether Socrates is tall by it being determinate that Socrates is
not tall. is suggests that determinacy-whether and determinacy-that are tied to one
another through the following principle: it is determinate whether so-and-so just in
case either it is determinate that so-and-so or determinate that not so-and-so. Using
‘Mw’ for the determinate-whether operator, this is to say the following:
(5-10) Mw $ (M _ M:).
124
is means that the determinate-whether operator behaves just like the non-
contingency operator behaves in modal logic. So it is governed by principles such
as the following:
(5-11) Mw $Mw:
It follows that various principles that regulate the behavior of the determinate-that
operator do not hold of the indeterminate-whether operator, as well as that vari-
ous principles that the determinate-whether operator abides by do not govern the
determinate-that operator. And, once again, for good reason. For instance, you
would not want (K) to hold of indeterminacy-whether: surely it is determinate
whether Socrates’s being both tall and not tall implies that Socrates is tall, and surely
it is determinate whether Socrates is both tall and not tall. But you would not want
to conclude from this that it is determinate whether Socrates is tall. Similarly, you
would not want (5-11) to hold of determinacy-that. Surely it is determinate that all
tall things are tall, but it is not determinate that not all tall things are tall.
Given this connection between the determinate-that and determinate-whether
operators, it follows that the determinate-whether and indeterminate-whether op-
erators are duals of each other. at is, it follows both that it is determinate whether
so-and-so just in case it is not indeterminate whether not so-and-so, and that it is
indeterminate whether so-and-so just in case it is not indeterminate whether not so-
and-so:
(5-12) Mw $ :r:.
(5-13) r $ :Mw:.
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In fact, both (5-12) and (5-13) follow directly from (5-6) and (5-10) alone.1 Simi-
larly, it follows that the determinate-whether and indeterminate-whether operators
are contraries of each other. at is, it follows both that it is determinate whether
so-and-so just in case it is not indeterminate whether so-and-so, and that it is inde-
terminate whether so-and-so just in case it is not indeterminate whether so-and-so:
(5-14) Mw $ :r.
at the determinate-whether and indeterminate-whether are both duals and con-
traries of each other seems right on intuitive grounds: surely it is determinate whether
Socrates is tall just in case it is not indeterminate whether Socrates is not tall, and it is
indeterminate whether Socrates is tall just in case it is not determinate that Socrates
is not tall. Similarly, surely it is determinate whether Socrates is tall just in case it
is not indeterminate whether Socrates is tall. So the lack of parallelism between the
connection between determinacy-that and determinacy-whether, on the one hand,
and the connection between indeterminacy-whether and indeterminacy-that, on the
other, should not raise worries.
Now, getting clear on all these notions concerning determinacy and indetermi-
nacy is of general importance, given that their logical behavior and the connections
1Here is the proof. Consider the following instance of (5-6), and the following two instances of (5-10):
(5-6*) r:p $ (:M:p & :M::p).
(5-10*) Mwp$ (Mp _ M:p).
(5-10**) Mw:p$ (M:p _ M::p).
Since the right-hand sides of (5-6*) and (5-10**) are the negations of each other, from them it follows that
Mw:p $ :r: p. Since the right-hand sides of (5-10*) and (5-10**) are equivalent (remember that given
(RN) and (K), double negations may be added and eliminated freely within the scope of ‘M’), their le-hand
sides are also equivalent, i.e.Mwp $Mw:p. But this claim and the one we got from (5-6*) and (5-10**)
entail by transitivity of equivalence thatMwp $ :r:p. Since p was arbitrary, (5-12) follows. e proof
that (5-13) follows is exactly parallel, given the appropriate instances of (5-6) and (5-10).
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between them are oen poorly understood in the literature. For instance, both Gib-
bins (1982) and Pelletier (1984, 1989) claim that S5 is not the logic of the determinate-
that operator; Pelletier goes as far as to claim that it violates (K), and so that its
logic is not even normal. But both authors fail to recognize the distinction be-
tween determinacy-that and determinacy-whether: their arguments clearly conﬂate
between both operators. is confusion is alsomanifest inmuch of the literature gen-
erated by Evans’s so-called argument against vague objects, where the determinate-
that and indeterminate-whether operators are widely taken to be duals of each other
(Evans 1978).
On the other hand, getting clear an all these issues concerning determinacy and
indeterminacywill be particularly useful for our purposes here. For in order to under-
stand what exactly (5-1)-(5-4) claim and assess whether they are true, we ﬁrst need to
get clear on what exactly it means to say in general that parthood, composition, iden-
tity, existence, and cardinality are indeterminate. And as we will see below, a proper
general understanding of determinacy and determinacy aﬀords valuable tools to pre-
cisely characterize these notions and to address issues that have remained uncovered
in the literature. Let’s then move on to these notions.
5.2 Indeterminacy in Mereological Structure
Given our indeterminate-whether operator, wemay cash out what it means to say that
parthood and composition are indeterminate as follows:
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(5-15) It is indeterminate whether a thing is part of another.
(5-16) It is indeterminate whether some things compose another.
However, (5-15) and (5-16) are still far from being adequate accounts of indetermi-
nate parthood and indeterminate composition. For as we will see below, there is more
to these claims thanmight be apparent. Let’s begin with indeterminate parthood, and
then move on to indeterminate composition.
Notice that (5-15) has three readings. On the ﬁrst reading, the claim is that it is
indeterminate whether for a pair of things, one is part of the other. On the second
reading, the claim is that for some thing, it is indeterminate whether something is part
of it. On the third reading, the claim is that for a pair of things, it is indeterminate
whether one is part of the other. ese are as follows:
(5-15a) r9x9y x is part of y.
(5-15b) 9xr9y x is part of y.
(5-15c) 9x9yr x is part of y.
Does this mean that there are three diﬀerent notions of indeterminate parthood, one
corresponding to each reading of (5-15)? No: only the third reading aﬀords an in
principle viable characterization of indeterminate parthood. To see this, focus on
what the ﬁrst two say. (5-15a) says that it is indeterminate whether there is a thing
with parts. But this claim is false in any situation in which it is determinate that some-
thing exists. For it is determinate that anything whatsoever has at least one part, i.e.
itself. So if it is determinate that something exists, then it is not indeterminatewhether
there is a thing with parts, which is another way of saying that (5-15a) is false. Put
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another way, the following claim is always true:M8x9y x is part of y.2 So the follow-
ing claim is true in any situation in which it is determinate that there is something:
M9x9y x is part of y. But by (5-6) this claims entails the following one, which is just
the negation of (5-15a): :r9x9y x is part of y. Now, since (5-15a) is false in any
situation in which something determinately exists, it cannot provide an adequate ac-
count of indeterminate parthood: it should be in principle possible for parthood to
be indeterminate even if there are things that determinately exist.
Similarly, (5-15b) says that there exists a thing such that it is indeterminate
whether it has parts. But this can never be true. For it is always true that for any-
thing whatsoever it is determinate that it has at least one part, i.e. itself. So for any
object whatsoever, it is not indeterminate whether something is part of it, and this is
just another way of saying that (5-15b) is false. Put another way, (5-15b) is incompat-
ible with the following claim, which is always true: 8xM9y x is part of y.3 By (5-6),
this claim entails the following one, which is equivalent to the negation of (5-15b):
8x:r9y x is part of y.
So the only viable way of characterizing indeterminate parthood is via (5-15c), i.e.
there is only one notion of indeterminate parthood: parthood is indeterminate when
there is a pair of things such that it is indeterminate whether one is part of the other.
at is:
2is is always true taking reﬂexivity of parthood as a given. To see why, notice that if it is a given
that 8x x is part of x, then by (RN) it follows that M 8x x is part of x. Also by (RN), all logical truths are
determinate; so since it is a logical truth that (8x x is part of x) ! (8x9y x is part of y), it follows that
M((8x x is part of x) ! (8x9y x is part of y)). So by (K), it follows thatM8x9y x is part of y.
3is is always true also taking reﬂexivity of parthood as a given. Notice that if it is a given that 8x x is
part of x, it follows that a is part of a, for an arbitrary a. By (RN) it follows that M a is part of a. Also by
(RN) it follows thatM ( a is part of a ! 9y a is part of y). So by (K), it follows thatM 9y a is part of y.
Since a was arbitrary, it follows that 8xM9y x is part of y.
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(Indeterminate Parthood)
Parthood is indeterminate iﬀ for some pair of things, x andy, it is indeterminate
whether x is part of y.
And notice that this is exactly what is supposed to be going on in the example of
Kilimanjaro and R we saw at the outset. For in that case there is a pair of things,
Kilimanjaro and R, such that it is indeterminate whether R is part of Kilimanjaro.
Having gotten clear on indeterminate parthood, let’s move on to indeterminate
composition. Like with (5-15), there are three readings of (5-16) :
(5-16a) r9xs9y xs compose y.
(5-16b) 9xsr9y xs compose y.
(5-16c) 9xs9yr xs compose y.
e ﬁrst one is not a viable way of characterizing indeterminate composition, for the
same reason that (5-15a) is not a viable way of characterizing indeterminate part-
hood. (5-16a) says that it is indeterminate whether there are things that compose
something. But this can never be true provided that something determinately exists,
for it is determinate that any plurality of exactly one thing composes something, i.e.
the object in that plurality.4 So (5-16a) can never be true provided that something
determinately exists. Unlike (5-15b) in the case of parthood, however, (5-16b) does
not conﬂict with any trivial truths. (5-16b) says that for some things it is indetermi-
nate whether there is something that they compose. It is always true that for every
4eproof of this is exactly parallel to the proof given footnote 2 above, given that reﬂexivity of parthood
and the deﬁnition of composition.
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plurality of exactly one thing it is not indeterminate whether it composes something,
but this clearly does not hold trivially for any pluralities. So unlike (5-15b) in the case
of indeterminate parthood, (5-16b) is a viable way of characterizing indeterminate
composition. And like (5-15c) in the case of indeterminate parthood, (5-16c) is a
viable way of characterizing indeterminate composition.
(5-16b) and (5-16c) in fact suggest that there are two ways in which composi-
tion may be indeterminate, i.e. two forms or varieties of indeterminate composition.
For some things it may be indeterminate whether there is an object that those things
compose. And for some things and some object, it may be indeterminate whether
those things compose that object. I call these two forms of indeterminate compo-
sition de dicto indeterminate composition and de re indeterminate composition, re-
spectively, given the scopal interactions between the singular existential quantiﬁer
and indeterminate-whether operator in (5-16b) and (5-16c):
(De Dicto Indeterminate Composition)
Composition is de dicto indeterminate iﬀ for some things, the xs, it is indeter-
minate whether there is a thing, y, that the xs compose.
(De Re Indeterminate Composition)
Composition is de re indeterminate iﬀ for some things, the xs, and some thing,
y, it is indeterminate whether the xs compose y.
Notice that these two ways in which composition may be indeterminate were already
manifest in the examples discussed at the outset. In the example in which we put to-
gether a table, at some point it is indeterminate whether the base and the top compose
something. But it is so not because there is something such that it is indeterminate
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whether the base and the top compose it. Rather, it is indeterminate whether the base
and the top compose something because it is indeterminate whether there is some-
thing that they compose. By contrast, in the Kilimanjaro example it is indeterminate
whether the rocks andR compose something, i.e.Kilimanjaro. But this does notmean
that the rocks and R are such that it is indeterminate whether there is something that
they compose. It only means that the rocks, R, and Kilimanjaro are such that it is
indeterminate whether they compose it.
How are these two forms of indeterminate composition related to one another?
If composition is de dicto indeterminate, must it also be de re indeterminate? And
if composition is de re indeterminate, must it also be de dicto indeterminate? e
answer to both questions is no. To see this, ﬁrst notice that they may be related in
either a stronger or a weaker way:
(Strong Link)
For any xs, it is indeterminate whether there is a y that the xs compose iﬀ there
is a y such that it is indeterminate whether the xs compose y.
(Weak Link)
For some xs it is indeterminate whether there is a y that the xs compose iﬀ for
some xs there is a y such that it is indeterminate whether the xs compose y.
Strong Link claims that it is de dicto indeterminate whether some things compose
an object exactly when it is de re indeterminate whether those things compose an
object. By contrast, Weak Link only requires that there be de dicto vague composition
exactly when there is de re vague composition. So it is clear that Strong Link entails
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Weak Link. Because of this, if either direction of Weak Link fails, then so does the
corresponding direction of Strong Link.
Let’s ﬁrst see why the right-to-le direction of Weak Link fails. Notice that there
may be some xs and some y such that it is indeterminate whether the xs compose y
even if for any things, the xs included, it is not indeterminate whether there is some-
thing that those things compose—all that is required for consistency is that it be de-
terminate that there is an object that the xs compose, and that such an object not be
identical to y. Using the Kilimanjaro example: it may be indeterminate whether the
rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro even if for any things, the rocks and R included,
it is not indeterminate whether there is something that those things compose: all we
need is that it be determinate that there is an object that the rocks and R compose, and
that such an object not be Kilimanjaro. Let’s now see why the le-to-right direction
fails. Notice that there may be some xs such that it is indeterminate whether there is a
y that the xs compose even if for any things, the xs included, and any object, it is not
indeterminate whether those things compose that object—all that is required for con-
sistency is that for any object it be determinate that the xs do not compose that object.
Using the Kilimanjaro example: it may be indeterminate whether there is something
composed of the rocks and R even if for any things, the rocks and R included, and
any object, it is not indeterminate whether those things compose that object—all we
need for consistency is that for any object, it be determinate that the rocks and R do
not compose that object.
It follows, then, that the distinction between de dicto and de re indeterminate com-
position is far from superﬁcial: they are logically independent of each other in both
the weaker and the stronger sense. is means that one may in principle accept that
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there is indeterminate composition of one form without accepting that there is inde-
terminate composition of the other form. As we will see, this will be important in
getting clear on what is at issue in (5-2)-(5-4). But the distinction between de dicto
and de re indeterminate composition is also of general interest in metaphysics, for
philosophers in the recent literature have confused between them. For instance, con-
sider the discussion over the Lewis-Sider so-called argument from vagueness for un-
restricted composition (Lewis 1986, 212-13; Sider 2001, 121-32). As I mentioned
at the outset in chapter 4, the claim that composition may not be indeterminate is a
key premise of that argument. Neither Lewis nor Sider distinguish between de dicto
and de re indeterminate composition. Nonetheless, it is clear that their argument
concerns de dicto indeterminate composition. However, some metaphysicians have
objected to the argument by assuming that it concerns de re indeterminate composi-
tion (see e.g.Donnelly forthcoming). Nomatter how good those objections might be,
they are oﬀ-target—at best, they hit only the strawman because they fail to recognize
the distinction between de re and de dicto indeterminate composition.
We now have a better understanding of indeterminate parthood and the two ways
in which composition may be indeterminate. To get the full picture on these three
forms of mereological indeterminacy, let’s now see how indeterminate parthood is
connected to both de dicto and de re indeterminate composition.
From the discussion about the independence of de dicto and de re indeterminate
composition, it is easy to see that indeterminate parthood is independent of de dicto
indeterminate composition. However, it is not so with de re indeterminate compo-
sition: while de re indeterminate composition does not require indeterminate part-
hood, indeterminate parthood does require indeterminate composition. at inde-
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terminate parthood requires de re indeterminate composition follows directly from
the deﬁnition of composition, (RN), (K), and (5-6). Consider an arbitrary pair of
things, x and y. By the deﬁnition of composition, x and y compose y only if x is part
of y. So by (RN), this holds determinately. But then by (K) and (5-6), it is indetermi-
nate whether x is part of y only if it indeterminate whether x and y compose y. To see
why de re indeterminate composition does not require indeterminate parthood, con-
sider the Kilimanjaro example again. Notice that for it to be indeterminate whether
the rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro it is suﬃcient that for some part, y, of Kiliman-
jaro it be indeterminate whether there is something that y and at least one of the rocks
and R have as a common part (again by the deﬁnition of composition, (RN), (K), and
(5-6)). But clearly it being indeterminate whether there is something that y and at
least one of the rocks and R have as a common part does not require that for some
pair of objects (whether or not it includes any of the rocks and R) it be indeterminate
whether one is part of the other. So it may be indeterminate whether the rocks and
R compose Kilimanjaro even if for any pair of things it is not indeterminate whether
one is part of the other.
It follows, then, that only one of our three forms of mereological indeterminacy
requires another: if parthood is indeterminate, then composition must be de re inde-
terminate. Other than this, there may in principle be any form of indeterminacy in
the part-whole structure of the material world without there being any other.
Having gotten clear on what it means to say that parthood and composition are
indeterminate, and on how the relevant three notions are related to one another, let’s
move on to indeterminate identity, indeterminate existence, and indeterminate car-
dinality.
135
5.3 Indeterminacy in Logical Structure
As with indeterminate parthood and indeterminate composition, we may character-
ize indeterminate identity, indeterminate existence, and indeterminate cardinality in
terms of the indeterminate-whether operator:
(5-17) It is indeterminate whether a thing is identical to another.
(5-18) It is indeterminate whether something exists.
(5-19) It is indeterminate whether there are exactly n things.
But as we saw in the mereological case, claims of this sort need to be further spelled
out. Let’s begin with the one about indeterminate identity.
Like with (5-15) and (5-16), (5-17) has three readings:
(5-17a) r9x9y x = y.
(5-17b) 9xr9y x = y.
(5-17c) 9x9yr x = y.
Like in the case of parthood, neither of the ﬁrst two claims is a viable way of charac-
terizing indeterminate identity. (5-17a) says that it is indeterminate whether some-
thing is identical to something. is can never be true provided that it is determinate
that there is something, since it is always determinate that everything is identical to
something, i.e. itself. (5-17b) says that for some thing it is indeterminate whether
something is identical to it. is can never be true either, since for everything it is
determinate that there is something identical to it, i.e. itself. So, like (5-15c) in the
136
case of parthood, (5-17c) aﬀords the only viable way of characterizing indeterminate
identity:
(Indeterminate Identity)
Identity is indeterminate iﬀ for a pair of things, x and y, it is indeterminate
whether x = y.
And this is just what is supposed to be going on in the cases of indeterminate iden-
tity mentioned at the outset. e idea was that if it is indeterminate whether R
is part of Kilimanjaro, or whether the rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro, then it
must also be indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro=Kilimanjaro-, as well as whether
Kilimanjaro=Kilimanjaro+. ese are indeterminate identities in the sense above:
for a pair of things, it is indeterminate whether one is identical to the other.
Characterizing indeterminate existence ismuch less straightforward, and it will be
easier to do so once we have a grip on indeterminate cardinality. So let’s account for
that notion ﬁrst. Consider the standard ﬁrst-order rendering of the claim that there
are exactly n things:
(5-20) 9x1 . . . 9xn((x1 6= x2 & . . . & xn-1 6= xn) & 8y(x1 = y_   _ xn = y)
is suggest that (5-19) has two readings:
(5-19a) r9x1 . . . 9xn((x1 6= x2 & . . . & xn-1 6= xn) & 8y(x1 = y_   _ xn = y))
(5-19b) 9x1 . . . 9xnr((x1 6= x2 & . . . & xn-1 6= xn) & 8y(x1 = y_   _ xn = y))
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e ﬁrst one claims that for some n, it is indeterminate whether there are at least n
things and at most n things, i.e. whether there are exactly n things. e second one
claims that for some n and some things, it is indeterminate whether there are at least
n such things and there are at most as many objects as there are such things. Only the
ﬁrst one is an in principle viable account of indeterminate cardinality. To see why the
second one does not, notice, on the one hand, that it may be determinate that there
are exactly n things even if for some things it is indeterminate whether there are at
least n of them. On the other hand, it may be indeterminate how many things there
are even if for any x1, . . . , xn it is determinate that either x1 = x2, or . . . or xn-1 = xn,
or there is a y such that y 6= x1 and . . . and y 6= xn. For instance, let n = 2, where
x1 = x2 = my nose. en such disjunction holds determinately, but it could still be
indeterminate whether there are exactly two things. us, indeterminate cardinality
must be characterized as follows:
(Indeterminate Cardinality)
Cardinality is indeterminate iﬀ for some n, it is indeterminate whether there
are exactly nmaterial things.
And this is what seems to be going on in the example discussed at the outset. e
thought was that if at some point when we are putting a table together it is indeter-
minate whether the top and base compose something, then it is also indeterminate
how many things there are. e latter claim is just the claim that for some number
(e.g. the number of things there were when the top and bottom were scattered in the
room), it is indeterminate whether there are exactly that many things.
138
Let’s ﬁnally move on to indeterminate existence. To see why this notion is
much harder to characterize than the previous ones, consider the simplest ﬁrst-order,
predicate-free way of cashing out the claim that something exists, according to which
something exists iﬀ something is identical to itself:
(5-21) Something exists iﬀ 9x x = x.
is suggests that (5-18) is to be construed in one of the following two ways:
(5-21a) r9x x = x.
(5-21b) 9xr x = x.
e ﬁrst claim says that it is indeterminate whether something is identical to itself.
(5-21a) fails for the same reason (5-17a) fails: it can never be true provided that it is
determinate that something exists. Someone might think, however, that this is not
an appropriate objection to (5-21a), since the objection assumes that something de-
terminately exists, when (5-21a) is supposed to characterize indeterminate existence.
But this is misguided: it being determinate whether something exists should be in
principle compatible with some things existing determinately. For instance, it being
indeterminate whether something exists at some point when we are putting a table
together should be in principle compatible with both the top and bottom existing de-
terminately. On the other hand, (5-21b) can never be true at all. For it is determinate
that everything is identical to itself, and so for anything whatsoever it is determinate
that it is self-identical.
Of course, there are other ﬁrst-order, predicate-free ways of cashing out the claim
that something exists. Consider the following, for instance:
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(5-22) Something exists iﬀ 9x9y x = y.
But this suggests that indeterminate existence ought to be characterized in one of the
ways given in (5-17a)-(5-17c). None of these claims, however, provides a viable ac-
count of indeterminate existence. As we saw above, the ﬁrst two are always false.
And while the third one provides a viable characterization of indeterminate iden-
tity, indeterminate existence is prima facie a diﬀerent notion altogether. Whatever
indeterminate existence may be, it seems that it need not be indeterminate whether
something exists simply because there is a pair of things such that it is indeterminate
whether one is identical to the other. Similarly, it seems that for some pair of things
it need not be indeterminate whether one is identical to the other simply because it is
indeterminate whether something exists.
Now, we need not limit ourselves to ﬁrst-order, predicate-free resources to express
that something exists. If, for instance, we spelled out the claim that something exists
either via a ﬁrst-order existence predicate (i.e. an existence predicate other than the
one given by the open formula 9y y = x) or by using second-order resources, per-
haps we could give viable characterization of indeterminate existence. e former,
Meinongian or noeist strategy is this:
(5-23) Something exists iﬀ 9x x exists.
So this suggests that indeterminate existence is to be accounted for in one of the fol-
lowing two ways:
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(5-23a) r9x x exists.
(5-23b) 9xr x exists.
e ﬁrst claim would not properly characterize indeterminate existence, for the same
reason that (5-21a) fails: prima facie, it may be indeterminate whether something
exists even if it is determinate that there is something. e second is viable. However,
it is objectionable on independent grounds—characterizing indeterminate existence
in such a way that it is entangled with a number of diﬃcult issues from the get-go
would be a methodologically poor way to proceed.
e second-order, Fregean strategy is this:
(5-24) Something exists iﬀ 9F9x x is F.
e idea is then that indeterminate existence is to be characterized in one of the fol-
lowing ways:
(5-24a) r9F9x x is F.
(5-24b) 9Fr9x x is F.
(5-24c) 9F9xrx is F.
But none of these claims would do to characterize indeterminate existence. With re-
spect to (5-24a), prima facie it may be indeterminate whether something exists even if
it is determinate that something has some property, e.g. even if it is determinate that
Socrates is human. at is, indeterminate existence should not to be incompatible
with it being determinate that Socrates is human. (5-24b) fails because prima facie it
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may be indeterminate whether something exists even if for every property, it is de-
terminate that something has that property. In other words, indeterminate existence
does not seem to be incompatible with every property being determinately instanti-
ated by something or other. And (5-24c) fails because prima facie it may fail to be
indeterminate whether something exists even if for some property and some thing it
is indeterminate whether that thing has that property, e.g. even if it is indeterminate
whether Socrates is tall.
e prospects of giving a precise and viable characterization of indeterminate ex-
istence are starting to look bleak. eMeinongian or noeist account via (5-23b) seems
to be themore promising one, even though it handicaps indeterminate existence from
the get-go by associating with a host of diﬃcult issues. Must we conclude that a non-
Meinongian or noeist notion of indeterminate existence is ineﬀable, or worse, inco-
herent?
No: thinking about indeterminate identity and indeterminate ﬁnite cardinality
aﬀords a limited yet viable and non-Meinongian characterization of indeterminate
existence, which will be good enough for our purposes. In general, it may be determi-
nate how many things there are even if either identity or existence are indeterminate.
For instance, it may be determinate that there are denumerably many objects even if
for a pair of those objects it is indeterminate whether one is identical to the other, as
well as even if it is indeterminate whether there is one more thing. But arguably this
could not happen if we consider only ﬁnite cardinalities: if it is determinate that there
are only ﬁnitely many things, and either identity or existence is indeterminate, then
it must be indeterminate how many things there are.5 For instance, suppose that it
5Notice that it is not incoherent to suppose that it is determinate that there only ﬁnitely many things,
but that it’s indeterminate how many. For instance, it being determinate that there are either exactly two,
etc. things is perfectly compatible with it being indeterminate whether there are exactly n things, for any
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is determinate that there is at least one thing, and that it is determinate that there are
at most two things. Suppose, too, that it is determinate that x and y exist. en if
it is indeterminate whether x = y, it must be indeterminate whether there is exactly
one thing, as well as indeterminate whether there are exactly two things. And if it
is determinate that x = y but indeterminate whether something exists, then it must
also be indeterminate whether there is exactly one thing, as well as indeterminate
whether there are exactly two things.6 Moreover, arguably the connection also holds
the other way around: if it is determinate that there are only ﬁnitely many things, but
it is indeterminate how many things there are, then either identity or existence must
be indeterminate. For instance, suppose again that it is determinate that there is at
least one thing, that it is determinate that there are at most two things, and that it is
determinate that x and y exist. en if it is indeterminate whether there are exactly
two things, then it must be indeterminate whether x = y, or whether something ex-
ists. So arguably indeterminate identity, indeterminate existence, and indeterminate
ﬁnite cardinality are connected to each other through the following principle:
(5-25) Necessarily, if it is determinate that there are only ﬁnitely many things, then
it is indeterminate how many things there are iﬀ either identity or existence is
indeterminate.
is principle suggests that we may give a viable, non-Meinongian account of in-
determinate existence for at least ﬁnite worlds in terms of two notions that we have
already characterized: indeterminate identity and indeterminate cardinality. e idea
ﬁnite n.
6Per the previous note, it should be clear that it is not incoherent to suppose that it is determinate there
are at leastm and at most n things, but that it is indeterminate whether there are exactly k things, for any
ﬁnitem,n,k withm 6= n andm 6 k 6 n.
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is that if there are ﬁnitely many things, then existence is indeterminate iﬀ cardinal-
ity is indeterminate but identity is not. at is, if there are only ﬁnitely many things,
then:
(Indeterminate Existence)
Existence is indeterminate iﬀ for some n, it is indeterminate whether there are
exactly n things, but for no pair of things, x and y, it is indeterminate whether
x = y.
is limited account is enough for our purposes because, as mentioned at the outset,
the restriction to worlds with only ﬁnitely manymaterial things does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the argument against indeterminacy in the mereological structure of the ma-
terial world based on (5-1)-(5-5): if either parthood or composition may be indeter-
minate among material things, then surely they may be so at worlds with only ﬁnitely
many material things. Of course, one might still wonder whether there is a perfectly
general non-Meinongian account of indeterminate existence. In light of the failed
eﬀorts above, it is reasonable to be skeptical about this.
We now have a better understanding of what it means to say that parthood, com-
position, identity, existence, and cardinality are indeterminate, as well as of a few im-
portant connections between some of these notions. Let us now see how they come
into play in (5-1)-(5-4) and the arguments in their favor.
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5.4 From Indeterminacy in Mereological Structure to Indeterminacy in
Logical Structure
Remember that the general idea behind (5-1)-(5-4) is that certain forms of indeter-
minacy in the mereological structure of the material world require certain forms of
indeterminacy in its logical structure. Given our accounts of the notions at issue in
these claims, we may now get clearer on what exactly they claim.
(5-1) is straightforward given our characterizations of indeterminate parthood
and indeterminate identity. It claims that if for some pair of material things it is in-
determinate whether one is part of the other, then for some pair of material things
it must be indeterminate whether one is identical to the other. In other words, (5-1)
holds that:
() Necessarily, if for some pair of material things, x and y, it is indeterminate
whether x is part of y, then for some pair of material things, x and y, it is inde-
terminate whether x = y.
(5-2)-(5-4) are less straightforward, given that we have distinguished between de dicto
and de re indeterminate composition. Which form of indeterminate composition is
at issue in each claim?
e idea behind (5-2) was that if it is indeterminate whether the rocks and R
compose Kilimanjaro, then it must also be indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro =
Kilimanjaro-, as well as indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro = Kilimanjaro+. So it
is clear that what is at stake here is de re indeterminate composition, not de dicto
145
indeterminate composition. So (5-2) claims that de re indeterminate composition
requires indeterminate identity. at is, (5-2) claims that:
() Necessarily, if for some material things, the xs, and some material thing, y, it is
indeterminate whether the xs compose y, then for some pair of material things,
x and y, it is indeterminate whether x = y.
Now, the idea behind (5-3) and (5-4) was that if at some point when we are bringing
the top and base together it is indeterminate whether they compose something, then
it must also be indeterminate whether something exists, as well as how many things
there are. It is clear thatwhat is at stake here is de dicto indeterminate composition, not
de re indeterminate composition. So (5-3) and (5-4) claim that de dicto indeterminate
composition requires indeterminate existence and indeterminate cardinality. Given
(5-25), this to say that (5-3) and (5-4) make the following claims, respectively:
() Necessarily, if there are only ﬁnitely many material things, and for some ma-
terial things it is indeterminate whether there is something that they compose,
but for no pair of material things, x and y, it is indeterminate whether x = y,
then for some ﬁnite n it is indeterminate whether there are exactly n material
things.
() Necessarily, if there are only ﬁnitelymanymaterial things and for somematerial
things it is indeterminate whether there is something that they compose, then
for some ﬁnite n it is indeterminate whether there are exactly n things.
With this clearer understanding of ()-(), we may also spell out the arguments
in their favor a bit better. Let’s ﬁrst revisit the argument for () and (). e argu-
ment is that these claims hold assuming only certain principles of classical logic and
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classical extensional mereology; in particular, excluded middle and uniqueness of
composition (Weatherson 2003, Williams and Barnes forthcoming). Let’s use to the
Kilimanjaro example; remember that R is ex-hypothesi the only rock such that it is in-
determinate whether it is part of Kilimanjaro, the rocks is the plurality of all and only
those rocks that are determinately part of Kilimanjaro, Kilimanjaro- is a thing deter-
minately composed of the rocks, andKilimanjaro+ is a thing determinately composed
of the R and the rocks. Now consider the following claims:
(5-26) Either R is part of Kilimanjaro, or it is not.
(5-27) If R is part of Kilimanjaro, then some things compose both Kilimanjaro and
Kilimanjaro+.
(5-28) If some things compose both Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro+, then Kilimanjaro
= Kilimanjaro+.
(5-29) If R is not part of Kilimanjaro, then some things compose both Kilimanjaro and
Kilimanjaro-.
(5-30) If some things compose both Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro-, then
Kilimanjaro=Kilimanjaro-.
(5-31) Either Kilimanjaro=Kilimanjaro+ or Kilimanjaro= K-.
e argument goes as follows: (5-26) holds by excludedmiddle, and it holds determi-
nately by (RN). Given the deﬁnition of composition and uniqueness of composition,
(5-31) follows from (5-26); so by (RN) (5-26) holds only if (5-31) does. But since
(5-26) holds determinately, by (K) so does (5-31). Now, since (5-31) is a disjunction,
it can hold determinately only if either at least one disjunct holds determinately or
it is indeterminate whether each disjunct holds. But if it is indeterminate whether
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R is part of Kilimanjaro, then by Leibniz’s Law neither disjunct holds determinately,
since it is neither indeterminate whether R is part of Kilimanjaro+ nor indetermi-
nate whether R is part of Kilimanjaro-. So if it is indeterminate whether R is part of
Kilimanjaro, it follows that it is indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro=Kilimanjaro+ as
well as whether Kilimanjaro= K-. Since R, the rocks, Kilimanjaro, Kilimanjaro-, and
Kilimanjaro+ are all arbitrary for any situation in which parthood is indeterminate,
() follows.7 () follows in exactly the same way, only replacing (5-26), (5-27), and
(5-29) with the following claims:
(5-26*) Either the rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro, or they do not.
(5-27*) If the rocks and R compose Kilimanjaro, then some things compose both
Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro+.
(5-29*) If the rocks and R do not compose Kilimanjaro, then some things compose
both Kilimanjaro and Kilimanjaro-.
Let’s now revisit the case for () and (). Here is one way to make the core
intuition behind the argument as strong as possible: suppose that it is determinate
that there are at most three material things. Suppose, too, that it is determinate that,
x and y, exists, that x 6= y, and that both x and y are mereologically simple material
things. It follows that it is determinate that there are at least twomaterial things. Now,
by (RN) and (K), it is clear that the following hold:
7Weatherson 2003 andWilliams andBarnes forthcoming do not give the argument in this level of detail;
for instance, they fail to explicitly appeal to (RN) and (K). Moreover, they never explain how from (5-31)
holding determinately we are to conclude that () follows; Leibniz’s Law is not explicitly appealed to, and
the claim that it is indeterminate whether R is part of Kilimanjaro is never even explicitly appealed to in
order to derive the relevant indeterminate identities. Nonetheless, I take it that the above reconstruction
of the argument is what they have in mind.
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(5-32) If it is determinate that nothing is composed of x and y, then it must be deter-
minate that there are exactly two material things.
(5-33) If it is determinate that something is composed of x and y , then it must be
determinate that there are exactly three material things.
So, the argument goes, it follows that:
(5-34) If it is indeterminatewhether something is composed of x andy , then itmust be
indeterminate whether there are exactly twomaterial things, as well as whether
there are exactly three things.
Generalizing the argument for any situation in which there are ﬁnitely many things
such that for some of them it is indeterminate whether they compose something, ()
and () follow.
As I mentioned at the outset, my aim here will be to show that the possibility of
external deviations undermines the alleged necessary connections between the rele-
vant forms of indeterminacy in the mereological structure of the material world and
the relevant forms of indeterminacy in its logical structure. Now the target is clear: I
will argue that the possibility of external deviations allows for counterexample worlds
for each of ()-(), and exposes the ﬂaws in the arguments for them. Let us now see
how this works.
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5.5 Indeterminacy in Mereological Structure without Indeterminacy in
Logical Structure
Notice that since indeterminate parthood requires de re indeterminate composition,
() follows from (). And clearly () follows from (). So in order to show that all
of these claims are false, it will suﬃcient to give two counterexample worlds: one in
which () is false, and one in which () is false. Now, since indeterminate identity
requires indeterminate cardinality if there are only ﬁnitely many things, in order to
get a world where () is false it will be suﬃcient to get a world with a determinate ﬁnite
cardinality of material things where nonetheless for some pair of material things it is
indeterminate whether one is part of the other. And in order to get a world where
() is false, it will be suﬃcient to get a world with a determinate ﬁnite cardinality of
material things, where for no pair of material things it is indeterminate whether one
is identical to the other, but where nonetheless for some material things it is indeter-
minate whether there is something composed of them. Let’s see how the possibility
of external disparities allows us to construct such two worlds.
5.5.1 Against () and ()
LetW be a world with material objects a, b, and c. Let’s build some spatiotemporal
structure into this world—assume that (i)-(iv) hold determinately atW:
(i) Neither a’s exact location nor b’s exact location is a subregion of the other.
(ii) a and b expand into c.
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(iii) Something is located somewhere only if it is a contraction of c.
(iv) Something is a contraction of c only if it is identical to either a, b, or c.
Now let’s assume that the following holds about the mereological structure ofW:
() It is indeterminate whether a is part of c and, as well as whether b is part of c.
From (i)-(iv) and () it follows thatW is a world with a determinate ﬁnite cardinality
of material things, but where parthood is indeterminate among somematerial things.
Let’s see why.
at parthood is indeterminate for some material things at W follows directly
from (): since it is indeterminate whether a is part of c and indeterminate whether
b is part of c, there are pairs of material things such that it is indeterminate whether
one is part of the other. Let’s now see whyW has a determinate ﬁnite cardinality of
material things. First, from (i), (ii), and Leibniz’s Law it follows that a, b, and c are
pairwise non-identical: from (i) it follows that a 6= b, and from (ii) that a 6= c 6=
b. Now since we are assuming that (i) and (ii) hold determinately atW, and since
(RN) requires that Leibniz’s Law also hold determinately at W, by (RN) and (K) it
follows that a, b, and c are determinately pairwise non-identical. So it follows that it
is determinate that there are at least three material things inW. On the other hand,
(iii) and (iv) guarantee that it is determinate that a, b, and c are the only material
inhabitants of W. For together with the assumption that material objects must be
located somewhere, (iii) requires that every material object inW be exactly located
at a subregion of c’s exact location, and (iv) requires that any such thing be a, b, or c.
So since (iii) and (iv) hold determinately atW, it is determinate that a, b, and c are
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the only material things inW. It follows, then, that it is determinate that there are
exactly three material things atW.
W is thus a counterexample to both () and (). It is world with indeterminate
parthood and indeterminate de re composition, but with no indeterminate identity.
Here is the general thought behindW. e location relations between material
things and regions of spacetime at this world are determinate, and so are the mereo-
logical relations among regions of spacetime. So the relative location relations among
material things at this world are also determinate; this is what assuming that (i)-(iv)
hold determinately atW amounts to. And from the determinacy of such relations it
follows that the identity relations among material things are determinate as well. But
the thought is that since the part-whole and relative location relations among mate-
rial things need not align per the possibility of external deviations, it is possible that
the former relations be determinate but that the latter be indeterminate.
A few points aboutW are worth noting. First, notice thatW is not only a world
where parthood is indeterminate and composition is de re indeterminate, but also
a world where cardinality and identity are not indeterminate: per (5-25) it is also a
world where existence is not indeterminate. So it is also a world with those two forms
of indeterminacy in mereological indeterminacy, but with no form of indeterminacy
inmereological structure: the overall logical structure ofW is perfectly determinate.
Second, the following is the speciﬁc version of Contractions)Parts and
Expansions)Fusions that are violated atW:
(MContractions)MParts)
It is determinate that x is a contraction of y only if it is determinate that x is part
of y.
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(MExpansions)MFusions)
It is determinate that y is an expansion of the xs only if it is determinate that y
is a fusion of the xs.
By (RN) and (K) it is clear that both Contractions)Parts and Expansions)Fusions
also fail to hold determinately at W. One might worry, however, that R)P, Fun-
damentality, Distinctness and claims like (P1)-(P3) do not deliver the possibility
of cases violating any of these claims. All they deliver are cases where a material
thing is a contraction but not a part of another, and where some material things ex-
pand but do not compose others. But such cases have nothing to do with determi-
nacy and indeterminacy. More generally, one might wonder whether violations of
MContractions)MParts andMExpansions)MFusions are metaphysically possible, and
not merely logically consistent. e consistency of such cases is clear, given the con-
sistency of (i)-(iv) and (). But their metaphysical possibility is a diﬀerent matter.
Two things about this. On the one hand, remember from the arguments for () and
() that these claims allegedly hold as amatter of logic given certain principles of clas-
sical logic and classical extensional mereology: the thought was that given excluded
middle and uniqueness of composition, indeterminate parthood and de re indetermi-
nate composition logically require indeterminate identity. So a consistent description
of a world likeW is suﬃcient to undermine these claims as they have been defended
in the literature, for nothing prevents that excluded middle or uniqueness of compo-
sition hold atW.
On the other hand, the worry about the metaphysical possibility of these cases
cannot be that they involve indeterminate parthood and de re indeterminacy com-
position, for the possibility of these forms of mereological indeterminacy is precisely
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what is at stake. So one must allow their possibility for the sake of argument, and
object to them on the grounds that their possibility requires something unacceptable.
However, once one accepts the metaphysical possibility of these forms of mereologi-
cal indeterminacy for the sake of argument, it is easy to get the metaphysical possibil-
ity of cases violatingMContractions)MParts andMExpansions)MFusions from R)P,
Fundamentality, Distinctness and appropriate assumptions about the contents of T.
is simply requires enriching L with the determinacy-that operator and making the
following assumption in place of (P2):
(P4) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, such that it is indeterminate
whether one is part of the other, and a pair of regions, such that it is determinate
that one is a subregion of the other.
From R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, (P1) and (P4) it follows that there is a
metaphysically possible world where a sentence of L claiming the following is true:
for a pair of material things, x and y, it is determinate that x is exactly located at a
subregion of the region at which y is exactly located, but indeterminate whether x is
part of y.
Now, one may have another worry about the metaphysical possibility ofW: per-
haps it makes unjustiﬁed assumptions about what mereological principles are neces-
sarily true. In particular, notice thatW is a world where unrestricted composition
fails; soW is not metaphysically possible if unrestricted composition is necessarily
true. Prima facie, this sort of worry aboutW would be dialectically inappropriate,
since, as I brieﬂy mentioned earlier, the debate over indeterminacy in mereology is
entangled with the debate over unrestricted composition. But one might point out
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that the worry is dialectically inappropriate only in debates concerning de dicto inde-
terminate composition, whereasW concerns only indeterminate parthood and de re
indeterminate composition. So the challenge for giving a counterexample world for
() and ()would be to give aworldwhere parthood is indeterminate and composition
is indeterminate, where there is no indeterminate identity, and where composition is
unrestricted.
e challenge, however, can be met: W may easily be modiﬁed so that unre-
stricted composition holds without aﬀecting our main result. LetW be a world like
W, which diﬀers from it in only two respects. First, a+b, a+c, b+c, and a+b+c
determinately exist inW along with a, b, and c (where x1 +   + xn =df the fusion
of x1, . . . , xn). Second, (iv) holds atW instead of (iv):
(iv) Something is a contraction of c only if it is identical to either a, b, c, a + b,
a+ c, b+ c, or a+ b+ c.
Like W, W is a world with a determinate ﬁnite cardinality of material things
where composition is indeterminate, but where parthood is nonetheless indetermi-
nate among somematerial things; so it is a counterexample to both ()and ()meeting
the challenge. at parthood is indeterminate follows again from () alone. To see
thatW has a determinate ﬁnite cardinality of material things, notice that from Leib-
niz’s Law, (i), (ii), and the fact that a + b, a + c, b + c, and a + b + c exist inW,
it follows there are at least seven material objects inW. So since Leibniz’s Law, (i),
(ii) and the fact that a + b, a + c, b + c, and a + b + c exist in W, by (RN) and
(K) it follows that it is determinate that there are at least seven material things inW.
On the other hand, (iii) and (iv) guarantee that there are no material things other
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than the seven we already have; so by (RN) and (K) it follows that it is determinate
that there are exactly seven material things at W. And it is clear that unrestricted
composition holds atW: any material things compose something.
us, the possibility of external deviations allows for parthood to be indetermi-
nate, for composition to be de re indeterminate, but for identity, existence, and cardi-
nality not to be indeterminate. Where, then, do the arguments for () and () on the
basis of (5-26)-(5-31) go wrong? e problem is not that they are not generalizable
to all cases where parthood may be indeterminate—notice that atW andW there
is not an object playing the role that Kilimanjaro- plays in those arguments, i.e. an
object that is composed of some things each of which is determinately part of a thing
that has indeterminate parts. But notice that this is not at the cost of denying that un-
restricted composition or some other mereological principle that in the Kilimanjaro
example entails the existence of Kilimanjaro-. For asW makes clear, there may fail
to be something playing the role of Kilimanjaro- even if such principles hold.
5.5.2 Against () and ()
Let’s move on to () and (). Consider a world,W, which is exactly likeW except
that the following assumption holds instead of ():
() It is indeterminate whether there is something that a and b compose.
Now remember from W that from (i)-(iv) holding determinately it follows that it
is determinate that there are exactly three material things, and so that identity is not
indeterminate. From () it follows that composition is de dicto indeterminate. So are
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(i)-(iv) and () suﬃcient guarantee thatW is a world with a determinate ﬁnite cardi-
nality of material things where identity is not indeterminate, but where composition
is de dicto indeterminate, i.e. a counterexample world to () and ()?
No; for it is not clear that () is compatible with a, b, and c being the onlymaterial
things inW. at is, it is not clear that () is in fact consistent with (iii)-(iv). e
worry is that () makes it indeterminate whether there is a fourth material object in
W, i.e. a + b: it seems that if there were a thing composed of a and b, then there
would be an additional material object inW, and hence there would be at least four
material objects in W. So one of (iv)-(vi) would have to fail. So it seems that ()
makes it indeterminate whether there are exactly three or exactly four material things
inW.
However, we may dispel this worry and make it clear that () is compatible with
(iii)-(iv) by building a bit more spatiotemporal structure intoW. Let’s assume that
Fusions)Expansions and Uniqueness of Location hold atW, i.e. that it is determi-
nate that somematerial things compose an object only if they expand into it, and that
it is determinate that no two material things share their exact location. Let’s look at
what happens if these principles hold in W. If Fusions)Expansions holds in W,
then a and b have a fusion, a + b, only if a + b is a expansion of a and b. And so if
Uniqueness of Location also holds inW, then a and b have a fusion, a+ b, and ex-
pand into it only ifa+b is identical to such an object. But then the worry about an ad-
ditional material object inW disappears provided both these principles hold inW:
sincea and b expand into c, if there were such thing asa+b, it would be identical to c,
and hence it would not be a fourth object inW. Given, then, Fusions)Expansions
andUniqueness of Location, it is clear that () is compatible with a, b, and c being the
157
only inhabitants ofW, even if it is indeterminate whether there is something com-
posed of them. at is, given these principles, the apparent tension between () and
(iii)-(iv) evaporates: despite (), (iii) and (iv) together Fusions)Expansions and
Uniqueness of Location eﬀectively set a determinate upper bound on the cardinality
of material things inW.
Here is the key idea more generally. Suppose that it is determinate that there are
exactly n Fs, that it is determinate that there is at most one G, but that it is indeter-
minate whether there is a G. is seems to be inconsistent with it being determinate
that there are exactly n things that are either F or G: it being indeterminate whether
there is a G seems to make it indeterminate whether there are exactly n or exactly
n+1 things that are either F orG. But the apparent conﬂict disappears provided that
it is determinate that every G is identical to one of the Fs: adding a G would make
no diﬀerence in how many things there are that are either F or G. So the claims that
there are exactly n Fs and that it is determinate that every G is identical to one of the
Fs set a determinate upper bound on how many objects there are that are either F or
G.
us, if both Fusions)Expansions and Uniqueness of Location hold atW, ()
is perfectly compatible with (i)-(iv). So it follows that there are exactly three material
things atW, that identity is not indeterminate atW, but that composition is de dicto
indeterminate atW. So we have a counterexample world to () and ().
One might have another sort of worry about W. Despite our discussion about
indeterminate existence and (5-25), one may remain unconvinced that there is no
indeterminate existence inW. And the worry is reasonable: aer all, doesn’t () just
claim that it is indeterminate whether there is something composed of a and b?
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What is giving the appearance that existence is indeterminate at W is that
the indeterminacy-whether operator directly operates on an existentially quantiﬁed
claim. But this does not require that existence be indeterminate. Suppose, for in-
stance, that everyone but one person in the world has a head full of hair; the remain-
ing person has lost quite a bit but is not yet completely hairless. en it is determinate
that there is at most one bald person, and also that it is indeterminate whether there
is one. e latter claim is an indeterminate existence claim: r9x x is bald. But it
does not require that existence be indeterminate. It only requires that it be indeter-
minate whether there exists a thing with certain features, i.e. being bald. And the
indeterminacy may be blamed on the part of the claim concerning the relevant fea-
tures—baldness in this example—not on the part that concerns there existing a thing
satisfying such that so-and-so.
is is exactly what is going on inW: it is indeterminate whether there is some-
thing composed of a and b. But that does not require that existence be indeterminate:
we may blame the indeterminacy on the part of the claim concerning composition,
not on the one concerning existence. So from it being indeterminate whether there
is something composed of a and b it does not follow that it is indeterminate whether
there is something other than a, b, and c. All that follows from this is that it is inde-
terminate whether there is a thing with such-and-such features, i.e. being composed
of a and b. But given Fusions)Expansions and Uniqueness of Location, it is clear
that the existence of a thing with the relevant features would not require that there be
something other than a, b, and c. So despite appearances to the contrary, there is no
indeterminate existence inW, even if we were to bracket (5-25).
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e idea behindW is thus similar to the idea behindW: location relations be-
tween material things and regions of spacetime are determinate, and that so are the
mereological relations among regions of spacetime. So the relative location relations
among material things at this world are also determinate. And from the determinacy
of such relations it follows that the identity relations among material things deter-
minate as well. But in this case principles determinately governing the behavior of
relations of spatiotemporal location put a cap on the number of material things there
are. is allows for relations of part-whole and relative location among material to
align and misalign in appropriate ways for it to be possible that the latter relations be
determinate but that the former be indeterminate.
Onemay have the same sorts of worries aboutW that we had aboutW, concern-
ing metaphysical possibility vs. mere logical consistency. In this case, the principles
violated are not onlyMContractions)MParts andMExpansions)MFusions, but also the
following one:
(MExpansions)MFusions*)
It is determinate that the xs have an expansion only if it is determinate that the
xs have a fusion.
But the worries may be answered just as before. Since one must allow for the sake of
argument that it is possible that composition be de dicto indeterminate, we need just
add a determinacy operator to L and replace (P2) with the assumption below in order
to get the metaphysical possibility of violations ofMExpansions)MFusions*:
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(P5) It is possible that there be a pair of material things, such that it is indeterminate
whether they compose something, and a pair of regions, such that it is determi-
nate that they compose a region.
FromR)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, (P1) and (P5), the metaphysical possibility
of the cases of external deviations at issue inW is metaphysically possible.
In the speciﬁc case ofW, however, someonemayworry that it is odd to think that
MContractions)MParts,MExpansions)MFusions, andMExpansions)MFusions* are all
violated, but that Fusions)Expansions and Uniqueness of Location hold determi-
nately. Moreover, one may worry that it is arbitrary to hand-pick the latter two claims
as principles governing relations of relative spatiotemporal location inW, for they
are just the appropriate ones to get the results we want. However, there is nothing odd
or unprincipled about thinking that there are worlds whereMContractions)MParts,
MExpansions)MFusions, and MExpansions)MFusions* are all violated, but where
Fusions)Expansions and Uniqueness of Location hold determinately. For R)P,
Fundamentality, Distinctness, and the relevant assumptions entail that there are such
worlds. Surely these claims entail that there are worlds at which Fusions)Expansions
is violated, but also worlds where it holds—it is certainly not necessary that there be
fusions that are not expansions! And with respect to Uniqueness of Location, re-
member that R)P, Fundamentality, Distinctness, and the relevant assumptions are
neutral on whatever necessary truths theremay be concerning relations of spatiotem-
poral location. So they are perfectly compatible with Uniqueness of Location being
necessarily true—they do not deliver a world where it fails. On the other hand, even
if Uniqueness of Location is not necessary, it is certainly not impossible: surely it is
not necessary that no two things fail to share their exact location. So there is nothing
strange or ad hoc about the alignments and misalignments there are atW.
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us, the possibility of external deviations allows for composition to be de dicto
indeterminate, but for identity, existence, and cardinality not to be indeterminate.
Where, then, do the arguments for () and () on the basis of claims such as (5-32)-
(5-34) go wrong? In the case ofW, the relevant claims are as follows:
(5-35) If it is determinate that nothing is composed of a and b, then it must be deter-
minate that there are exactly three material things.
(5-36) If it is indeterminate whether something is composed of a and b , then it must
be indeterminate whether there are exactly three material things.
(5-35) clearly follows from (RN) and (K) given (i)-(iv). And the thought was that we
maymove from (5-35) to (5-36). eproblem is that thismove seems to be valid but is
in fact fallacious. AsW makes clear, the move may be blocked simply by assuming
that it is determinate that there is something that a and b compose only if such an
object is one of the things that already exist. Moreover, notice that it is hard to think
of a plausible set of principles governing the behavior of the determinate-that and
indeterminate-whether operators that would allow us to make this jump; so that it
cannot even be argued thatW conﬂicts with some plausible principle governing the
logic of determinacy and indeterminacy. For instance, it is clear that (RN) and (K)
do not license the move. (RN) and (5-37) do license it, and so does (5-38) on its own:
(5-37) M( !  )! (M !M).
(5-38) (M !M )! (M !M).
But these two principles are clearly false. Surely it is determinate that Socrates is both
human andnot human only if Socrates is human, and so by (K) surely it is determinate
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that Socrates is both human and not human only if it is determinate that Socrates
is human. Moreover, it is determinate that Socrates is human. But from this you
would not want to conclude that it is determinate that Socrates is both human and
not human.
It follows, then, that there are counterexamples to all ()-() given the possibil-
ity of external deviations. Provided that the mereological and spatiotemporal struc-
tures of the material world may come apart, its mereological structure and its logical
structure may also come apart, in such way that there may be indeterminacy in its
mereological structure but not in its spatiotemporal or logical ones.
Let me ﬁnish this section by taking stock on an important point concerning the
argument against mereological indeterminacy based on (5-1)-(5-5). Someone might
grant that I have undermined ()-(), and so that I have undermined that argument,
but still worry about the dialectical payoﬀ of this result. For one might think that we
may give an argument in the same spirit along the following lines: there are worlds
such that if parthood and composition amongmaterial things are indeterminate, then
existence, identity, or cardinality among material things are also indeterminate. But
at no world existence, identity, or cardinality among material things may be inde-
terminate; so at no world parthood and composition among material things may be
indeterminate. e idea is then that while at strange worlds like W, W, and W
indeterminacy in mereological structure does not lead to indeterminacy in logical
structure, there are worlds at which it does, and that this is enough to rule out the
possibility of mereological indeterminacy.
e same worry may be raised in another context. As I have mentioned a few
times in this and last chapter, the claim that composition may not be de dicto indeter-
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minate is a key premise of the argument fromvagueness for unrestricted composition.
Undermining () renders this premise unsupported. So if I have undermined ()
then I have given reasons for moderates about composition not to worry about the
argument from vagueness, for it will no longer be worrisome if their views require
that composition be de dicto indeterminate. However, someone might point out that
while I may have shown that some moderate theorist about composition need not
worry if her view requires de dicto indeterminate composition, I have not shown that
no such theorist need worry about it; in particular, I have not shown that any of the
usual moderate theorists (e.g. Van Inwagen 1990) need not be concerned. For it may
still be that some (of the usual) moderate views require that composition be de dicto
indeterminate in a way that leads to identity, existence, or cardinality being indeter-
minate.
us, the point is that while in some cases indeterminacy in the mereological
structure of the material world may not lead to indeterminacy in its logical struc-
ture, in some cases it might; and that this is suﬃcient to reject that there may be
indeterminacy in its mereological structure altogether. Two things about this. First,
W,W, andW at least make it clear that mereological indeterminacy does not on
its own require indeterminacy in logical structure: whether or not there is indetermi-
nacy in logical structure atworldswhere there ismereological indeterminacy depends
on other features of those worlds, and on the interaction between those features and
mereological indeterminacy. So it would be wrong to conclude that mereological in-
determinacy is to be blamed for there being indeterminacy in logical structure: one
may reject the other features or the problematic ways in which they interact with
mereology. Another way to put the point: it need not be a reductio on mereological
indeterminacy that there is indeterminacy in logical structure at some worlds where
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there is indeterminacy inmereological structure, contrary towhat theworry suggests.
Second, notice that for all I have said it may be that all worlds where there is indeter-
minacy in parthood and composition are worlds that share the structural features that
prevent mereological indeterminacy from requiring indeterminacy in identity, exis-
tence, or composition atW,W, andW. Remember that at these worlds relations
of relative spatiotemporal location are determinate, and make matters of identity, ex-
istence, and cardinality among material things determinate. And there is a discon-
nect between mereological relations and relations of relative spatiotemporal location
which allows for there to be indeterminacy in the former without indeterminacy in
the latter, and hence without indeterminacy in identity, existence, and cardinality.
So as long as at every world where there is mereological indeterminacy there are re-
lations that play the role that relations of relative spatiotemporal location play inW,
W, and W, at no world where there is mereological indeterminacy will there be
indeterminacy in mereological structure. Of course, I have not defended this claim
about every world where there is mereological indeterminacy. e point is only that
the worry at issue may in principle be addressed with the kind of resources I have
developed here.
5.6 Neutrality about the Nature and Source of Indeterminacy
I want to conclude this chapter by brieﬂy noting that nothing in what I have argued
here requires a particular view on the nature or source of indeterminacy—all the no-
tions, principles, counterexamples worlds, etc. are in principle compatible with inde-
terminacy being an ontic, semantic, or epistemic phenomenon. As Imentioned at the
outset, this is important: it allows us to undermine the sort of argument againstmere-
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ological indeterminacy based on (5-1)-(5-5) even if one thinks that all indeterminacy
is semantic indeterminacy, and even if one thinks that no piece of logical vocabulary
has precisiﬁcations.
It is easy to see that all the above is compatible with thinking that the indetermi-
nacy at issue is ontic indeterminacy. is wouldmean, for instance, that for parthood
and composition to be indeterminate is just for there to be no determinate matter of
fact as to whether somematerial things stand in certain mereological relations to one
another. Similarly, it would mean that ()-() claim that if there is no determinate
matter of fact as to whether some material things stand in certain mereological rela-
tions to one another, then there must be no determinate matter of fact as to which
material things are identical to which, as to what material things there are, and as to
howmany there are. My overall suggestion that indeterminacy inmereological struc-
ture does not require indeterminacy in logical structure would thus be construed as
follows: there being no determinate matter of fact as to whether somematerial things
stand in certain mereological relations to one another is compatible with there being
determinate matters of fact about which material things are identical to which, about
what material things there are, and about how many there are. And the core of my
argument would be cashed out as follows: there failing to be determinate matters of
fact about mereological relations among material things does not require that there
be no determinate matters of fact about the relative spatiotemporal location among
them. Because of these discrepancies, determinate matters of fact about the relative
spatiotemporal location of material things may require determinacy inmatters of fact
about their identity, existence, and cardinality, even if matters of fact about mereo-
logical relations among them are indeterminate.
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Similarly, all the above is compatible with thinking that the indeterminacy at stake
is semantic in nature. is would mean that e.g. for parthood and composition to be
indeterminate is just for certain sentences with mereological vocabulary to lack a de-
terminate truth value, due to such vocabulary having multiple precisiﬁcations. Sim-
ilarly, it would mean that ()-() claim that if certain sentences with mereological
vocabulary lack a determinate truth value, then so must certain sentences with only
logical vocabulary. My overall suggestion that indeterminacy in mereological struc-
ture does not require indeterminacy in logical structure would thus be that certain
sentences with mereological vocabulary lacking a determinate truth value does not
require that sentences with only logical vocabulary lack a determinate truth value.
And the core of my argument would be construed as follows: certain sentences with
mereological vocabulary lacking a determinate truth value do not require that sen-
tences with location vocabulary also lack a determinate truth value. Because of this,
sentences with location vocabulary having a determinate truth valuemay require that
sentences with only logical vocabulary have a determinate truth value, even if sen-
tences with mereological vocabulary lack a determinate truth value.
Finally, all the above is also compatible with thinking the indeterminacy at issue
is epistemic indeterminacy. is would mean that e.g. for parthood and composition
to be indeterminate is just for us to be ignorant as to whether certain mereological re-
lations hold among material things. Similarly, it would mean that ()-() claim that
if we are ignorant as to whether some material things stand in certain mereological
relations to one another, then we must also be ignorant as to which material things
are identical to which, as to what material things there are, and as to how many there
are. My overall suggestion that indeterminacy in mereological structure does not re-
quire indeterminacy in logical structure would thus be cashed out as follows: being
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ignorant as to whether some material things stand in certain mereological relations
to one another does not require that we be ignorant as to which material things are
identical to which, as to whichmaterial things there are, and as to howmany there are.
And the core of my argument would be cashed out as follows: being ignorant about
mereological relations among material things does not require being ignorant about
the relative spatiotemporal location relations among them. Because of these discrep-
ancies, knowing about the relative spatiotemporal location relations among material
things may require that we know about their identity, existence, and cardinality, even
if we are ignorant about mereological relations among them.
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